Ddw 2011 1 Helium 3 neg – third wave

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DDW 2011


Helium 3 neg – third wave

Helium 3 neg – third wave 1

Heg Frontline (1/3) 2

XT 1: Space Leadership High Now 5

XT 3: He3 Not Key 6

XT 5A: Heg Doesn’t Solve Conflict 7

XT 5B: Power Transition =/= War 8

XT 6: No China Impact 9

Terror Frontline (1/3) 10

XT 1: No Acquisition 13

XT 3: No Motivation 14

XT 5: No Retaliation 15

Econ Frontline (1/2) 16

XT 1: Econ Recovering 19

XT 2: Spending Hurts the Economy 20

XT 4: US Not K2 Global Economy 21

XT 5B: Jobs k2 Economy 22

XT 6/7: Economic Collapse =/= War 23

Environment Frontline 24

Advantage CP 1NC (1/2) 25

2NC Solvency Wall 27

Additional Solvency Cards 28

Heg Frontline (1/3)

1. US doesn't need the plan – we're beating China now

Boozer 5/19 – member of Foothills Astronomical Society, pursuing a PhD in astrohpysics (Rick, 5/19/2011, "United States Will Beat China in Newest Space Race," http://www.marssociety.org/home/press/news/unitedstateswillbeatchinainnewestspacerace, RG)

COMMENTARY | America is laying the groundwork for its greatest space endeavor since sending astronauts to the Moon. But that's not the story you will hear from a few senators and congressional representatives who are more concerned with bringing home pork than significantly advancing U.S. spaceflight prowess. Exaggerating China's future spaceflight plans is one of their favorite strategies. In fact Chinese space ambitions are modest. Their yet-to-be-started space station won't be complete until 2020 at the earliest. It will weigh only 60 tons compared to the International Space Station's 400 tons and less than half the defunct Russian MIR station's 130 tons. China's state news announced they are tentatively considering a gigantic super rocket. It prompted Rep. Frank Wolf of Virginia to say, "The announcement made clear that if the United States does not get serious about its own Exploration Program, the next flag planted on the moon may be a Chinese flag." Even before the announcement, Rep. Bill Posey of Florida made similar dire predictions about future Chinese space accomplishments. However, careful reading of the Chinese article reveals it is a preliminary feasibility study, NOT any actual plan to build the rocket. Furthermore, given that the rocket would carry a 130-ton payload, which is exactly the same payload weight as the super rocket demanded by certain U.S. Senators, the Chinese study is probably just a knee-jerk response to the Senators' efforts.

2. Double bind --

A. Chinese lunar mining already started and they'll beat us there regardless of the plan

B. China's not going to the moon anytime soon and we'll maintain space leadership
3. Many alternative solutions to the H3 problems

Gitlin '11 -- PhD in Pharmacology from Imperial College London, taught International Science and Technology Policy at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Relations @ UK (Jonathan M., 3/2011, "National security driving a Helium-3 shortage, hurting physics," http://arstechnica.com/science/news/2011/02/national-security-driving-a-helium-3-shortage-hurting-physics.ars, RG)

So what can be done about the problem? Luckily, quite a few efforts are underway. Although the national security applications account for 95 percent of US 3He use, there are other ways to achieve the same end. Joe Glaser, from the National Nuclear Security Agency (NNSA), spoke about how this shortage has led to new science. NNSA has a number of different requirements for neutron detectors, from large portal monitors that are being installed in border crossings, seaports, and airports as part of the Second Line of Defense Program, to rugged portable units that can be used in the field.

For the static radiation portal monitors, like the one pictured at right, a number of solutions present themselves. Instead of 3He-filled tubes, BF3 can be used, if the boron has been enriched to around 90 percent 10B. These tubes are less sensitive than 3He; you need three tubes of BF3 to do the same work as a single 3He tube, and BF3 is a rather nasty gas, but it's readily available. Lining the detector tubes with a thin film of 10B allows you to avoid working with BF3, again relatively cheaply, although again these detectors are less sensitive than 3He.

Moving away from 10B, glass fibers doped with 6Li have a number of cool features. When neutrons meet the 6Li atoms, the resulting energy gets transferred into the fibers, which we can detect as light (just like the optical fibers that pipe sound between your hi-fi components). They detect both neutrons and gamma rays, and can be made in a range of shapes and sizes, including backpack systems.

