China Disadvantage Negative



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CDL Core Files 2014/2015 Index

China Disadvantage NEG



China Disadvantage Negative



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Answers follow in the same file.


1NC China Disadvantage [1/3]

A. Uniqueness – China’s the world leader in ocean exploration in the status quo



Fan 7-3

[Wei. “China takes lead in underwater exploration” 7/3/14 http://www.ecns.cn/2014/07-03/122159.shtml]

The Jiaolong submersible won the 2014 Hans Hass Fifty Fathoms Award in Sanya, Hainan province, in June. The award is jointly given by the Historical Diving Society Hans Hass Award Committee and Swiss watchmaker Blancpain.¶ The submersible, independently developed in China, reached as deep as 7,062 meters in the Mariana Trench in the western Pacific Ocean in 2012, setting a new record among Chinese divers.¶ The committee initiated a double prize for Cui Weicheng, deputy chief designer of Jiaolong, for his individual achievements, and the State Oceanic Administration for its support in building the submersible.¶ The award has been honoring individuals for excellence in underwater science and technology since 2003. Previous recipients include renowned film director and diving pioneer James Cameron and Stan Waterman, pioneering underwater film producer and photographer. This is the first time a Chinese project has won the award.¶ "Today, it is China that is leading the world in its commitment to manned deep ocean exploration," says Krov Menuhin, chairman of the award committee and advisory board member at the Historical Diving Society, an international non-profit organization that studies man's underwater activities and promotes public awareness of the ocean.


1NC China Disadvantage [2/3]

B. [INSERT A PLAN-SPECIFIC LINK]

C. Internal Link – Competition over oceanic influence hurts Chinese credibility and undermines overall relations



Yoshihara and Holmes 2009

[Tosh and James. Chair of China Maritime Studies and Professor of Strategy, both at the Naval War College. “Chinese Soft Power in the Indian Ocean” 2009. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1450481]

Beijing‘s use of Zheng He as a diplomatic tool is also motivated in part by the relative paucity of the country‘s “hard” power. A striking example followed the December 2004 tsunami, when countries such as the United States, Japan, Singapore, Australia, and New Zealand dispatched maritime assets to Indonesia to help in recovery operations off Aceh and the Sumatran coast. Beijing demurred from deploying naval forces to aid relief efforts—underscoring its inability to use military power to influence regional and world events. The goodwill generated by the U.S. Navy‘s exemplary tsunami relief effort was a particularly jarring episode for Beijing. In their surprisingly unsparing appraisals, Chinese analysts vividly portray Beijing's sense of helplessness when it witnessed—on the sidelines—America's impressive conversion of its hard- edged power projection capabilities into a humanitarian vehicle. As Qu Zhaowei laments: Although China had long wished to give full play to its own soft power in the region, because it did not possess adequate capabilities, it could only watch the United States reverse its negative image in the Asia-Pacific region since the Iraq War. According to Qu, Chinese fears that America's "overwhelming soft power influence" might negate China's engagement strategy in Asia spurred the PLAN to build large hospital ships as a strategic counter move. The tsunami experience, then, painfully demonstrated a harsh reality: hard power must play an effective role in underwriting soft power. As Bruce Elleman notes: When viewed in terms of the Confucian concept of ren, or “humaneness,” Washington was able to outshine Beijing by far. China is clearly aspiring to become a regional superpower by using a whole range of government powers, including its military forces, but when put to the test its naval forces failed. Beijing‘s lingering military weakness, inexperience in overseas environments, and deployment of forces to assure internal security in provinces such as Tibet and Xinjiang and regain control of Taiwan have prevented the PLA from building up forces in regions of real and growing interest. These strategic impediments and pressing priorities explain the inaction in 2004. Without hard power in these regions, Beijing has turned to Zheng He as a stopgap, deftly proliferating an admirable idea of China through its sophisticated historical narrative. This allows Chinese diplomats some say in Southeast and South Asian affairs while Beijing remains weak at sea. It also helps Beijing mold diplomatic conditions in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean basin in anticipation of a future buildup of naval power in regional waters, should Chinese leaders decide their interests warrant such a buildup. And its invented soft power may give rise to an innocuous impression of China, helping make the increasing Chinese political and military presence in coastal Asia palatable if not welcome to regional governments. History, then, influences China‘s outlook on maritime affairs, imbuing Beijing‘s oceanic aspirations with a sense of destiny. China‘s leadership routinely connects its grand strategy to past endeavors while attempting to conciliate its maritime neighbors. In short, China‘s leaders are sculpting an impressive program of public diplomacy, using the deeds of a venerated historical figure, backed by tangible signs of good faith, to rally domestic and international support behind today‘s oceanic ventures.


