This paper provides a systematic review and analysis of the financial crisis of 2007-2010. It first examines the various causes of the crisis, including growth of the housing bubble, easy credit conditions, subprime lending, predatory lending, deregulation and lax regulation, incorrect risk pricing, collapse of the shadow banking system, the commodity bubble, and systemic risk. The paper then discusses the impacts of the crisis on the major financial institutions, the financial wealth in the U.S., the real side of the U.S. economy, and the global economy—including Iceland, Hungary, Latvia, Russia, Spain, Ukraine, Dubai, and Greece. The emergency and short-term policy responses are then discussed. The paper then covers a number of principles of financial reforms and regulatory proposals, and examines a few latest U.S. reform proposals. It concludes with a discussion of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, and the reform of global capital rules—the Basel III accord—which was finally agreed by the Basel Committee on September 12, 2010.
JEL Classification: G00, G01, G18, G20, K20, N20
Keywords: Financial crisis, housing and commodity bubbles, shadow banking system, systemic risk, principles of financial reform, Dodd-Frank Reform Act, Basel III accord.
1. A Brief Introduction to the Financial Crisis2
According to leading economic figures, the financial crisis of 2007–2010 has been the most severe financial downturn since the Great Depression of the 1930s.Economist Peter Morici coined the term the “The Great Recession” to describe the period. While the causes are still being debated, many ramifications are clear and include the failure of major corporations, large declines in asset values (some estimates put the drop in the trillions of dollars range), substantial government intervention across the globe, and a significant decline in economic activity.3 Both regulatory and market based solutions have been proposed or executed to attempt to combat the causes and effects of the crisis. At the time of this writing, significant risks remain for the world economy over the coming years.4
After peaking in the United States in 2006, the global housing bubble collapsed. On the national level, home prices in the United States have dropped by almost 40% according to the Case-Schiller Home Price Index from 2006 peak to mid 2009. Securities with risk exposure to housing market plummeted, causing great damage to financial institutions across the globe. Stock markets all over the world suffered large drops in 2008 and early 2009 as questions arose regarding the solvency of major financial institutions and liquidity in the credit markets dried up. Worldwide growth slowed with the tightened credit markets and declines in international trade.5 Governments, central banks, and international organizations implemented various plans including fiscal expansion, monetary expansion and institutional bailouts at a scale never before seen to attempt to combat the crisis. Many analysts have allocated blame to inaccurate credit ratings for mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and antiquated financial regulatory practices.
While a cover story in BusinessWeek Magazine claims that economists mostly failed to predict the worst international economic crisis since the Great Depression of 1930s,6 not everyone was caught off guard. Dirk Bezemer in his research credits 12 economists with predicting (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (US), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson (US), Eric Janszen (US), Stephen Keen (Australia), Nouriel Roubini (US/Turkey), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen (Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US).
2. The Causes
The U.S. financial sector has experienced a phenomenal growth since 1940. As Figure 1 shows, its share in GDP has been on a rapid rise until the recent financial crisis.
Figure 1. Share of the U.S. financial sector in GDP since 1860.
The event that precipitated the crisis was the overvaluation of the United States housing market in 2006 and the subsequent crash. Housing prices were driven upwards by easy credit and over speculation on the belief in the false truism that housing prices always go up. Low initial rates on adjustable rate mortgages (ARM) and low down payment requirements encouraged short-term speculation with the hopes of selling or refinancing at more favorable terms. After a prolonged period of rising home prices, 2006 saw home prices start to decline as interest rates rose creating a poor refinancing environment. A rapid increase in default activity followed as home prices failed to rise as expected and mortgagors were unable to refinance upon the expiration of the initial ‘teaser’ rates and their ARM reset to higher rates.
Easy credit was available in the United States in the years leading up to the crisis because significant inflows of foreign money allowed the Federal Reserve to keep rates low. Much of the influx of foreign money came from the booming Asian economies and oil producing nations. The low rates were exacerbated by modern financial instruments such as MBS and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) that gave lenders extra incentive to make various types of loans available to consumers. As the risks associated with loan repayment (mortgages, credit cards, auto loans) were passed through to the investors in these instruments, it became easier for consumers to get loans and debt grew to unprecedented levels.7 The growth in the markets for these instruments also made it possible for investors all over the world to invest in, and therefore gain exposure to, the U.S. housing market.
Major financial institutions around the world suffered major losses when home prices dropped due to their investments in the subprime MBS market. The vicious cycle of foreclosure and falling house prices started when home values dropped below the value of the outstanding mortgage. The crisis spread to other parts of the economy as asset values and consumer and institutional wealth decreased causing defaults to mount on other types of loans. Global losses across all loan types have been estimated to be in the trillions of U.S. dollars.
