Ddw 2011 1 China Cooperation Negative

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DDW 2011


China Cooperation Negative

China Cooperation Negative 1

Things to Know 3

***CHINA*** 4

China Frontline 5

1NC #1 – No Chinese Intent 11

1NC #1 – Large US/China Gap 12

1NC #2 – Cooperation Fails – Too Broad 14

1NC #2 – Cooperation Fails – General 15

1NC #2 – Cooperation Fails – US 18

1NC #2 – Cooperation Fails – Holden Speech 20

1NC #2 – Cooperation Fails – China 21

1NC #2 – Cooperation Fails – China – Military Intent 26

1NC #2 – Cooperation Fails – China – Empirics 27

1NC #2 – A2 Dialogue Now 29

1NC #3 – Tech Transfer – Turns Case 30

1NC #3 – A2 Mars=/=Military 33

1NC #3 – A2 Export Controls Solve 35

1NC #3 – A2 Mutual Benefits 36

1NC #3 – A2 China=Peaceful 37

1NC #3 – Tech Transfer: NK/Iran Prolif 39

1NC #5 - No Space Race 40

1NC #5 – A2 Asian Space Race 41

1NC #6 – No Escalation 42

1NC #6 – No Miscalculation 43

1NC #7 - A2 Relations Spillover 45

1NC #7 – No US-China War 46

1NC #7 - Relations Resilient 47

1NC #8 – Space Mil Inevitable 49

1NC #8 – Alt cause 50

A2 – SOEs Don’t Link 53

A2 – Relations Spillover 55


Credibility Frontline 57

1NC #1 – NASA Credibility Resilient 59

1NC #2 – Cred Loss Inevitable 60

1NC #3 – Credibility Turn 61

1NC #4 – Obama Cred High 62

1NC #5 – Prez Powers not key 64

***MARS*** 65

Mars Frontline 66

***SOLVENCY*** 73

Solvency Frontline 74

1NC #1 – Plan Illegal 75

*****Off-Case***** 77

***Politics Links*** 78

Plan Unpopular – Congress 79

Plan Unpopular – House 81

Plan Unpopular – Wolf Opposition 82

Plan Unpopular – A2 Link Turn 83

***Arms Control CP*** 84

1NC Shell 85

Space Debris/Ozone Net Benefit 86

Politics Net Benefit –Moderate Support 87

Politics Net Benefit – Obama 89

Politics Net Benefit – A2 Perm Shields 90

Politics Net Benefit – A2 Missile Defense Popular 91

Solvency – China Coop 92

A2 – Russia Relations DA 93

A2 – Slippery Slope => No Missile Defense 94

A2 – China Cheats 95

***Condition CP*** 96

Conditions Key 97

Solvency – Tech Transfer 98

Privatization CP Solvency 99

Spending DA Links


Tradeoff DA Link 102


Things to Know

Acronyms to know:

-ASAT – Anti-Satellite Weapon

-BMD – Ballistic Missile Defense

-FMCT – Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

-PSI – Proliferation Security Initiative

-SOE – State Owned Entity (referring to Chinese companies owned by the government)

-PLA – People’s Liberation Army (China’s military)

-PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy

-PRC – People’s Republic of China

-ISS – International Space Station

-NASA – National Aeronautics and Space Administration

-USSR – Soviet Union

The affirmative’s plan (they have two possible ones, counterplan texts should change accordingly)

The United States federal government should substantially increase its exploration of Mars, including an offer to the People’s Republic of China of participation in a cooperative mission that explores Mars.
The United States federal government should substantially increase its terrestrial development of Mars through the provision of grants for state-owned aerospace and technology assets in the People’s Republic of China.
US-China Space War Advantage:

The premise is basically that both China and the US are committed to sending up as many satellites/space assets as possible to try gaining dominance over space. The affirmative argues that’s bad – it causes both countries to mistrust each other, and when a satellite inevitably malfunctions or is hit (either by accident or intention), the high tensions between the two will cause more weapons to be launched in retaliation (leaders will assume that such a satellite malfunction is indicative of an oncoming nuclear attack)


China Frontline

1. US doesn't need the plan – we're beating China now

Rick Boozer – member of Foothills Astronomical Society, pursuing a PhD in astrohpysics (5/19/2011, "United States Will Beat China in Newest Space Race," http://www.marssociety.org/home/press/news/unitedstateswillbeatchinainnewestspacerace, RG)