1NC China Disadvantage [3/3]

D. The Impact – A healthy US-China relationship that values both sides equally is vital to stave off a host of global threats



Gross 2013

[David. Senior Associate at the Pacific Forum of CSIS. “Seizing the Opportunity to Improve US-China Relations” 3/19/13 The Huffington Post, available via Lexis-Nexis]

Better relations with China would support wide-reaching political reform and liberalization. They would undercut the repressive internal forces that legitimize one-party authoritarian rule as a means of protecting the country against foreign military threats, particularly from the United States. In the field of national security, through an ongoing process of mutual threat reduction, the United States can ensure that China is a future partner and not a danger to the interests of America and its allies. The greatest benefit is that the U.S. would avoid a military conflict for the foreseeable future with a country it now considers a major potential adversary. Other critical security benefits to the United States and its allies include: • Significantly reducing China's current and potential military threat to Taiwan, thus securing Taiwan's democracy; • Utilizing China's considerable influence with North Korea to curb Pyongyang's nuclear weapon and missile development programs; • Increasing security cooperation with China on both regional and global issues, allowing the United States to leverage Chinese capabilities for meeting common transnational threats such as climate change, energy insecurity, pandemic disease, cyberterrorism and nuclear proliferation; • Curtailing cyberattacks by the Chinese military on U.S.-based targets as well as enforcing stringent measures against private individuals and groups in China that engage in cyber-hacking; • Having China submit its maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas to an independent international judicial body to prevent festering conflicts over uninhabited islands and energy resources from escalating to armed conflict; and • Reducing the scope, scale, and tempo of China's military modernization programs by discrediting the rationale for conducting a focused anti-U.S. buildup, especially since the country has so many other pressing material needs. In his second term, President Obama should seize the opportunity created by the emergence of China's new leadership to stabilize U.S.-China relations -- by pursuing a diplomatic strategy that minimizes conflict, achieves greater mutually beneficial Sino-American cooperation, and significantly expands trade and investment between the two countries. This approach would enable the United States to maintain an effective military presence in the Asia Pacific in coming years, despite defense budget cuts, while also rebalancing economic and political resources to the region to ensure stability and mutual prosperity.


Plan-Specific 1NC Link: Aquaculture [1/1]

( ) US aquaculture expansion trades off with China’s market share



Bondie and Wolf 2013

[Marcella and Anna – U of I – Chicago. “Planning for Sustainable Aquaculture” 2013 http://www.uic.edu/cuppa/upp/research/research/Student%20Pages/pdf/bondie_wolf_project.pdf]


As many studies assert, the United States is the largest Western importer of tilapia, China is the largest global exporter of tilapia, and both will continue to be so into the future. This suggests that contemporary food systems are primarily influenced by global market forces and large food distributors, ¶ such as Wal-Mart and Costco. These distributors, though in a position to incentivize aquaculture ¶ producers to practice sustainable methods, merely react to current unsustainable practices, rather than ¶ taking a proactive approach to avoiding unsustainable practices at the start. ¶ To counter this trend of importing unsustainably farmed fish, countries that have the economic means ¶ and the need to increase food security should encourage legislation that enables municipalities ¶ and regional areas to participate in the creation and support of local aquaculture systems. The growth of small, local aquaculture operations will allow consumers a healthy supply of fish protein and may ¶ reduce the global market share of Chinese aquaculture. This is likely to result in reducing the often-¶ unavoidable unsustainable practices that stem from large-scale production and export of fish product.