Other interesting technologies that are further away from the market include new organic materials that can detect high-energy neutrons. Additionally, NNSA has caught the recycling bug, and believe that it can meet up to 20 percent of its needs by recycling old 3He tubes.
4. China war is empirically disproven -- they've had security competition for the last 2 decades and it hasn't escalated -- also no reason why being in space deters a war

Heg Frontline (2/3)
5. No heg impact –

A. No relationship between US capabilities and peace

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College. [Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52,

Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld]

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the relative level of American activism and international stability. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists, defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30 And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilis-ing presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up. Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace and US military expenditure are unrelated.

B. No impact to the transition – international order accommodates rising powers

Ikenberry 08 professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University

(John, The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is fundamentally different from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the major tool that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

Heg Frontline (3/3)
6. Collapse of heg wont cause china war – they’ll rise peacefully

Bitzinger and Desker 08 Dean of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Senior Fellow with the Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University

(Richard and Barry, Why east asian war is unlikely Survival, Volume 50, Issue 6 December 2008 , pages 105 – 128

Growing Chinese - and more generally, Asian - self-confidence, and the awareness that the era of US pre-eminence in East Asia is drawing to a close, is likely to give rise to a revived debate over the validity of claims for an Asian model of development and the significance of 'Asian values' in shaping the region's responses to global and local developments. Chinese perspectives on the structure of international society and the norms and values underpinning the international order will be particularly influential. The Asian financial and economic crisis of 1997-98 led to the collapse of an earlier debate on Asian values, which had reflected the economic rise of East Asian states and whose leading voices included leaders and intellectuals in Malaysia and Singapore.3 Meanwhile, the emergence of the United States as the sole superpower in the post-Cold War era focused attention on the 'Washington Consensus' in favour of elected democracies, the sanctity of individual political and civil rights, the promotion of free trade and open markets and the recognition of doctrines of humanitarian intervention.4 The new debate is likely to reflect the changing power relations within East Asia and highlight alternative views on the appropriate ways and means of ordering societies, and on the role and function of regional and international institutions. A new paradigm in international affairs can be expected: the Beijing Consensus is founded on the leadership role of the authoritarian party state, a technocratic approach to governance, the significance of social rights and obligations, a reassertion of the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference, and support for freer markets and stronger regional and international institutions.5 The emphasis is on effective leadership and good governance.6

The argument that there is an emerging Beijing Consensus is not premised on the rise of the East and decline of the West, as sometimes seemed to be the sub-text of the earlier Asian-values debate.7 However, like the earlier debate, the new one reflects alternative philosophical traditions. The issue is the appropriate balance between the rights of the individual and those of the state. This emerging debate will highlight the shared identity and values of China and the other states in the region, even if conventional realist analysts join John Mearsheimer to suggest that it will result in 'intense security competition with considerable potential for war' in which most of China's neighbours 'will join with the United States to contain China's power'.8 These shared values are likely to reduce the risk of conflict and result in regional pressure for an accommodation of and engagement with an emerging China, rather than confrontation.

XT 1: Space Leadership High Now

No chance China passes us -- Boozer says that's just political pork -- China's space station isn't complete and will be less than 1/6 the size of ours -- not to mention all their space plans are just speculative

The U.S. is the clear leader in the race for space dominance – their cards just say the U.S. and China are in competition for space primacy now

Bruce W. Macdonald-- Senior Director, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Program, U.S. Institute of Peace, Member of the Committee on Senate U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics; assistant director for national security at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, served on the National Security Council staff, professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee, served in the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, honors graduate in aerospace engineering from Princeton University, two masters degrees from Princeton, one in aerospace engineering with a specialty in rocket propulsion, and the second in public and international affairs, (CQ Congressional Testimony, 5/11/11, “Military And Civil Space Programs In China; Committee: Senate U.S.-China Economic And Security Review Commission”, Lexis Nexis)

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Commission, it is a pleasure to appear before you today, and I thank you for extending to me this invitation to discuss the important issue of China's military space policy and programs and their implications for the security of the United States and its allies and friends. I am speaking purely in a private capacity, and my comments do not represent the views of the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), which provides analysis, training and tools to help prevent, manage and end violent international conflicts, promote stability, and professionalize the field of peacebuilding. Prior to USIP, I led the Council on Foreign Relations study of China, Space Weapons, and U.S. Security, which built upon my years of national security policy work in and out of government, travel to China, and training as an aerospace engineer. The Chinese Challenge This hearing is timely, and one of rising urgency. In the more than four years since China destroyed an aging weather satellite, demonstrating not only an antisatellite (ASAT) capability but the potential for strategic ballistic missile defense capability as well, it has proceeded to deploy more, and more advanced, military space capabilities as well. We should not be surprised by this, nor should we be stricken with fear. We would, however, be unwise to ignore both these developments, which are public knowledge, and other developments that are of a classified nature. The Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) appears to recognize what most thoughtful observers of national security also recognize, that U.S. space assets, coupled with our advances in brilliant weaponry, have provided the United States with unprecedented and unequaled global conventional military capabilities. Both China and the United States are fortunate that neither country is the enemy of the other. However, China's growing economic and military power, coupled with friction points in the relationship, most notably over Taiwan, suggest that a future U.S.China conflict, though unlikely, cannot be ruled out.

