Ddw 2011 1 t – Human Presence


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DDW 2011


T – Human Presence
A. Interpretation: Space exploration includes human presence—most predictable and sets best limits to the topic

Mathew Faulk, writes for SpaceDaily, 10/13/03, “The Problems in Thinking about Humans and Space”, http://www.spacedaily.com/news/oped-03zzk.html

Given the recent shuttle tragedy and other space mishaps, perhaps the initial and primary focus should only be on simply being able to successfully transport humans within the space environment safely, reliably, and successfully, before any cargo, scientific, or economic concerns should even enter the picture. After all, space exploration is a human activity, without humans it would not exist. Humans and the human person should therefore be the central focus when considering any topic related to this endeavor.
B. Violation: the aff deploys missile defense, not tied to human presence

C. Vote neg
1. Limits: allowing inanimate objects means there are an infinite amount of affirmatives, explodes the research burden for the neg. and kills limits.
2. Brightline: our interpretation provides the most clear interpretation of what is and isn’t topical, prefer for predictability
T- development
A. Interpretation- Development includes economic and commercial activities while exploration is venturing to unknown areas

Hsu and Cox 09

[Feng Hsu, Sr. Fellow, Aerospace Technology Working Group and Ken Cox, Founder & Director Aerospace Technology Working Group, 2/20/09, http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewsr.html?pid=30702, Caplan]

In our view, even with adequate reform in its governance model, NASA is not a rightful institution to lead or manage the nation's business in Space Development projects. This is because human space development activities, such as development of affordable launch vehicles, RLVs, space-based solar power, space touring capabilities, communication satellites, and trans-earth or trans-lunar space transportation infrastructure systems, are primarily human economic and commercial development endeavors that are not only cost-benefit-sensitive in project management, but are in the nature of business activities and are thus subject to fundamental business principles related to profitability, sustainability, and market development, etc. Whereas, in space exploration, by its nature and definition, there are basic human scientific research and development (R&D) activities that require exploring the unknowns, pushing the envelope of new frontiers or taking higher risks with full government and public support, and these need to be invested in solely by taxpayer contributions.

B. Violation- The Aff increases space militarization capabilities- not tied to economic or commercial development
C. Voting issue-
1. Limits – The topic is already massive – allowing militarization allows for a whole new research base with thousands of different plan mechanisms for militarization- killing limits

2. Brightline – only our definition sets what is topical and what is not. Any other interpretation is vague and destroys education

Arms Race DA
Space weapons lead to global arms race

Hitchens 02 (Theresa Hitchens, Vice President of the Center for Defense Information, 2002. “Weapons in Space: Silver Bullet or Russian Roulette?” http://www.cdi.org/missile-defense/spaceweapons.cfm)

The United States already enjoys an overwhelming advantage in military use of space; space assets such as the Global Positioning System satellite network have proven invaluable in improving precision-targeting giving the U.S. military a decisive battlefield edge. There would be even a more formidable military advantage to possession of weapons in space — global power projection and the enormous difficulty in defending against space weapons aimed at terrestrial targets. "It is ... possible to project power through and from space in response to events anywhere in the world. Having this capability would give the United States a much stronger deterrent and, in a conflict, an extraordinary military advantage," notes the Space Commission report. Space weapons — even those primarily designed for defense of U.S. satellites — would have inherent offensive and first-strike capabilities, however, (whether aimed at space-based or earth-based targets) and would demand a military and political response from U.S. competitors. "To be sure, not deploying weapons in space is no guarantee that potentially hostile nations (such as China) will not develop and deploy ASATs. However, it is virtually certain that deploying U.S. weapons in space will lead to the development and deployment of ASATs to counter such weapons," notes a new policy brief by the Cato Institute.27 China and Russia long have been worried about possible U.S. breakout on space-based weaponry. Officials from both countries have expressed concern that the U.S. missile defense program is aimed not at what Moscow and Beijing see as a non-credible threat from rogue-nation ballistic missiles, but rather at launching a long-term U.S. effort to dominate space. Both Russia and China also are key proponents of negotiations at the UN Conference on Disarmament to expand the 1967 Outer Space Treaty to ban all types of weapons. The effort to start talks known as PAROS, for "prevention of an arms race in outer space," has been stalled due in large part to the objection of the United States. For example, in November 2000, the United States was one of three countries (the others were Israel and Micronesia) to refuse to vote for a UN resolution citing the need for steps to prevent the arming of space.28 It is inconceivable that either Russia or China would allow the United States to become the sole nation with space-based weapons. "Once a nation embarks down the road to gain a huge asymmetric advantage, the natural tendency of others is to close that gap. An arms race tends to develop an inertia of its own," writes Air Force Lt. Col. Bruce M. DeBlois, in a 1998 article in Airpower Journal.29 Chinese moves to put weapons in space would trigger regional rival India to consider the same, in turn, spurring Pakistan to strive for parity with India. Even U.S. allies in Europe might feel pressure to "keep up with the Joneses." It is quite easy to imagine the course of a new arms race in space that would be nearly as destabilizing as the atomic weapons race proved to be.

Space weapons cause first striking and nuclear war

Krepon 04 (Michael Krepon, president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004. Arms Control Association, “Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option,” http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon#krepon)

To prevent adversaries from shooting back, the United States would need to know exactly where all threatening space objects are located, to neutralize them without producing debris that can damage U.S. or allied space objects, and to target and defeat all ground-based military activities that could join the fight in space. In other words, successful space warfare mandates pre-emptive strikes and a preventive war in space as well as on the ground. War plans and execution often go awry here on Earth. It takes enormous hubris to believe that space warfare would be any different. If ASAT and space-based, ground-attack weapons are flight-tested and deployed, space warriors will have succeeded in the dubious achievement of replicating the hair-trigger nuclear postures that plagued humankind during the Cold War. Armageddon nuclear postures continue to this day, with thousands of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons ready to be launched in minutes to incinerate opposing forces, command and control nodes, and other targets, some of which happen to be located within large metropolitan areas. If the heavens were weaponized, these nuclear postures would be reinforced and elevated into space. U.S. space warriors now have a doctrine and plans for counterspace operations, but they do not have a credible plan to stop inadvertent or uncontrolled escalation once the shooting starts. Like U.S. war-fighting scenarios, there is a huge chasm between plans and consequences, in which requirements for escalation dominance make uncontrolled escalation far more likely. A pre-emptive strike in space on a nation that possesses nuclear weapons would invite the gravest possible consequences. Attacks on satellites that provide early warning and other critical military support functions would most likely be viewed either as a surrogate or as a prelude to attacks on nuclear forces.