Plan-Specific 1NC Link: Offshore Wind [1/1]

( ) China’s a global leader in wind energy – the plan undermines their market

Zoninsein 2010

[M. Staff Writer for the New York Times. “Chinese Offshore Development Blows Past US” The New York Times, 9/7/10 available via Lexis-Nexis]


As proposed American offshore wind-farm projects creep forward -- slowed by state legislative debates, due diligence and environmental impact assessments -- China has leapt past the United States, installing its first offshore wind farm. Several other farms also are already under construction, and even the Chinese government's ambitious targets seem low compared to industry dreaming. "What the U.S. doesn't realize," said Peggy Liu, founder and chairwoman of the Joint U.S.-China Collaboration on Clean Energy, is that China "is going from manufacturing hub to the clean-tech laboratory of the world." The first major offshore wind farm outside of Europe is located in the East China Sea, near Shanghai. The 102-megawatt Donghai Bridge Wind Farm began transmitting power to the national grid in July and signals a new direction for Chinese renewable energy projects and the initiation of a national policy focusing not just on wind power, but increasingly on the offshore variety. Moreover, "it serves as a showcase of what the Chinese can do offshore ... and it's quite significant," said Rachel Enslow, a wind consultant and co-author of the report "China, Norway and Offshore Wind Development," published in March by Azure International for the World Wildlife Fund Norway.

Plan-Specific 1NC Link: Oil Drilling [1/1]

( ) Increased access to domestic oil creates energy conflicts between the US and China


Herberg 2011

[M. Research Director on Asian Security at the National Bureau of Asian Research. ‘China’s Energy Rise and the Future of US-China Energy Relations” 6/21/11 http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/china_s_energy_rise_and_the_future_of_us_china_energy_relations ]


Moreover, the potential to view our energy security problems as shared challenges continues to be undermined by the chronic overlay of distrust at a strategic level. Beijing’s leaders suspect that the U.S. seeks to use its energy vulnerabilities as part of a broader effort to contain China. Criticism of the impact of China’s overseas oil investments in pariah states and elsewhere is seen as a cynical ploy to weaken China’s access to vital oil supplies. Pressure from Washington to reduce carbon emissions is seen as a thinly veiled attempt to slow China’s economic growth and frustrate it from achieving its rightful economic role in the world. Washington, on the other hand, sees China’s energy expansion globally as built on predatory collaboration between Beijing and its national oil champions to carve out privileged access to petroleum supplies, an approach that many believe undermines future U.S. access to needed supplies. This strategic suspicion casts a pall of a “zero-sum” atmosphere of national competition over energy access and security that is repeatedly reinforced by rhetoric on both sides. The 2005 episode when China’s CNOOC sought to acquire Unocal and was forced to withdraw its bid due to a firestorm of criticism of China’s strategic energy intentions epitomized the toxic mix of bilateral energy suspicions and mirror-imaging.¶ Further, to the extent that the U.S. might encourage China to take a stronger leadership role on global energy security cooperation, it is still very unclear what role Beijing would want to take on the world energy stage. This is a corollary to the broader lack of clarity over what role Beijing wants to play in other global issues, from currencies to nuclear proliferation. Beijing remains largely inwardly focused and driven by its domestic search for stability, economic development, and territorial integrity. Consistent with its traditional broader foreign policy of “keeping a low profile”, Beijing has shown relatively little serious interest in multilateral energy cooperation.5 Conversely, assuming China were to show interest in a strategic energy partnership, it is not clear to what extent Washington is truly ready for a “shared global energy partnership”. This would require accommodating very different Chinese views on the role of energy markets and pricing, policies toward key petroleum producers and regions, the role of the IEA and multilateral cooperation, and responsibility for reducing carbon emissions. Washington tends to view a partnership as China simply joining in and becoming enmeshed and integrated into a set of U.S.-sponsored and led energy institutions and policy agendas established by the west. This is highly unlikely to be acceptable to Beijing’s leadership.


Plan Specific 1NC Link: Coral Reefs [1/1]

( ) China hates ocean protection efforts – they would be angered by the plan because they perceive it as infringing upon their development efforts.