XT 3: He3 Not Key

Helium 3 is not specifically k2 heg -- the NNSA has found monitors and units that will detect neutrons equally well -- they are also recycling He3 which will save 20% of it
Force the aff to isolate a specific tech or advantage that ONLY helium 3 provides – otherwise don’t buy their bluff
Alternative tech exists in the short-term -- we won't just drop off the military map

Shea and Morgan '10 -- CRS specialists in science and tech policy (Dana A. and Daniel, 12/22/10, "The Helium-3 Shortage: Supply, Demand, and Options for Congress," http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41419_20101222.pdf, RG)

Because of its detection performance, nontoxicity, and ease of use, helium-3 has become the material of choice for neutron detection. Nevertheless, other materials also have a long history of use. With the current shortage of helium-3, researchers are reexamining past alternatives and investigating new ones. Existing alternative neutron detection technologies have significant drawbacks relative to helium-3, such as toxicity or reduced sensitivity. A drop-in replacement technology does not currently exist.57 The alternatives with most short-term promise as helium-3 replacements are boron trifluoride, boron-lined tubes, lithium-loaded glass fibers, and scintillatorcoated plastic fibers. A new scintillating crystal composed of cesium-lithium-yttrium-chloride (CLYC) also appears promising. Other materials, less suitable in the short term, show promise for the long term. Before the helium-3 shortage became apparent, most neutron detection research was directed toward long-term goals such as improving sensitivity, efficiency, and other capabilities, rather than the short-term goal of matching current capabilities by alternative means.58

XT 5A: Heg Doesn’t Solve Conflict
Heg doesn’t solve war – Fettweis says in the 90’s the US cut back on military spending- no major war broke out- The incidence and magnitude of global conflict actually declined – prefer this evidence because its grounded in statistics and from a professor at the US Naval War College
They oversimplify the systemm

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College. [Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld]

Today's security debate often seems to be driven less by actual threats than vague, unnamed dangers. Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld warned about 'unknown unknowns': the threats 'we don't know we don't know', which 'tend to be the difficult ones'.32 Kristol and Kagan worry that if the United States fails to remain highly engaged, the international system 'is likely to yield very real external dangers, as threatening in their own way as the Soviet Union was a quarter century ago'.33 What exactly these dangers are is left open to interpretation. In the absence of identifiable threats, the unknown can provide us with an enemy, one whose power is limited only by the imagination. This is what Benjamin Friedman and Harvey Sapolsky call 'the threat of no threats', and is perhaps the most frightening danger of all.34 Even if, as folk wisdom has it, anything is possible, not everything is plausible. Vague, generalised dangers should never be acceptable replacements for specific threats when crafting national policy. There is no limit to the potential dangers the human mind can manufacture, but there are very definite limits to the specific threats the world contains. 'To make anything very terrible, obscurity seems in general to be necessary', noted Edmund Burke. 'When we know the full extent of any danger, when we can accustom our eyes to it, a great deal of the apprehension vanishes.'35 The full extent of today's dangers is not only knowable, but relatively minor.

ZERO evidentiary support for their credibility arg. Decades of research side with us

Fettweis 10 – Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College. [Christopher J. Fettweis, “Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy,” Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 – 82//informaworld]

This belief rests on a shaky foundation, to put it mildly. Decades of scholarship have been unable to produce much evidence that high credibility helps a state achieve its goals, or that low credibility makes rivals or allies act any differently.9 Although study after study has refuted the basic assumptions of the credibility imperative, the pathology continues to affect policymaking in the new century, inspiring new instances of irrational, unnecessary action. The imperative, like many foreign-policy pathologies, typically inspires belligerence in those under its spell.10 Credibility is always maintained through action, usually military action, no matter how small the issue or large the odds.

XT 5B: Power Transition =/= War

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