At the same time that the housing bubble grew, the shadow banking system started to play a greater part in facilitating credit market liquidity within the U.S. economy. The shadow banking system consists of institutions like investment banks and hedge funds, which are not subject to the same regulations as depository institutions like commercial banks. Many of these institutions had high exposures to the MBS market and suffered large losses leading to unprecedented write downs. These losses were unable to be absorbed because of already high debt burdens. As losses mounted, the credit providing facilities of these institutions dried up inhibiting economic activity across the world. Governments stepped in with bailout funds directed at key financial institutions with hopes of restoring confidence and restarting the flow of credit.
2.1. Growth of the Housing Bubble
Home prices were pushed up by increased demand for housing. During the housing bubble, the growth of home prices outpaced income growth. Over the decade ending in 2006, the price of the typical American house increased 124%. At the peak of the bubble in 2006, the national median home price was 4.6 times the median household income. In 2004 it was 4.0 and over the entire twenty-year period prior to 2001 the ratio ranged from 2.9 to 3.1. This implies that new homebuyers increasingly took on larger loans relative to their incomes. Additionally, existing homeowners leveraged their increased paper wealth by taking out second mortgages or home equity loans (HEL) to finance home improvements and consumer spending.
From the other side, home prices were pulled upwards by a strong appetite from investors for exposure to the high yielding U.S. MBS and CDO markets over the low yielding U.S. treasuries. The flow of foreign money pouring into the U.S. increased from 2000 to 2007, outpacing the growth in supply of relatively safe assets to invest it in. Investment banks used AAA and other highly rated MBS and CDO securities to meet the demand. By 2003, the supply of securities backed by mortgages originated in the traditional way began to run out. Faced with high demand from investment banks and no intention of retaining the resulting loan on their own books, mortgage originators lent with increasingly less stringent standards as long as they could still be sold in the primary market.
The ultimate investors tended to overlook the drop in lending standards because of complexity of the origination, aggregation, and securitization process. CDOs and collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) act as conduits through which thousands of underlying mortgage loan payments are aggregated together into a pool and then paid out to a series of tranches by a well defined sequence of priority called a cash flow waterfall.8 The highest priority tranches garnered AAA or other investment grade ratings, while the lower priority tranches received lower ratings. Due to the sheer magnitude of the pools and the complexity of the waterfall pay down structures, investors relied heavily on the rating agencies’ assessments.
After the peak in 2006, housing prices in the U.S. declined over 20% by the end of 2008, as shown in Figure 2. With decreased asset values, homeowners with ARM were unable to refinance before their interest rates were due to step up. Foreclosures in 2007 increased 79% with approximately 1.3 million properties in some stage of the foreclosure process. This number rose to 2.3 million in 2008 with 9.2% of all mortgages in the U.S. in either delinquency or foreclosure. By the third quarter of 2009 this number rose to 14.4%.
Figure 2. Percentage rate of change in house price, 1978Q1-2009Q3. Shaded areas refer to recession. Source: Bernanke (2010)9
Figure 3. U.S. properties under foreclosure activity
Low interest rates made credit more accessible, enabling American consumers to increase their borrowing. In 2000, the fed funds target rate was 6.5%. Coupled with the perceived risk of deflation, the dot-com bubble and the September 11th terrorist attacks drove the Fed to lower the fed funds rate to 1% by 2003. Ben Bernanke argued that further downward pressure on rates came with the large U.S. current account deficit.10 The trade deficit’s implicit strong international demand for U.S. financial assets drove up bond prices and therefore drove down yields.
Bernanke’s argument is based on the balance of payments relationship between the current account and the capital account. In order to finance the growing U.S. current account deficit, which increased by $650 billion from 1996 to 2004 or from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP, the U.S. needed to borrow large amounts of money from abroad. Therefore large amounts of foreign money flowed into the U.S. to finance its imports. The two primary reasons why foreign countries were able to lend to the U.S. were high personal savings rates or high oil prices. American consumers used these borrowed funds to finance current consumption including housing. This inflow of capital increased demand for U.S. financial assets. Foreign government institutions tended to invest in U.S. Treasuries while financial institutions invested in the mortgage market. For these reasons Bernanke suggested that one driver of the crisis was a foreign “savings glut.”
Between mid-2004 and mid-2006, the fed funds target rate increased significantly causing ARM to have a higher interest rate reset and thereby increasing their monthly payments. These less manageable loans coupled with the inverse relationship between interest rates and asset prices made speculation in the housing market riskier.11
2.3. Subprime Lending
Subprime loans are those deemed to have a greater risk of default than conventional loans. This can be due to a poorer credit rating of the borrower and different terms of the loan such as lower down payments. In March 2007, 7.5 million first-lien subprime mortgage loans were outstanding totaling $1.3 trillion. High risk subprime lending increased due to government policies and competition among financial institutions like investment banks and the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSE) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
In 2004, the subprime market grew to 20% of the overall U.S. housing market. At that time the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relaxed its net capital rules thereby making it more attractive for investment banks to increase leverage and expand their MBS issuance. This thirst for MBS spurred more lending to riskier borrowers and spurred the GSEs to follow suit under competitive pressures. The evidence of the poorer loan screening is shown in the rise in subprime defaults, which rose to 25% in 2008 after remaining between 10-15% in the eight years prior to 2006.