DSO 2012

[Der Speigel (Prominent German publication) Online. “Saving the Southern Ocean: China, Russia Block Plan to Protect Antarctic Waters” 11/2/12 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/china-and-russia-block-plan-to-create-ocean-sanctuaries-in-antarctica-a-864962.html]

Proposals to establish marine reserves in two critical areas of the Southern Ocean were stymied by Russia, China and Ukraine at the end of a two-week international summit in Australia on Thursday. Commercial fishing restrictions in the proposed sanctuaries proved to be the main sticking point. ¶ A meeting of the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) in Hobart, Australia ended in deadlock on Thursday when member nations failed to reach agreement on new protected areas across Antarctica, home to the world's most intact marine ecosystem.¶ The two-week CCAMLR talks, attended by representatives from 24 nations and the European Union, were geared at establishing giant marine sanctuaries in two critical areas of the Southern Ocean.¶ One of the most pristine ocean regions in the world, its waters are home to penguins, seals, whales and seabirds, whose food sources are increasingly under threat from climate change and overfishing. At stake are the region's stocks of krill, a valuable crustacean which is the keystone species of the Antarctic ecosystem. The growing global demand for animal feed and fish bait is causing a rapid decline in its numbers.¶ "Antarctica is home to unique ecosystems," said German Agricultural Minister Ilse Aigner ahead of the talks, pledging that Germany would "actively support protection of its oceans."¶ A US-New Zealand plan foresaw a 1.6 million square kilometer protected area in the Ross Sea, while nations led by the EU and Australia had proposed a series of reserves encompassing 1.9 million square kilometers -- an area bigger than Alaska.¶ Commercial Versus Conservation Interests¶ But these efforts were thwarted by resistance from China, Russia and Ukraine, which raised objections to fishing restrictions in the proposed reserve on the grounds they would have too much impact on their annual hauls"(Establishing marine reserves) is a complex process involving a large amount of scientific research as well as international diplomacy," said CCAMLR in a statement. "It was decided … that further consideration of the proposals is needed." Amid the lack of consensus, the decision on the ocean sanctuary was postponed until a special session to be held in Germany in July 2013.¶ Environmentalists expressed their concern at the outcome of the CCAMLR talks. "We're deeply disappointed," Steve Campbell of the Antarctic Ocean Alliance told Reuters. "Members failed to establish any large-scale Antarctic marine protection because a number of countries actively blocked conservation efforts."¶ "CCAMLR has behaved like a fisheries organization instead of an organization dedicated to conservation of Antarctic waters," railed Farah Obaidullah of Greenpeace.¶ Gerry Leape from the Pew Environment Group agreed, telling AFP that "In 2011, participating countries agreed to work together to protect and conserve the unique marine life that thrives in the ocean surrounding Antarctica. Instead, they are heading home and leaving the door wide open to unchecked commercial fishing in these areas."


2NC / 1NR Extensions: A/T #1 – “Relations Low” [1/1]

1. US-China cooperation over the ocean is expanding in the status quo. Our MecroPress evidence says China is becoming a global oceanic leader and investing key resources in further exploration and development.

2. China’s expanding influence over ocean exploration and development – this is proven by recent actions in the South and East China seas.



Dutton 2014

[Peter. Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the US Naval War College. “China’s Maritime Disputes in the East and South China Seas” The Naval War College Review, January 2014. Available via Ebsco]


China's many operational actions in the near seas and its use of the language of international law to seek legitimacy for these actions represent the steady unfolding of China's strategy to develop an arc of maritime control across those seas. Accelerated Chinese activities around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, the aDIZ announcement, and the Cowpens incident are just the most recent "battles" in China's security campaign in the region. Unless current trends change, there is no reason to believe that China's campaign will stop short of achieving its aims.

2NC / 1NR Extensions: A/T #2 – “No Link” [1/1]

1. China’s the global leader in ocean exploration. They are investing in new submersible technology that can explore further beneath the ocean’s surface than any other country in the world. The plan’s increase in US exploration would encroach on Chinese priorities. That’s our 1NC Fan evidence.