CP Text: The United States Federal government should ratify and enforce the Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Threat or Use of Force Against Outer Space Objects and support an amendment that prevents the placement of defensive weapons and ASATS in outer space.

The United States Federal Government should fully reinstate Long Range Navigation system revision C technology and develop enhanced Long Range Navigation system technology.
eLORAN solves the aff without having to send satellites into space.


International LORAN Association- Authoring Team: Dr Sally Basker General Lighthouse Authorities (GLA) of the UK and Ireland, Commander Joseph Chop US Coast Guard, Colonel J Ron Davis (USAF, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Captain G Thomas Gunther (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Michael Herring US Coast Guard, Mr Francis Hubert DCN Brest, France, Professor David Last GLA Consultant, Dr Sherman Lo Stanford University, Commander John Merrill US Coast Guard, Lieutenant Kirk Montgomery (USCG, Ret.) Symmetricom, Inc, Mr Mitchell J Narins US Federal Aviation Administration, Commander Christopher Nichols US Coast Guard, Dr Gerard Offermans Reelektronika BV, Dr Ben Peterson (Captain, USCG, Ret.) Peterson Integrated Geopositioning, Captain Robert Wenzel (USCG, Ret.) Booz Allen Hamilton, Lieutenant Ronald Wright US Coast Guard 16 October 2007 ‘Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document’ //DoeS

This Enhanced Loran (eLoran) Definition Document has been published by the International Loran Association to provide a high-level definition of eLoran for policy makers, service providers, and users. It was developed in November 2006 at the United States Coast Guard Navigation Center by an international team of authors. Enhanced Loran is an internationally-standardized positioning navigation, and timing (PNT) service for use by many modes of transport and in other applications. It is the latest in the long- standing and proven series of low-frequency, LOng-RAnge Navigation (LORAN) systems, one that takes full advantage of 21st century technology. eLoran meets the accuracy, availability, integrity, and continuity performance requirements for aviation non-precision instrument approaches, maritime harbor entrance and approach maneuvers, land-mobile vehicle navigation, and location-based services, and is a precise source of time and frequency for applications such as telecommunications1. eLoran is an independent, dissimilar, complement to Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). It allows GNSS users to retain the safety, security, and economic benefits of GNSS, even when their satellite services are disrupted. The eLoran System eLoran meets a set of worldwide standards and operates wholly independently of GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, or any future GNSS. Each user’s eLoran receiver will be operable in all regions where an eLoran service is provided. eLoran receivers shall work automatically, with minimal user input. The core eLoran system comprises modernized control centers, transmitting stations and monitoring sites. eLoran transmissions are synchronized to an identifiable, publicly-certified, source of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) by a method wholly independent of GNSS. This allows the eLoran Service Provider to operate on a time scale that is synchronized with but operates independently of GNSS time scales. Synchronizing to a common time source will also allow receivers to employ a mixture of eLoran and satellite signals. The principal difference between eLoran and traditional Loran-C is the addition of a data channel on the transmitted signal. This conveys application-specific corrections, warnings, and signal integrity information to the user’s receiver. It is this data channel that allows eLoran to meet the very demanding requirements of landing aircraft using non-precision instrument approaches and bringing ships safely into harbor in low-visibility conditions. eLoran is also capable of providing the exceedingly precise time and frequency references needed by the telecommunications systems that carry voice and internet communications.

The US should ratify the PPWT-treaty is meaningless without the US

Su 10 [Jinyuan, fellow at Cambridge University, 4/8/10, “The ‘peaceful purposes’ principle in outer space and the Russia-China PPWT Proposal”, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S026596461000024X] AS

The debate on militarization vis-à-vis non-aggression in interpreting “peaceful purposes” in the context of outer space is already settled, with the latter doctrine having the advantage. However, non-aggression is too loose a concept when facing the issue of space weaponization. The current regime of space law should be amended to prohibit all weapons in space and ASATs on Earth. The PPWT provides a good basis for efforts in this direction. But it is noteworthy that, absent a legally binding treaty, deploying weapons in outer space in situations not amounting to self-defense still constitutes a violation of the general principle of maintaining international peace and security and falls foul of the current cooperative background theme of international law. The PPWT was submitted with a research mandate. It was hoped that it could be channeled into a negotiating format through establishment of a relevant ad hoc committee of the CD.130 This hope is now a step nearer, as on 29 May 2009 the CD adopted a program of work with PAROS as one of the working groups. The program is regarded as a breakthrough in light of the 11-year deadlock in the world's sole disarmament forum. A future treaty would be meaningless if the USA, a space superpower, was not on board. Therefore, the US positions must be incorporated. This makes the future of the PPWT heavily dependent on the interplay between Russia and China on one side and the USA on the other. The challenges ahead should not be underestimated, because the USA has been maintaining its space policy consistently for decades and the technical difficulties are unprecedented. But one should have good reasons to be optimistic, in view of the more multilateral vista promoted by President Obama on global issues. Priority has been given to the issue of outer space, as soon after his presidential inauguration he brought the 2006 US Space Policy under review, which usually only happens in a president's second term. In fact, Obama has said that he “opposes the stationing of weapons in space and the development of anti-satellite weapons” and that the USA “must show leadership by engaging other nations in discussions of how best to stop the slow slide towards a new battlefield”.131 The Joint Statement on the US–China Relationship released by the White House after President Obama's state visit to China also states that “[t]he two sides believed that the two countries have common interests in promoting the peaceful use of outer space and agree to take steps to enhance security in outer space”.132

Soft Power DA

US soft power high now

Joseph Nye, professor and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, 6/23, 2011, The Seesaw of Power, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/global/24iht-june24-ihtmag-nye-36.html?_r=1&ref=ihtGlobalAgendaSummer2011