COMMENTARY | America is laying the groundwork for its greatest space endeavor since sending astronauts to the Moon. But that's not the story you will hear from a few senators and congressional representatives who are more concerned with bringing home pork than significantly advancing U.S. spaceflight prowess. Exaggerating China's future spaceflight plans is one of their favorite strategies. In fact Chinese space ambitions are modest. Their yet-to-be-started space station won't be complete until 2020 at the earliest. It will weigh only 60 tons compared to the International Space Station's 400 tons and less than half the defunct Russian MIR station's 130 tons. China's state news announced they are tentatively considering a gigantic super rocket. It prompted Rep. Frank Wolf of Virginia to say, "The announcement made clear that if the United States does not get serious about its own Exploration Program, the next flag planted on the moon may be a Chinese flag." Even before the announcement, Rep. Bill Posey of Florida made similar dire predictions about future Chinese space accomplishments. However, careful reading of the Chinese article reveals it is a preliminary feasibility study, NOT any actual plan to build the rocket. Furthermore, given that the rocket would carry a 130-ton payload, which is exactly the same payload weight as the super rocket demanded by certain U.S. Senators, the Chinese study is probably just a knee-jerk response to the Senators' efforts.
2. Cooperation fails on both sides–

A. US – fears national security and military tech transfer

Reuters, Michael Martina, 4/29/11, “China astronaut calls for U.S. cooperation”, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42822072/ns/technology_and_science-space/t/china-astronaut-calls-us-cooperation///jchen

Efforts at U.S.-China cooperation in space have failed in the past decade, stymied by economic, diplomatic and security tensions, despite a 2009 attempt by President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, to launch collaboration. Obama and Hu, in a statement in November 2009, called for "the initiation of a joint dialogue on human spaceflight and space exploration, based on the principles of transparency, reciprocity and mutual benefit." U.S. fears over national defense and inadvertent technology transfer have proven to be major roadblocks, particularly after Beijing carried out an anti-satellite test in January 2007, using a ground-based missile to destroy one of its inactive weather satellites. Yang, considered a hero of China's ambitious space program and the first from his country to enter space, made the statement during a carefully controlled media visit to China's astronaut training facility in the western suburbs of Beijing. There, journalists were ushered through an echoing hall housing three new space flight training simulators, none in use by China's 24 astronauts. But China is pushing forward without the United States, its funding in the face of NASA scale-backs and its cooperative efforts with Russia and other countries possibly constituting the next best hope for the future of space exploration.

B. China - security tensions and lack of interest

Reuters, Jim Wolf, “Space: A frontier too far for U.S.-China cooperation”, 1/3/11, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40897403/ns/technology_and_science-space/t/space-frontier-too-far-us-china-cooperation///jchen

WASHINGTON — The prospects for cooperation between the United States and China in space are fading even as proponents say working together in the heavens could help build bridges in often-testy relations on Earth. The idea of joint ventures in space, including spacewalks, explorations and symbolic "feelgood" projects, have been floated from time to time by leaders on both sides. Efforts have gone nowhere over the past decade, swamped by economic, diplomatic and security tensions, despite a 2009 attempt by President Barack Obama and his Chinese counterpart, Hu Jintao, to kick-start the bureaucracies. U.S. domestic politics make the issue unlikely to advance when Obama hosts Hu at the White House on Jan. 19. Washington is at odds with Beijing over its currency policies and huge trade surplus but needs China's help to deter North Korea and Iran's nuclear ambitions and advance global climate and trade talks, among other matters. Hu's state visit will highlight the importance of expanding cooperation on "bilateral, regional and global issues," the White House said. But space appears to be a frontier too far for now, partly due to U.S. fears of an inadvertent technology transfer. China may no longer be much interested in any event, reckoning it does not need U.S. expertise for its space program.

3. Technology Transfer turns the aff–
A. Increased cooperation results in proliferation to Iran and North Korea

Jeff Foust, Editor and publisher of the Space Review online journal, 11/30/09, “Caution about US-China space cooperation”, http://www.spacepolitics.com/2009/11/30/caution-about-us-china-space-cooperation///jchen