2. China’s investing significant financial and political capital into ocean exploration. National pride proves they’d react negatively to the plan.



Marlow 2013

[Jeff. Reporter for Wired. “Ocean Exploration: The Deep Space Age” Vision: Perspectives from Dubai, March, http://vision.ae/en/life/articles/ocean_exploration_the_deep_space_age]


The race is on to discover what lies at the bottom of the world’s final undiscovered frontier: its seas. Far from being a pursuit of wealthy celebrities or curious scientists, oceanography has become a key geopolitical consideration, with marine conservation and the securing of resources new priorities for global powers ¶ On 26 March of last year, a large green submersible touched down gently on the sea floor. Plumes of silt billowed across the surface – which had likely been undisturbed for centuries – while spindly crabs and slithering eels peered out warily at their unusual visitor. On the water’s surface, 11,000 metres above the isolated sea craft, the visit to the ocean bottom was creating substantially more attention. After all, the pilot was Hollywood mogul James Cameron, and he had just become the first man to glide solo to the world’s deepest point.¶ Cameron may be the most high-profile deep-ocean explorer of recent years, but he’s certainly not alone among billionaires in pursuit of glory, adventure and scientific discovery on the sea floor. Virgin Oceanic – funded by Virgin Group founder Sir Richard Branson – is developing a submersible to visit the deepest point in each of the planet’s five oceans. Amazon’s CEO, Jeff Bezos, used advanced deep-sea sonar instruments to locate the discarded engines of Nasa’s Apollo 11 spacecraft, and is planning an expedition to retrieve them from the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean. Eric Schmidt, the Executive Chairman of Google, who is estimated to be worth US$7bn, is bankrolling the Schmidt Ocean Institute. The ocean’s depths – the final unexplored frontier on Earth – are suddenly getting rather crowded.¶ Exploration resurgence¶ In China, the Jiaolong submersible (capable of 7,000-metre dives) has access to a larger proportion of sea floor than all other manned research vehicles. Last June, three Chinese oceanauts at the bottom of the Pacific Ocean placed a call to their countrymen in space, who were piloting their Shenzhou 9 spacecraft through complex docking manoeuvres. The message was clear: China is investing significant financial and political capital in deep-sea exploration, which fuels the duel fires of national pride and technological advancement in much the same way as its fledgling space programme.¶ So why is deep-sea exploration seeing a resurgence? What is so fascinating about the darkness beneath the waves that has billionaires and governments racing to develop new capabilities?¶ Among private oceanographic benefactors, the combination of enhanced submersible technologies and the urge to distinguish themselves from their caviar-slurping, mansion-building, peers have fuelled the race to the bottom.¶

3. If necessary, read another plan-specific link.




2NC / 1NR Extensions: A/T #3 – “Cooperation Impossible” [1/1]

1. Cooperation isn’t impossible – their evidence just says that the US and China will never fully trust one another. Even if that is true, it doesn’t disprove our argument that the US and China can effectively cooperate on key global issues. Our Gross evidence says that the US-China relationship is improving in quality and number of cooperative initiatives.

2. Cooperation’s not impossible – the US and China are making strong progress



Pellerin 2014

[C. Staffer for the Armed Forces Press Services. “Hagel, China’s Defense Minister Build Military Relations Model” AFPS 4/9/14 Available via Lexis-Nexis]