There are two great power shifts going on in this century that I describe in my book. One is West to East, on which I agree with Kishore. Before the industrial revolution, Asia was more than half the world’s population and more than half the world’s product, and by the middle of the 21st century Asia will return to what you might call normal proportions. But the second shift is quite different, and I don’t think we’ve wrapped our minds around it enough, and that is the shift away from governments, East or West, to nongovernmental actors, which is powered by the information revolution. When I think about the distribution of power in the world, I think of a three-dimensional chess board. The top board is military power: I think the Americans are the only global superpower, and I think it’ll stay that way for a couple of decades. If you go to the second board, of economic power among states, the world is multipolar. If you go to the bottom board — transnational relations, things outside the control of governments — power is chaotically distributed, and this is where the diffusion of power comes in. You have flows of financial reserves and resources that are larger than the budgets of most countries. You have not only terrorists, but you have cyberterrorists who stay at home and send electrons across borders, and you don’t have any idea where they came from. You have climate change. You have pandemics. In these areas, it’s not a question of East vs. West. Unless East and West — and South — cooperate, you can’t deal with these issues. You have to use soft and hard power to create networks and institutions, and if you ask what country is best placed to create them, I think it’ll remain the United States. So I think the Americans will remain the most powerful, but it’ll be a different sort of power.

Space weapons cause loss of soft power and a multipolar world – outweighs hard power.

Brown 09 (Trevor Brown, MSc, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, 2009. Air & Space Power Journal, “Soft Power and Space Weaponization,” http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj09/spr09/brown.html)

The United States has plans to weaponize space and is already deploying missile-defense platforms.1 Official, published papers outline long-term visions for space weapons, including direct-ascent antisatellite (ASAT) missiles, ground-based lasers that target satellites in low Earth orbit, and hypervelocity rod bundles that strike from space.2 According to federal budget documents, the Pentagon has asked Congress for considerable resources to test weapons in space, marking the biggest step toward creating a space battlefield since the Strategic Defense Initiative during the Cold War.3 Although two co-orbital escort vehicles—the XSS-11 experimental microsatellite and the Autonomous Nanosatellite Guardian for Evaluating Local Space—are intended to monitor the space environment and inspect friendly satellites, they possess the technical ability to disrupt other nations’ military reconnaissance and communications satellites.4 These developments have caused considerable apprehension in Moscow, Beijing, and other capitals across the world, resulting in a security dilemma. Russia and China believe that they must respond to this strategic challenge by taking measures to dissuade the United States from pursuing space weapons and missile defenses. Their response will likely include developing more advanced ASAT weapons, building more intercontinental ballistic missiles, extending the life of existing ballistic missiles, adopting countermeasures against missile defenses, developing other asymmetric capabilities for the medium of space, and reconsidering commitments on arms control.5 The military options for Russia and China are not very appealing since neither can compete directly with the United States in space on an equal financial, military, or technical footing. Consequently, their first and best choice is the diplomatic route through the United Nations (UN) by presenting resolutions and treaties in hopes of countering US space-weaponization efforts with international law. Although such attempts have thus far failed to halt US plans, they have managed to build an international consensus against the United States. Indeed, on 5 December 2007, a vote on a UN resolution calling for measures to stop an arms race in space passed by a count of 178 to one against the United States, with Israel abstaining.6 The problem for the United States is that other nations believe it seeks to monopolize space in order to further its hegemonic dominance.7 In recent years, a growing number of nations have vocally objected to this perceived agenda. Poor US diplomacy on the issue of space weaponization contributes to increased geopolitical backlashes of the sort leading to the recent decline in US soft power—the ability to attract others by the legitimacy of policies and the values that underlie them—which, in turn, has restrained overall US national power despite any gains in hard power (i.e., the ability to coerce).8 The United States should not take its soft power lightly since decreases in that attribute over the past decade have led to increases in global influence for strategic competitors, particularly Russia and China. The ramifications have included a gradual political, economic, and social realignment, otherwise known as “multipolarism” and translated as waning US power and influence. “Soft power, therefore, is not just a matter of ephemeral popularity; it is a means of obtaining outcomes the United States wants. . . . When the United States becomes so unpopular that being pro-American is a kiss of death in other countries’ domestic politics, foreign political leaders are unlikely to make helpful concessions. . . . And when U.S. policies lose their legitimacy in the eyes of others, distrust grows, reducing U.S. leverage in international affairs.”9 Due to US losses of soft power, the international community now views with suspicion any legitimate concerns that the United States may have about protecting critical assets in space, making it far more difficult politically for the Air Force to make plans to offer such protection.

Cross apply their Kagan in 7 card, collapse of hegemony leads to nuclear war.

1. Debt ceiling barely staved off disaster

David Espo August 1, 2011 Associated Press “House OKs debt; Giffords brings down the House” http://www.journalgazette.net/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20110801/NEWS03/110809968/1066/NEWS03

Emergency legislation to scrape past an economy-rattling national financial default sped through the House Monday night a scant day before the deadline for action. The moment was made all the more electric by Rep. Gabrielle Giffords’ first appearance in Congress since being shot in the head six months earlier. The vote was 269-161, but all eyes were on Giffords, who drew thunderous applause as she walked into the House chamber unannounced and cast her vote in favor of the bill. A final Senate sign-off for the measure is virtually assured on Tuesday. “If the bill were presented to the president, he would sign it,” the White House said, an understatement of enormous proportions. After months of fiercely partisan struggle, the House’s top Republican and Democratic leaders swung behind the bill, ratifying a deal sealed Sunday night with a phone call from House Speaker John Boehner to President Barack Obama. “The legislation will solve this debt crisis and help get the American people back to work, Boehner said at a news conference a few hours before the vote. The Democratic leader, Rep. Nancy Pelosi, was far less effusive. “I’m not happy with it, but I’m proud of some of the accomplishments in it. That’s why I’m voting for it.” So, too, many of the first-term Republicans whose election in 2010 handed the GOP control of the House and set the federal government on a new, more conservative course. “It’s about time that Congress come together and figure out a way to live within our means,” said one of them, Sean Duffy of Wisconsin. “This bill is going to start that process although it doesn’t go far enough.” The measure would cut federal spending by at least $2.1 trillion over a decade – and possibly considerably more – and would not require tax increases. The U.S. debt limit would rise by at least $2.1 trillion, tiding the Treasury over through the 2012 elections. Without legislation in place by the end of Tuesday, the Treasury would run out of cash needed to pay all its bills. Administration officials say a default would ensue that would severely damage the economy. Beyond merely avoiding disaster, Obama and congressional leaders hoped their extraordinary accord would reassure investors at home and around the world, preserve the United States’ Aaa credit rating and begin to slow the growth in America’s soaring debt. In a roller-coaster day on Wall Street, the Dow Jones industrial average surged, then sank and finally finished down for a seventh straight session but only slightly.