When President Obama visited China earlier this month, the US and China issued a joint statement that included a passage about space cooperation, including “starting a dialogue on human space flight and space exploration”. Cooperation would be a good thing, right? Not necessarily, according to some. In an Aviation Week op-ed last week, Eric Sterner warns cooperation could lead to more technology transfer, something that, in the 1990s, led to stiffened export control regulations that transferred commercial satellites and their components to the US Munitions List. Such transfer is worrisome, he argues, not only because it could aid Chinese military modernization but also because China is a “serial proliferator” who could then transfer such technologies to places like Iran and North Korea. “Until China’s intentions are clearer and its behavior has verifiably and persistently changed,” he concludes, “close cooperation entails risks that far exceed the potential benefits.” In this week’s issue of The Space Review, Taylor Dinerman raises concerns about the appearance of cooperation between the US and China. If the US looks like it’s trying too hard to cooperate with China (or other countries, for that matter), it could give the appearance of weakness. He also notes that previous models for international cooperation, such as Apollo-Soyuz and ISS, don’t fit the current situation, in part because of the lack of knowledge about what is motivating China’s human spaceflight program. “If the US presents itself as too eager for partnership agreements or too weak to explore the solar system without assistance, then the world and the American people will only see softness.”

B. Nuclear war

Hayes & Hamel-Green, 10 – *Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainable Development, AND ** Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University (1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, “The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia,” http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)

The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea’s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China’s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended deterrence (“nuclear umbrella”) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. The consequences of failing to address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole international community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger…To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

4. Double bind – either tech is stolen or export restrictions prevent actual cooperation

Peter Selding, European correspondent for Space News, “Chinese Official Urges U.S.-Chinese Space Cooperation”, 4/15/11, http://www.china-defense-mashup.com/chinese-official-urges-us-chinese-space-cooperation.html/print///jchen

A top Chinese government space official on April 14 appealed to the U.S. government to lift its decade-long ban on most forms of U.S.-Chinese space cooperation, saying both nations would benefit from closer government and commercial space interaction. He specifically called for cooperation on manned space flight, in which China has made massive investment in recent years. Lei Fanpei, vice president of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. (CASC), which oversees much of China’s launch vehicle and satellite manufacturing industry, said China purchased more than $1 billion in U.S.-built satellites in the 1990s before the de facto ban went into effect in 1999. Since then, the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) have made it impossible to export most satellite components, or full satellites, to China for launch on China’s now successful line of Long March rockets. The ITAR regulations that tightened the U.S. technology export regime were put into place to punish China for its missile exports, and to slow development of China’s rocket industry by reducing its customer base. Most commercial telecommunications satellites carry at least some U.S. parts, which is why ITAR has all but locked China out of the global commercial launch market.

5. Space race doesn’t escalate – American militarization of space deters Chinese weapon development

James A. Lewis, Senior Fellow and Director, Technology and Public Policy Program, CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “CHINA’S MILITARY MODERNIZATION AND ITS IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES AND ASIA PACIFIC REGION”, 3/30/07, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/congress/ts070330lewis.pdf//jchen

Anti-Satellite Weapons

China’s January 2007 anti-satellite test has received much attention. The test should not have been a surprise. The Chinese have been working on anti-satellite weapons for at least a decade, despite their denials. The particular weapon used in the test – a kinetic intercept of a low earth orbit satellite – is the least sophisticated mode of anti-satellite attack and something that the Soviets and the U.S. developed, tested, and abandoned decades ago. China is working on other anti-satellite weapons, and public reports speculate that these include ground-based lasers and, perhaps, attack satellites. It also includes cyber attacks against the ground facilities and networks that control U.S. space assets. Since it is clear to most militaries that a good portion of the U.S. advantage in combat comes from satellite data, potential opponents like China are searching for ways to interfere with these services from space and the networks that support them. As with many of China’s military modernization programs, a robust U.S. response can undercut China’s efforts. In anti-satellite weapons, the U.S. can reinforce its advantage in space by continuing to harden its satellites, by moving to a more flexible military space architecture, by accelerating its Operationally Responsive Space programs, and b developing alternative technologies such as high-altitude UAVs and mini-satellites. These alternative technologies could provide “space-like” services that would render attacks on satellites useless. Since the U.S. is already pursuing many of these programs, and given the robustness of its satellite fleet, if the Chinese were to use anti-satellite weapons in a clash, they would gain no advantage. It is in the U.S. interest to ensure that this continues to be the case. Prior to the test, many nations, including China, castigated the U.S. for its plans for future military activities in space. The U.S. ignored them, and this has proven to be the right decision. Space arms control efforts would not help the U.S. retain its military advantage, nor would they make a positive contribution to national security. A UN treaty banning weapons in space would harm U.S. national security. We would observe it; others would not. One reason China has been an advocate of a treaty is because it calculates that an agreement would put the U.S. at a disadvantage. A ban would be unverifiable, even if there were an inspection regime put in place. There are many ways to attack satellites and the services they provide, and the kinetic weapon China used is the most primitive and most detectable means of attack. No treaty could credibly address all of them. It is difficult to negotiate seriously with a partner who has little experience of arms control and whose credibility, after years of denying that it had antisatellite programs and asserting that its intentions in space are entirely peaceful, is badly tattered. Space is an area of U.S. military advantage – asymmetric advantage in that no other nation can match it. One way to counter China’s military modernization is to continue to aggressively pursue the U.S. asymmetric military advantage in space.