Hagel met with Chang and then a larger group of defense officials before he and Chang revealed during a news conference a new model for U.S.-China military-to-military relations.¶ The secretary’s visit to Beijing comes in the middle of a 10-day trip to the Asia-Pacific region, during which he visited Japan and will travel to Mongolia later this week. The trip began in Hawaii with the first meeting for defense ministers of the 10 member countries of the Association for Southeast Asian Nations to be held in the United States.¶ “One focus of our discussion today was how we develop a new model of military-to-military relations,” Hagel said about his meeting with Chang. “We’ve just finished a very good meeting,” the secretary added, “during which I restated that the United States is committed to continuing to build a constructive and productive relationship with China.”¶ Hagel explained that the United States believes its approach should be to build a sustained and substantive dialogue, deepen practical cooperation in areas of common interest, and manage competition and differences through openness and communication.¶ In each area, he added, there is much work to do, but the nations are making strong progress.¶ “As General Chang announced, we agreed today on several new ways to improve our military-to-military relationship,” Hagel said. First, the U.S. and Chinese defense agencies will establish an army-to-army dialogue as an institutionalized mechanism within the framework of the U.S.-China military-to-military relationship.¶ Second, the secretary added, “we agreed to participate in a joint military-medical cooperative activity. This will build on experiences gained at the 2014 Rim of the Pacific exercise, a U.S.-hosted multilateral naval exercise that China will participate in for the first time this summer.”¶ Third, Hagel said, the defense agencies will establish an Asia-Pacific security dialogue between the assistant secretary of defense for Asia-Pacific security affairs and the director of the Chinese Defense Ministry’s foreign affairs office to exchange views on a range of security issues.¶ “This dialogue will build on the discussions Gen. Chong and I had today on regional security issues,” the secretary said, “including North Korea and the growing threat posed by its nuclear and missile programs.”



2NC / 1NR Extensions: A/T #4 – “Relations Resilient” [1/1]

1. Relations may typically bounce back, but the affirmative forecloses on meaningful cooperation for the foreseeable future. Our 1NC link evidence explains the reasons that China would be very upset by the plan, and our 1NC Yoshihara and Holmes evidence says that oceanic disputes risk unraveling the entire relationship due to the importance China places on all things maritime.

2. Relations aren’t resilient in the case of ocean policy – resource tensions are too high for cooperation to sustain



Klare 2010

[Michael T. Klare is a professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the author, most recently, of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet. “China Shakes the World” September 19, 2010 http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175297/tomgram%3A_michael_klare%2C_china_shakes_the_world]

Rarely has a simple press interview said more about the global power shifts taking place in our world. On July 20th, the chief economist of the International Energy Agency (IEA), Fatih Birol, told the Wall Street Journal that China had overtaken the United States to become the world’s number one energy consumer. One can read this development in many ways: as evidence of China’s continuing industrial prowess, of the lingering recession in the United States, of the growing popularity of automobiles in China, even of America’s superior energy efficiency as compared to that of China. All of these observations are valid, but all miss the main point: by becoming the world’s leading energy consumer, China will also become an ever more dominant international actor and so set the pace in shaping our global future.¶ Because energy is tied to so many aspects of the global economy, and because doubts are growing about the future availability of oil and other vital fuels, the decisions China makes regarding its energy portfolio will have far-reaching consequences. As the leading player in the global energy market, China will significantly determine not only the prices we will be paying for critical fuels but also the type of energy systems we will come to rely on. More importantly, China’s decisions on energy preferences will largely determine whether China and the United States can avoid becoming embroiled in a global struggle over imported oil and whether the world will escape catastrophic climate change.¶ How to Rise to Global Preeminence¶ You can’t really appreciate the significance of China’s newfound energy prominence if you don’t first grasp the role of energy in America’s rise to global preeminence.


Plan-Specific Link Extensions: Aquaculture [1/1]

( ) Aquaculture is a major component of the Chinese economy – the plan undermines a key market



Manta 2013

[Manta Consulting – a global investment firm. “Financing Aquaculture” Manta Consulting, 2013 http://www.mantaconsultinginc.com/wp-content/uploads/Manta_FinancingAquaculture.pdf]


The aquaculture market is worth about $120 billion per year at the farm level, producing 60 million tons of seafood. That's about 41% of the world's seafood in 2012. At current consumption rates, an additional 23 million tons of seafood per year will be needed worldwide by 2030.1 ¶ Asian production dominates. China accounts for 62% of global product- ion. Demand for seafood produced locally, safely and sustainably creates opportunities for other countries to capture market share.