2. Link

3. Fiscal Discipline key to keeping Moody’s Rating

Bloomberg 8/2

(Bloomberg, "US Credit Rating Affirmed as Moody's Fitch warn of Downgrade on Defecit," 8/2/2011 pg online @ www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-02/u-s-aaa-rating-faces-moody-s-downgrade-on-debt-economic-slowdown-concern.html//arjun)

Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings affirmed their AAA credit ratings for the U.S. while warning that downgrades were possible if lawmakers fail to enact debt reduction measures and the economy weakens. The outlook for the U.S. grade is now negative, Moody’s said in a statement yesterday after President Barack Obama signed into law a plan to lift the nation’s borrowing limit and cut spending following months of wrangling between Democratic leaders and Republican lawmakers. The compromise “is a positive step toward reducing the future path of the deficit and the debt levels,” Steven Hess, senior credit officer at Moody’s in New York, said in a telephone interview yesterday. “We do think more needs to be done to ensure a reduction in the debt to GDP ratio, for example, going forward.” JPMorgan Chase & Co. estimated that a downgrade would raise U.S. borrowing costs by $100 billion a year, while Obama said it could hurt the broader economy by increasing consumer borrowing costs tied to Treasury rates. The ratio of general government debt, including state and local governments, to gross domestic product is projected to climb to 100 percent in 2012, the most of any AAA-ranked country, Fitch said in April. A downgrade is a sign that Congress is failing to address a real fiscal issue,” Guy LeBas, chief fixed-income strategist at Janney Montgomery Scott LLC in Philadelphia, said in an interview before the announcements. ‘Tough Choices’ A decision on the rating may be made within two years, or “considerably sooner,” according to Moody’s Hess. Fitch’s David Riley said that while the rating may be cut in the medium term, its risks in the near-term “are not high.” The company expects to complete the ratings review by this month. “Although the agreement is a good first step in adjusting the fiscal challenges that the U.S. faces, it is just a first step,” Riley, Fitch’s London-based head of sovereign ratings, said in a telephone interview yesterday. Standard & Poor’s put the U.S. government on notice on April 18 that it risks losing its AAA rating unless lawmakers agree on a plan by 2013 to reduce budget deficits and the national debt. S&P
indicated last week that anything less than $4 trillion in cuts would jeopardize the grade. S&P, which has ranked the U.S. AAA since 1941, rates 18 sovereign issuers as AAA, including Canada, Germany and Singapore, according to Bloomberg data. Spain and Japan are among those ranked at the AA level by ratings company. Debt-Limit Compromise So far the threat of losing a AAA rating has been overwhelmed by concerns about a continued slowdown in the U.S. economy, supporting demand for Treasuries. The yield on the benchmark 10-year note fell reached 2.59 percent in Tokyo trading today, extending declines to the lowest since November. The yield is below the 4.05 percent average in the past decade. A gain in Treasury yields of 50 basis points would reduce U.S. economic growth by about 0.4 percentage points, JPMorgan said in a report, citing Federal Reserve research and data. Obama signed the debt-limit compromise on the day the Treasury had warned the nation’s borrowing authority would expire, ending a months-long debate that reinforced partisan divisions over federal spending. Debt-to-GDP The Senate voted 74-26 for the measure, which raises the nation’s debt ceiling until 2013 and threatens automatic spending cuts to enforce $2.4 trillion in spending reductions over the next 10 years. The House passed the plan Aug. 1. “While the combination of the congressional committee process and automatic triggers provides a mechanism to induce fiscal discipline, this framework is untested,” Moody’s said in its statement. Moody’s said its baseline scenario assumes that fiscal discipline is maintained in 2012. “Further measures will likely be required to ensure that the long-run fiscal trajectory remains compatible with a Aaa rating,” Moody’s said. The credit rater expects a stabilization of the federal government’s debt-to-gross domestic product ratio not too far above its projected 2012 level of 73 percent by the middle of the decade, followed by a decline.

5. Economic Decline Results from Downgrade

The Washington Post, News Source, 4/19 (April 19th 2011, “U.S. credit rating downgrade: the Armageddon scenario,” http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/political-economy/post/us-ratings-downgrade-the-armageddon-scenario/2011/04/19/AFnE0n5D_blog.html)

A credit rating downgrade for the United States would spell even more financial trouble for the U.S. government, hampering its ability to borrow money as investors demand higher yields to make up for the increased risk. That would cause its national debt to balloon further and increase the need to hike taxes or make even more painful cuts in spending. But the real Armageddon scenario would occur when the impact of a sovereign downgrade hit the rest of the U.S. economy. The U.S. “risks eroding its standing at the core of the global monetary system,” Mohamed El-Erian, chief executive and co-chief investment officer at PIMCO, wrote in a commentary piece for the Financial Times. Pension funds and investment trusts that are bound by covenant to invest only in AAA-rated debt could be forced to dump U.S. holdings. Banks that do the bulk of their business in the U.S. could themselves face downgrades. Eventually, the dollar could lose its status as the world’s reserve currency. The ripple effects of Standard & Poors’ decision to downgrade its outlook for the U.S. were already spreading on Monday. The agency also downgraded its outlook for five AAA-rated U.S. insurance groups: Knights of Columbus, New York Life Insurance, Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance, Teachers Insurance & Annuity Association of America and United Services Automobile Association. In downgrading their outlook from stable to negative, S&P noted that these companies are “constrained by the U.S. sovereign credit rating because their businesses and assets are highly concentrated in the U.S.” S&P analyst David Zuber and his colleagues wrote that they took into account “direct and indirect sovereign risks—such as the impact of macroeconomic volatility, currency devaluation, asset impairment, and investment portfolio deterioration.” How likely is this nightmare scenario to happen? There are 19 sovereigns rated AAA by the S&P. Of those, only the United States has a negative outlook. There are a number of countries that have lost AAA ratings over the past 20 years—including Canada, Denmark, Finland and Sweden—but they ended up regaining them. Goldman Sachs analyst Alec Phillips wrote in a research note on Tuesday that while he agrees with S&P that the “current trajectory of fiscal policy is unsustainable over the long-term” and that the U.S. “already appears to be on the edge of AAA territory,” he has a somewhat more optimistic view of the U.S. situation over the next few years and assumes that some fiscal tightening is likely to occur.