6. No space war– limited satellite strikes don’t escalate – assumes miscalculation

Weston '9 – Major, attending Joint Military Attaché School en route to serve as the assistant air attaché to the Republic of the Philippines (Scott A, Spring 2009, "Examining Space Warfare: Scenarios, Risks, and US Policy Implications," Proquest, RG)

In the first scenario, the United States deploys to defend Taiwan against China's attempt to subdue the island forcibly. As in the RAND study, China would likely refrain from attacking US space assets to preserve its own space ISR capability, which it needs to monitor the US buildup. The United States would also delay full counterspace operations until fully deployed in order to prepare for retaliation with assets in place instead of in transit, where space disruption would cause much more confusion. With the United States almost fully deployed, China would do well to utilize any counterspace weapons it possesses before the United States targets them. Given its limited ASAT capability, China would likely target US military communication and reconnaissance satellites, avoiding permanent damage to dual-use commercial satellites to preserve its global reputation and protect its own third-party commercial space contracts. The Chinese would use kinetic attacks and any rapidly deployed ASAT lasers against low-altitude satellites, such as those performing reconnaissance, while likely attacking high-altitude communication satellites by jamming or feeding them malicious code. In addition to hitting space assets, China would probably deploy high-powered GPS and other signal jamming throughout the theater to degrade US bombing accuracy and complicate navigation. US doctrine, which places priority on air and space superiority, suggests that the first US attack would target China's ground-based counterspace capability, using the full range of joint-attack forces and munitions. This first wave of ground attacks would also combine with counterspace offensive operations of a nondestructive nature, as highlighted in the Schriever war games, to temporarily blind Chinese ISR satellites and jam communication and signal- collection satellites. A few political caveats attach to this doctrine-directed target list, however. China's launch facilities are far inland, thus raising the possibility that it would consider strikes in these areas a significant escalation, just as the United States would consider Chinese attacks on US launch facilities at Cape Canaveral, Florida, and Vandenberg AFB, California, provocative. The United States would also have to avoid targeting ground-based missile-launch-detection capabilities, which China might interpret as preparation for a nuclear first strike. As mentioned in the RAND war-game scenario, China would be far less affected than the United States by the loss of most space assets at this point because its air-breathing ISR assets could cover the immediate theater and short-range ground communications that do not rely upon satellites.37 Conversely, once US forces have deployed, they would rely heavily upon space assets. In a limited military engagement such as this, it is unlikely that the United States would attempt to facilitate ISR flights by establishing air superiority over all of China. US forces would thus remain highly reliant upon satellites for ISR over mainland China and for communication with the homeland and between deployed units. The RAND study also pointed out that China would likely contract commercial thirdparty space assets to provide needed capabilities, complicating repercussions from US attacks. All told, counterspace operations would probably prove as discriminate as possible to prevent strategic escalation. Both sides would hesitate to utilize kinetic-kill ASATs against anything but very low-altitude satellites for fear of incurring international condemnation and increasing debris hazards for their own resources.38 In all likelihood, the United States would not use its kinetic ASAT capability, preferring to utilize its limited number of seabased Standard Missile 3s for ABM defense of forward-deployed forces. Thus, the number of satellites destroyed or permanently disabled would be very low. As limited as this scenario appears, it bears out realistic actions taken under current policy and doctrine, given the resources available to each side. In this case, it is difficult to see how even one of our most capable space adversaries would have either the capability or the motivation to attempt a surprise attack on US space assets that would rise to the level of a space Pearl Harbor. It is also difficult to understand how the cost of deploying hundreds or even thousands of US weapon satellites to ensure space dominance would greatly affect the outcome of this scenario. Even a deployed spacebased missile-defense shield probably would not encourage the United States to intentionally escalate a limited regional conflict with another nuclear power to a full nuclear exchange if there were any risk of nuclear warheads reaching US soil.
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