( ) US aquaculture development creates a direct tradeoff with the Chinese market



MacMillan 2006

[John. Ph.D., President, National Aquaculture Association, “OFFSHORE AQUACULTURE”, US Government Printing Office, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg64138/html/CHRG-109shrg64138.htm]

IV. Aquaculture Development in a Global Market¶ Large-scale marine aquaculture of the type likely to be considered for development in the U.S. exclusive economic zone is being undertaken in many other countries as we speak. In fact, we must recognize that ¶ this type of operation will be a much larger scale and more capital ¶ intensive than most other forms of aquaculture in the United States. As ¶ such, many of those who would consider undertaking these projects will ¶ readily evaluate foreign development locations as alternatives to ¶ development in the United States. To the extent that we create obstacles to development in this country, marine aquaculture projects will be located in Australia, Belize, Canada, Chile, China, Mexico, ¶ Norway, New Zealand, Scotland, Spain, Vietnam and other countries. The transportation requirements do not present a significant barrier to ¶ U.S. markets from these locations, particularly when we consider the ¶ disparity in labor costs and regulatory costs.¶ If we are to have any hope of creating a commercial offshore aquaculture industry in the United States, and addressing food security ¶ requirements and the current seafood trade imbalance, we will have to ¶ eliminate existing unwarranted barriers to development and create a ¶ reasonable program for evaluation and approval of offshore aquaculture ¶ projects.



Plan-Specific Link Extensions: Offshore Wind [1/1]

( ) US increases in renewable energy directly trade off with China’s market share.



Schoen 2012

[Lucas – Energy for the World Resources Institute. “Clean Tech’s Rise, Part 1: Will the US and China Reap the Mutual Benefits?” 2012 http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/ChinaFAQs_IssueBrief1_MutualBenefits.pdf]

China itself, meanwhile, is becoming a critical market. In¶ recent years, it has become the world’s largest source of,¶ and destination for, investment in clean energy.¶ China is¶ expected to invest at least $300 billion in domestic clean¶ energy technologies over the next five years¶ 10¶ as part of its¶ drive to curb greenhouse gas emissions, gain economic¶ benefits, and improve energy security, in pursuit of¶ aggressive renewable energy deployment targets in its¶ 12¶ th¶ Five-Year Plan¶ 11¶ (see table).¶ “There is no doubt that the¶ country remains committed to the ongoing development¶ of its renewable energy sector,” notes a recent analysis¶ from Ernst & Young.¶ 12The investment race, meanwhile,¶ is heating up. In 2010, China invested a world-leading $45¶ billion in clean energy, while the U.S. slipped to second¶ place with about $33.7 billionIn 2011, however, the U.S.¶ recaptured the lead, with investment surging to¶ $48 billion, while China invested $45.5 billion.¶ 13¶ China’s clear commitment to clean energy has made it¶ “attractive to U.S. and international investors” because it¶ offers “the certainty they are looking for before investing,”¶ notes Deborah Seligsohn, a China specialist with the ¶ World Resources Institute and WRI’s ChinaFAQs project.¶ Companies including First Solar, GE, Duke Energy,¶ American Electric Power, and many other U.S. firms have¶ all invested or expressed interest in investing in China,¶ and “increasingly entrepreneurs with new ideas are¶ looking to China to make those ideas become a reality.”


Plan-Specific Link Extensions: Oil Drilling [1/1]

( ) The United States and China fall prey to aggressive energy disagreements



Herberg 2011

[M. Research Director on Asian Security at the National Bureau of Asian Research. ‘China’s Energy Rise and the Future of US-China Energy Relations” 6/21/11 http://newamerica.net/publications/policy/china_s_energy_rise_and_the_future_of_us_china_energy_relations ]