7. Nuclear War and extinction

Bearden, Fellow of the Alpha Foundation’s Institute for Advanced Study & Director of the Association of Distinguished American Scientists, 6-12-2K (T.E., “The Unnecessary Energy Crisis: How to Solve It Quickly,” ADAS Position Paper: Solution to the Energy Crisis, www.cheniere.org/techpapers/Unnecessary%20Energy%20Crisis.doc)

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions.  Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released.  As an example, suppose a starving North Korea {2} launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response.  Or suppose a desperate China whose long range nuclear missiles can reach the United States attacks Taiwan.  In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary.  The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed.  Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all, is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible.  As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs, with a great percent of the WMD arsenals being unleashed .  The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

Mil K
Space weapons as a technological panacea to all our problems underpins a logic of domination of both unknowable foreign “enemies” and the cultural institutions into a utopian view of a world without conflict

Peoples 09 (Columba, Lecturer in I.R. at the U of Bristol, “Haunted dreams: Critical Theory, Technology and the militarization of Space”, Securing Space, pg 99-103)

In sum, for Marcuse and the other early Critical Theorists technological rationality equates to a mode of being in which modern science, technology and domination go together. It might be wondered, however, as to why particularly we should revisit Critical Theory in light of the resurgent debate on the militarization/weaponization of space. 65 Certainly the rhetoric surrounding both the military and non-military use of space in the case of the United States, which has tended to stimulate the greatest debate in this regard, is pervaded by the language of domination underpinned by an assumption of technological supremacy. Indeed, pace Agamben, some have gone so far as to argue that current research into space weapons that could ‘target anyone, anywhere, at anytime’ portends the reduction of all life to “bare life”. 66 Whether or not this assumption is backed up either by actual technological advances or funding is less easy to verify. 67 But recent policy discourse surrounding US space technology is certainly replete with aspirations of ‘dominance’, and related concepts such as ‘space control’ and ‘space superiority’. Representative of this is the recently released US National Space Policy of August, 2006 which states that: The United States considers space capabilities – including the ground and space segments and supporting links – vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either those rights or developing capabilities intended to so; take those actions necessary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference; and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to US national interests. 68 This follows on the back of a persistent fascination with space as ‘the ultimate highground’ for both civil and military purposes, 69 the designation of space as within Joint Vision 2020’s mandate of ‘full spectrum dominance’, 70 the elevation of the concept of ‘Space Control’ (‘the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required’ 71 ) within US air and space doctrine, as well as references by American military officials to the ‘…importance of dominating space in peace and war.’ 72 The role of space surveillance and communications technologies during the Gulf war of 1991, the US led strike on Afghanistan and the invasion of Iraq in 2003 have added substance to this stated centrality of space dominance to US military capacity. In addition the latent “dual-use” potentialities of missile defense technologies – whether in terms of using deployed Ground-Based Missile Defense as a rudimentary form of anti-satellite or ASAT weapon or the offensive potential of ostensibly defensive technologies in development such as the “NFIRE” and Space-Based Laser (SBL) have raised further questions about the potential use of space as a theatre of war in its own right as well as a “force multiplier” for conventional terrestrial conflicts. 73 Much of this current debate invites parallels with the period of the 1950s and ‘60’s and Marcuse’s ensuing analysis. Certainly there are echoes of Von Braun’s proposed orbital bombing platforms in recent discussions of ‘Long-Rod Penetrators’ – satellites used to deliver projectile weapons (i.e. missiles) from orbit. 74 Indeed , Neufeld argues that von Braun is a ‘forgotten forerunner to space power theory’, most notably being the first person to use the term ‘space superiority’, the antecedent to today’s concepts of space control and dominance, in print. 75 Likewise, Marcuse’s war- gamers at RAND have their contemporary equivalent in simulations of space conflict in the ‘2010 and 2020 time frame’ that invariably end up in escalated, even nuclear, conflict where players recommend space weaponization in the interim as a panacea. 76 It would be tempting to read American space policy in this regard in terms of Marcuse’s assertion that: ‘Technological rationality reveals its political character as it becomes the great vehicle of better domination, creating a truly totalitarian universe in which society and nature, mind and body are kept in a state of permanent mobilization for the defense of this universe.’ 77 To do so would of course be taking Marcuse’s use of the term ‘universe’ too literally; even the ‘discursive universe’ surrounding American policy on space is not entirely closed, as objections to the bellicose nature of the current US stance attest to. 78 At the same time, Marcuse’s foreboding reading of the nature of technological development in One-Dimensional Man and elsewhere might at the very least provide a cautionary reminder of the latent negative consequences of increasing technological sophistication, most obviously in weapons of war. Like Coker’s reading of Adorno cited earlier, Douglas Kellner argues that ‘[Marcuse] feared that more sophisticated technologies would “instrumentalize” war and produce ever more brutal forms of destruction – a vision amply confirmed in the Vietnam and Persian Gulf wars. […] Indeed, One- Dimensional Man provides a model analysis of the synthesis of business, the state, the media, and other cultural institutions under the hegemony of corporate capital which characterizes the US economy and polity in the 1980s and early 1990s.’ 79 Arguably, we could easily extend this analysis to contemporary US space policy.