Another underestimated constraint is the limited institutional capacity in either Washington or Beijing to carry out a strategic discussion on energy. It’s not clear who would be talking to whom. Beijing’s energy policymaking agencies, the National Energy Administration and the NDRC, are extraordinarily thinly spread and are not really at the center of decisions on China’s overseas oil and gas acquisition and investment strategy, its regional foreign policy, or decisions that drive oil demand and security. China’s NOCs and the State Council are at the center of the major policies in those areas. Energy policymaking in China is deeply fragmented and horizontal coordination is very weak. In Washington, much of the same description applies. While there is the huge Department of Energy this is largely geared to work at the expert and technical level regarding clean energy, renewables, and other new energy issues rather than strategic concerns. The State Department has established several new middle level positions to focus on energy security concerns but still has very limited ability to support such a strategic energy dialogue. Policymaking is diffuse and fragmented. Edward Morse, one of the most trenchant energy analysts today, has described the U.S. international energy policy as “mostly brawn, not much brain”.¶ ¶ What seems more plausible, then, is something more like an approaching “E-Zero” era of energy geopolitics, to borrow from Eurasia Group’s Ian Bremmer.7 China’s raw global energy impact, the gravitational force of its booming energy and oil demand, and its global energy footprint are growing rapidly. In energy, as in a growing number of other policy arenas, China is simply too big to stand on the sidelines any longer. Yet there is little evidence Beijing is ready to take on broader international responsibilities to help strengthen multilateral energy cooperation, working to maintain the open energy markets that have helped fuel Chinese economic prosperity, and working collaboratively towards stability in key energy exporting regions, most importantly the Persian Gulf. Beijing remains intent on a decidedly national and narrow view of its energy security. But U.S. power to shape and sustain an open and stable global energy environment is clearly on the wane and, in any event, it isn’t clear the U.S. is ready to share leadership in a way that would be sufficiently meaningful to Beijing. ¶ ¶ In the meantime, global oil markets are tightening sharply again: supply growth is slow and structurally constrained, oil demand growth has resumed, and oil prices are rising dramatically threatening the fragile global economic recovery. Other rising petroleum powers and big importers, including Saudi Arabia, Russia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Iran, Venezuela, and India, are driving the development of an increasingly statist, politicized, and balkanized global oil market.


Plan Specific Link Extension: Coral Reefs [1/1]

( ) Chinese ocean exploration efforts are expanding – the plan would create competition



Kashyap 2014

[Arjun. Chinese Environmental Trends analyst for the International Business Times “China-Led International Ocean Exploration Mission To Look For Oil In South China Sea, Including In Disputed Regions” The International Business Times, 1/27/14. Available via Lexis-Nexis]

In a first-of-its-kind exercise for the world’s second-largest economy, an international scientific expedition to look for oil in the South China Sea will set sail from Hong Kong on Tuesday, according to the South China Morning Post.¶ The trip is part of the latest edition of the decade-long International Ocean Discovery Program that will run from 2013 to 2023. The IODP was launched by the U.S. in the 1960s, and its latest effort will include 31 scientists from 10 countries drilling at three different sites for two months.¶ "Oil and gas fields lie close to the coast, but the key is to open the treasure box buried beneath the basin," Wang Pinxian, a marine geologist and member of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, told the Post Monday.¶ The IODP invited proposals from 26 member nations and, while a proposal to drill in the controversial South China Sea -- first proposed by China in 2008 -- was not the most popular one, it was reportedly mainly chosen because the Chinese government agreed to pick up 70 percent, or $6 million, of the mission’s tab. The NSF, which used to contribute 70 per cent of the Joides Resolution's expenses, cut its annual ocean drilling budget to $50 million last year, David Divins, director of the IODP’s ocean drilling program.¶ The expedition will sail aboard the American scientific drill ship, Joides Resolution, operated by the National Science Foundation, or NSF, the Post reported, adding that the voyage will take the team to waters claimed variously by China, the Philippines and Vietnam.¶ So far, the ship has received permission from the Philippines and Beijing but is waiting for a response from the Vietnamese government to drill at a site in the southwest part of the South China Sea, the Post reported, citing Divins, adding that the expedition may have to opt for an alternative site.¶ Tensions stemming from China's energy interests are a constant undercurrent to the region's geopolitics. For instance, in May 2012, China began drilling to new depths in the South China Sea, 200 miles southeast of Hong Kong, with the launch of its first deep-water oil drilling rig, triggering tensions between Manila and Beijing. In December 2012, China had asked Vietnam to stop exploring for oil in disputed areas of the South China Sea and demanded that the latter not harass Chinese fishing boats.




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