Militarism is a tautology in of itself- the only reason this violence and war exists in the post-soviet era is to sustain itself indefinitely

Andrew Bachevich, professor of international relations at Boston University, 2005, “ The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War”, http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/transcripts/5169.html/:pf_printable

ANDREW BACEVICH: With that eloquent introduction, I would like to rest my case and take your questions. I am very flattered that you would turn up this early on a weekday to talk about my book. I am not sure I am going to tell you too much that you don't already know. I must say that in my own intellectual journey, one of the things that I have come to believe is that it is not the hidden fact or the secret that is suddenly unearthed that reveals great truths. Rather, it is the things that we already know, that we read about time and again, that we see right in front of our nose, but take for granted and, therefore, don't appreciate—that is what really defines truth. So I am not sure I am going to tell you all that much that you really don't already know, but I am going to invite you to face up to these facts this morning. It seems to me that today, to a really unprecedented extent in our history, U.S. foreign policy has come to be militarized. By that I mean that force has come to be the preferred instrument of U.S. policy. There is a general assumption that alternative instruments are less effective; therefore, when faced with a particular problem, the sensible, logical thing to do is to turn things over to the people in the Department of Defense. Furthermore, I would argue that our policy today has become militarized in a second sense, and that is that there is amongst us—and if I say "us" or "we," I mean the American people—there has come to be amongst us a general expectation that it is through the perpetuation of U.S. military supremacy—underline that three times, not simply U.S. military strength, U.S. military supremacy—that by perpetuating U.S. military supremacy, we will be able to accomplish our purposes in the world, however we define those purposes. My book, in a sense, is an effort to try to answer the question: How did this come about, this circumstance where our policy has come to be so militarized? I think that there is an answer that is offered in the press, in our public discourse, and that common answer is that somehow in the period since 9/11, as the result of some sort of cabal or conspiracy, mostly associated with the Bush Administration, that this new set of attitudes about military power has been imposed on us, and we are caught by surprise. Well, my view is that that common answer is grossly defective, and that a better answer begins by acknowledging that U.S. foreign policy has come to be militarized today as a consequence of ideas about military power that took hold long before George W. Bush was elected President, long before 9/11. To put it bluntly, we, the people—not necessarily you or me as an individual, but many millions of our fellow citizens—we, the people, have become infatuated with military power; and that policymakers, not just in this Administration but in prior administrations, have capitalized on that infatuation to take us down the path that we have followed, a path that has led, for example, to the current quagmire in Iraq. This infatuation with military power ought to be called by what it is. What it is, again at least in one guy's judgment, is a variant of militarism. Now, "militarism" is a loaded term. If you are of my generation, if you say the word "militarism," it probably conjures up images of Wehrmacht soldiers in field gray uniforms goose-stepping down some broad avenue in Europe, circa 1940. When I say "militarism," I don't mean that militarism. Just as we Americans pursue imperial projects in ways that differ rather dramatically from the empires of the British or the French or the Japanese, so too I would argue that our version of militarism is distinctive. Just as we do empire our own way, we do militarism our own way. So the book, which I hope you will have time to take a look at, tries to explain the origins of this new American militarism, suggests that it is at odds with our interests and with our founding traditions, and concludes by offering some ideas about how to restore balance and realism to U.S. military policy. Let me make a point of emphasizing some of the things that this book is not. First of all, it is not an expression of anti-Americanism. I am not some American who somehow harbors some deep-seated loathing of our country. On the contrary. The book is also not, emphatically not, an attack on soldiers. I was once a soldier myself. My son is a soldier, a second lieutenant in the U.S. Army. And I, like I suspect many of you, hold in very high regard those Americans who choose to serve this country and to protect this country in uniform. So this is not an attack on soldiers. It is also not a pacifist tract. It is not an argument in favor of disarmament or weakness. In my judgment, humankind, like it or not, is condemned to live in a world in which political competition will never end and in which, like it or not, force will always have a place, will always play a role, if we are to enjoy even a modicum of stability and justice in a fundamentally disordered world. But the key point is this: At the end of the Cold War, Americans said "Yes" to military power. The skepticism about arms and armies that informed the American experiment from its founding vanished. Political leaders, liberals and conservatives alike, underlined three times, became enamored with military might. Now, how does this new American militarism, which I define in three ways—first, as having outsized expectations regarding the efficacy of force; second, a tendency to see military power as the truest measure of national greatness; and third, having a romanticized view of soldiers—how does this new American militarism manifest itself? Well, it does so, first of all, in the scope, cost, and configuration of America's present-day military establishment. Here I am going to tell you the things you already know. To the extent that you know U.S. history, you know that through the first two centuries of our history, political leaders in Washington gauged the size and capabilities of America's armed services according to the security tasks immediately at hand. A grave and proximate threat to the nation's well-being might require a large and powerful military establishment. We Americans all know, deep in our hearts and souls, that we are not a peaceful people. We all know that our story over the past two-plus centuries is a story of defining aspirations, setting goals, and seizing them, and we have not hesitated throughout our history to use force for those purposes. We have not hesitated to raise up forces when we needed to. Sometimes the purposes have been great and grand and moral and exalted. And sometimes the purposes have been shabby and less admirable. But here was the pattern: in the absence of such an imperative, in the absence of such immediate requirement, policymakers always scaled down the American military establishment accordingly. That is to say, with the passing of crisis, whatever the crisis was—sometimes it was "we want California"—the army raised up for the crisis went immediately out of existence. This was the case after we took California in 1848; in 1865 at the end of the Civil War; this was the case in 1918 at the end of World War I; and, although we have forgotten it, it was also the case in 1945 at the end of World War II. On VJ Day, there are 12 million American men and women in uniform, having constituted by that time just about the most formidable military force that the world had ever seen up to then. Within six months, it vanished, it went away, very much reflecting the pattern of American history. The general principle was to maintain the minimum force required and no more. Well, that has changed. Since the end of the Cold War, this great crisis previous to the global war on terror, having come to value military power for its own sake, the United States has abandoned this principle and is committed as a matter of policy to maintaining military capabilities far in excess of those of any would-be adversary or combination of adversaries. To put it more bluntly, we are committed as a nation, as a people, to maintaining U.S. military supremacy in perpetuity. I mean, you know that and I know that. This commitment finds both qualitative and quantitative expression, with the U.S. military establishment now not only dwarfing that of any potential adversary, but also dwarfing that of the other great power who we generally view to be close friends. When I was a kid, long ago, phrases like "British Empire," "Royal Navy," "Royal Air Force," carried some weight. You know, that was something to be taken seriously. Let's compare U.S. forces today to those of our British ally. This is generally seen, maybe with the exception of Israel, as the next-most-competent and formidable military power in the world. Thus, whereas the United States Navy today maintains a total of 12 large attack aircraft carriers, the once-vaunted Royal Navy has none. Indeed, in all the battle fleets of the world there is no ship even remotely comparable to a Nimitz Class carrier. Today the United States Marine Corps possesses more attack aircraft than does the entire Royal Air Force. And the United States has two other even larger air forces, one an integral part of the United States Navy and the other actually called the United States Air Force. Indeed, in terms of numbers of men and women in uniform, the United States Marine Corps today is half again as large as the British Army. And the Pentagon has a second, even larger army, actually called the United States Army, which, in turn, operates its own Air Force of approximately 5,000 aircraft. All of these massive and redundant capabilities cost money. Thus, notably, the present-day Pentagon budget, adjusted for inflation, is 12 percent larger than the average defense budget of the Cold War era. That figure is now clearly out of date because I wrote this book before the last increase in defense spending. But the key point is if the Cold War was a great crisis that seemed to call upon us to maintain substantial military forces, the Cold War is gone and we are spending even more now. It mentions in today's paper that in 2002, U.S. defense spending exceeded by a factor of 25 the combined defense budgets of the seven rogue states then comprising the roster of U.S. enemies. Indeed the United States today spends more on defense than every other nation of the world combined. Again, I don't know why it is in the paper today, because it is not news. It is in my book, which was published a couple months before today's New York Times. One nation spending more on defense than every one of the other nations of the world combined is a circumstance without precedent in modern history. Now, one could conclude, "Well, I endorse that notion." But one at least ought to acknowledge that it is somewhat out of the ordinary. On a day-to-day basis, what do these expensive forces exist to do? Simply put, for the Department of Defense, defense per se figures as little more than an afterthought. What we have done since 9/11 is we have created another whole Cabinet department to defend the United States, called the Department of Homeland Security. Whereas the agency called the Department of Defense doesn't really defend the United States. It exists for what purpose? You know what purpose: for global power projection. The primary mission of America's far-flung military establishment is global power projection, which is a reality tacitly understood in all quarters of American society. Well over a decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States continues to maintain bases and military forces in several dozens of countries, and sometimes more than 100 countries. This rouses minimal controversy, despite the fact that many of these countries are perfectly capable of providing for their own security needs. We are 60 years this month after VE Day, and we still have U.S. forces in Germany. Many of you have been to Germany. You don't have to be a lover of Germany to acknowledge that this is a stable, liberal democracy, affluent, frankly facing almost zero security threats, and is eminently capable of handling its own problems. Sixty years after the end of World War II, we still have forces there. Sixty years after the end of World War II, we still have forces in Japan. Perhaps more troubling is the fact that it is not simply that we maintain these old commitments, but that we continually expand our commitments. Hamid Karzai, the President of Afghanistan, a couple of weeks ago solicits the Department of Defense, saying, "Please establish a permanent U.S. base in Afghanistan." You know that one of the aspects of the Uzbekistan story, hovering on the fringes of this civil unrest/massacre, is the fact that we have a U.S. base in Uzbekistan. Again, this is not controversial, but think about it. If you are like me, five years ago you could not have found Uzbekistan on a map. And if somebody had said to you, "I got a great idea. Let's station U.S. forces permanently in Central Asia," you would have said "You're nuts." But we do have U.S. forces in Central Asia, and my bet is that we are going to have U.S. forces in Central Asia long after my children are drawing Social Security, if there is any Social Security for them to draw. Even apart from fighting wars and pursuing terrorists, that U.S. forces are constantly prowling around the globe, training, exercising, planning, posturing, elicits no more notice from the average American than the presence of a cop on a city street corner. Even before the Pentagon officially assigned itself the mission of "shaping the international environment" members of the political elite—and, I would emphasize, liberals as much as conservatives—had reached the common understanding that scattering U.S. troops around the globe to restrain, inspire, influence, persuade, and cajole paid dividends. The indisputable fact of global U.S. military preeminence also affects the global mindset of the officer corps. For the Armed Services, dominance constitutes a baseline. Now, there was a time early in the 20th century—this was, I think, in 1916—when the Congress passed legislation that committed the United States to building a navy that will be second to none, meaning will be as good as, as strong as, the best. The best at that time was the Royal Navy. That was assumed to be adequacy. Well, now dominance is inadequate in the mindset of the officer corps. Dominance constitutes a baseline, a point of departure from which to scale the heights of ever greater capabilities. Indeed, the Services have come to view supremacy as merely adequate and any hesitation in efforts to increase the margin of supremacy as evidence of falling behind. You've got to pay attention to this debate over the F22, which is the next generation of air superiority fighter that the Air Force is determined to field, at a cost of ungodly sums of money. Is it because we face threats that can shoot down our current fleet of F15s and F16s and F14s? No. Only in the unimaginable scenario of us fighting against the Israeli Air Force. Is there any air force remotely capable of holding its own against ours? No. Notwithstanding that fact, the Air Force is adamant we have to have this new generation of fighter, because mere dominance is not enough. The new American militarism manifests itself through an increased propensity to use force, leading in effect to the normalization of war. I'm going to cut this talk in about half and make these last couple of points and then quit so that we can have some discussion. But I want to talk about this normalization of war. Self-restraint regarding the use of force in our time has now all but disappeared. Whereas during the entire Cold War era large-scale U.S. military actions abroad totaled a scant six in all, since the fall of the Berlin Wall, war has become almost an annual event. The brief period extending from 1989's Operation Just Cause—that was the overthrow of Manuel Noriega—to Operation Iraqi Freedom, which began in 2003, that brief period featured nine major military interventions. And that count, nine, excludes the innumerable lesser actions, such as Bill Clinton's signature Cruise missile attacks against obscure targets in obscure places, the almost daily bombing of Iraq beginning in December of 1998 and extending to the spring of 2003, along with the quasi-combat operations that have been GIs dispatched to Rwanda, Colombia, East Timor, and the Philippines. As crisis became a seemingly permanent condition, so too did war. The Bush Administration has tacitly acknowledged as much in describing the global campaign against terror, as a conflict likely to last decades, and in promulgating and in implementing a doctrine of preventive war. Again, I am not telling you anything you don't know, but think about it. Think about it. The Administration says that we are going to be engaged in a "global" war—"global" is their term, not my term—that is going to last how long? Decades. As a matter of fact, some Administration officials have said perhaps generations. The response of the American people to this notification—and it is simply a notification—that we are going to be engaged in a global war that is going to last decades, if not generations, is basically to say: "Well, okay. If that's what you guys say, that sounds about right." There is really no more serious critical reaction than that, simply to defer to this notification. Policymakers have increasingly come to see coercion as a sort of all-purpose tool. Among American war planners, the assumption has now taken root that wherever and whenever U.S. forces next engage in hostilities it will be the result of the United States consciously choosing to launch a war, as we did against Iraq in 2003. Would it surprise you, would it shock you, would it make you slap your forehead and say, "Boy, I never saw that coming!" if tomorrow morning you opened up your New York Times and read that the United States had launched air strikes against nuclear facilities in Iran? No, it wouldn't surprise you. You wouldn't necessarily approve of that, but that has come to be the way that we have thought about war. That has come to be the sort of prerogatives that we have claimed for ourselves with regard to the U.S. use of force. It is a prerogative claimed by the Bush Administration not simply because President Bush has fallen under the sway of a bunch of crazy neo-conservatives, but rather because we Americans, in the aftermath of Vietnam and especially since the end of the Cold War, have come to have a set of ideas about force that seems to justify and make sensible that sort of behavior. As President Bush has remarked, the big lesson of 9/11 was that "this country must go on the offense and stay on the offense." The American public's ready acceptance of the prospect of war without foreseeable end, and of a policy that abandons even the pretense of the United States fighting defensively, or viewing war as a last resort, shows clearly how far the process of militarization and of militarism has advanced. Well, I could go on to either dazzle you or fail to dazzle you with all kinds of reflections about a new aesthetic of war and of the elevation of the American soldier to the status of cultural icon, and try to persuade you that all of this package of ideas and attitudes constitutes a decisive turning-away from the values that informed the founding of this country, and in particular of the skepticism about military power and of what the Founding Fathers called "standing armies," that until very recently had been deeply inculcated into our national consciousness. But I won't. Rather, I will stop and hope that I have interested you in this, and also very much look forward to taking any questions or comments that you may have.

Alternative: reject the affirmatives notion of embracing militarism
The Military Industrial Complex views war as a business opportunity- this model requires the state to constantly construct new threats to make us fear while driving the human race ever closer to extinction

Manuel Valenzuela, attorney, consultant, freelance writer and author, 2003, “Perpetual War, Perpetual Terror”, dissident voice

The Pentagon is the Department of War, not Defense. It is in business to kill, kill, and kill some more. Without war, violence and weapons there is no Pentagon. And so to survive, to remain a player, wars must be created, weapons must be allocated, profits must be made and the Military Industrial Complex must continue exporting and manufacturing violence and conflict throughout the globe. And, as always, in the great tradition of the United States, enemies must exist. Indians, English, Mexicans, Spanish, Nazis, Koreans, Communists and now the ever-ambiguous Terrorists. The Cold War came to an end and so too the great profits of the MIC. Reductions in the Pentagon budget threatened the lifeblood of the industry; a new enemy had to be unearthed. There is no war - hence no profit - without evildoers, without terrorists lurching at every corner, waiting patiently for the moment to strike, instilling fear into our lives, absorbing our attention. We are told our nation is in imminent danger, that we are a mushroom cloud waiting to happen. And so we fear, transforming our mass uneasiness into nationalistic and patriotic fervor, wrapping ourselves up in the flag and the Military Industrial Complex. We have fallen into the mouse trap, becoming the subservient slaves of an engine run by greed, interested not in peace but constant war, constant killing and constant sacrifice to the almighty dollar. Brainwashed to believe that War is Peace we sound the drums of war, marching our sons and daughters to a battle that cannot be won either by sword or gun. We are programmed to see the world as a conflict between "Us" versus "Them", "Good" versus "Evil," that we must inflict death on those who are not with us and on those against us. The MIC prays on our human emotions and psychology, exploiting human nature and our still fragile memories of the horrors of 9/11, manipulating us to believe that what they say and do is right for us all. We unite behind one common enemy, fearing for our lives, complacent and obedient, blindly descending like a plague of locusts onto foreign land, devastating, usurping, conquering and devouring those who have been deemed enemies of the state, those who harbor and live among them, "evil ones," "evildoers" and "haters of freedom," all for the sake of profit and pillage, ideology and empire. Power unfettered and unleashed, our freedoms die and are released The so-called "War on Terror" is but a charade, a fear-engendering escapade, designed to last into perpetuity, helping guarantee that the Military Industrial Complex will grow exponentially in power. It is a replacement for a Cold War long ago since retired and unable to deliver a massive increase in defense spending. Terrorists and the countries that harbor them have replaced the Soviet Union and Communists as enemy number one. With a war that may go on indefinitely, pursuing an enemy that lives in shadows and in the haze of ambiguity, the MIC will grow ever more powerful, conscripting hundreds of thousands of our youth, sending them to guide, operate and unleash their products of death. Rumblings of bringing back the draft are growing louder, and if you think your children and grandchildren will escape it, think again. In a war without end, in battles that do not cease, the MIC will need human flesh from which to recycle those who perish and fall wounded. Empire building needs bodies and drones to go with military might, instruments of death need trigger fingers and human brains, and, with so many expendable young men and women being conditioned in this so-called "war on terror," MIC will continue its reprogramming of citizen soldiers from peaceful civilians to warmongering killing machines. After all, "War is Peace." Yet the Department of War, ever steadfast to use its weaponry, fails to realize that no amount of money will win this war if the root causes of terrorism are not confronted as priority number one. If you get to the roots, you pull out the weed. If not, it grows back again and again. But perhaps a perpetual war is what MIC has sought all along. A lifetime of combat, a lifetime of profit, a lifetime of power. Assembly lines of missiles, bombs, tanks and aircraft operate without pause, helping expand a sluggish economy and the interests of the Pax Americana. Profit over people, violence before peace, the American killing machine continues on its path to human extinction, and it is the hands and minds of our best and brightest building and creating these products of decimation.

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