Peter Wallison of the American Enterprise Institute has the crisis rooted directly in sub-prime lending by the GSEs. On 30 September 1999, The New York Times reported that the Clinton Administration pushed for sub-prime lending: “Fannie Mae, the nation's biggest underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing pressure from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people. In moving, even tentatively, into this new area of lending, Fannie Mae is taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any difficulties during flush economic times. But the government-subsidized corporation may run into trouble in an economic downturn, prompting a government rescue similar to that of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s.”12 Furthermore, the anti-redlining components of the 1977 Community Reinvestment act (CRA) were regulated and strengthened in 1995. A 2000 study by the U.S. Department of the Treasury found that $467 billion of mortgage credit went to low and middle-income neighborhoods from CRA-covered lenders between 1993 and 1998. This was still only a small portion of the increase in subprime lending as only 25% occurred at CRA-covered institutions.
Even the increase in subprime lending was unable to satisfy investor appetite. The shadow banking system was driven to replicate exposure to the MBS market using financial derivatives one hundred times over! The losses far exceeded the loans.
2.4. Predatory Lending
Predatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, to enter into “unsafe” or “unsound” secured loans for inappropriate purposes. One example is a bait-and-switch technique whereby low advertised interest rates were swapped for higher or adjustable interest terms. In some instances, negative amortization (Neg-Am) was created which acted to conceal the true terms from the borrower until a much later date.
Countrywide, a mortgage lender was charged in California with “Unfair Business Practices” and “False Advertising” by originating “to homeowners with weak credit, ARMs that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments.”
Speculative mortgagees forego the equity building benefits of home ownership and rely solely on the home price appreciation component of their investment. When home prices decreased, there was little incentive not to default. With rising homeowner defaults, Countrywide ended up being acquired by Bank of America in early 2008.
Employees at mortgage lenders frequently describe an atmosphere whereby they were pushed to originate loans and sell them through to investors with commission incentives. With no intention of keeping loans on their own books, false documentation and fraud became more prevalent.
2.5. Insufficient Regulation and Deregulation
Many argue that regulation lagged behind changes in modern finance. Some areas where change outpaced regulation include the increased relevance of the shadow banking system, the standardization and regulation of new derivative contracts and creative accounting techniques, which took advantage of off-balance sheet financing. To compound matters, financial deregulation was commonplace.
2.5.1 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
In November 1999, President Bill Clinton signed into Law the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. Some point to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act as an impetus for reduced separation between traditionally conservative commercial banks and the more risky investment banks.
2.5.2 The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act
In October 1982, President Ronald Reagan signed into Law the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act, which began the process of banking deregulation that helped contribute to the savings and loan crises of the late 80's/early 90's, and the subsequent financial crises of 2007-2010. President Reagan stated at the signing, “all in all, I think we hit the jackpot”.
2.5.3 The Net Capital Rule
In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission relaxed the net capital rule, which enabled investment banks to substantially increase the level of debt they were taking on, fueling the growth in mortgage-backed securities supporting subprime mortgages. The SEC has conceded that self-regulation of investment banks contributed to the crisis.
2.5.4 Growth of Structured Investment Vehicles (SIV)
The structured investment vehicle (SIV) was invented by Citigroup in the 1980s as a way of moving liabilities off the balance sheet thereby allowing for increased leverage. Confidence remained weak as it was reported that between $500 billion and $1 trillion of liabilities would have to be returned to the balance sheets of the four largest U.S. banks in 2009. Similar balance sheet manipulation techniques were used by Enron, precipitating its downfall in 2001.
2.5.5 The Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000
Passed in 2000, this act allowed markets for over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives to be self-regulating. Originally, derivatives were meant as tool to hedge out certain risks associated with investments. However they quickly grew to be speculative tools. Credit Default Swaps (CDS) allowed investors to gain exposure to a certain corporation without investing directly in its debt or equity. Volume in the CDS market grew 100-fold between 1998 and 2008. By late 2008 the total outstanding debt linked to CDS was around $40 trillion and the total outstanding value of the OTC derivative market hit $683 trillion in June 2008. Derivatives used in this manner allowed firms to take on excessive amounts of risk through high leverage ratios. Warren Buffet coined the term “financial weapons of mass destruction” in 2003 when referring to derivatives used as speculative tools.
2.5.6 Consumer and Institutional Over-leveraging
U.S. households and financial institutions became increasingly indebted or overleveraged during the years preceding the crisis. This increased their vulnerability to the collapse of the housing bubble and worsened the ensuing economic downturn. Key statistics include:
Consumers taking advantage of rising home prices by tapping their growing equity in the form of home equity loans (HELs) that doubled from $627 billion in 2001 to $1,428 billion in 2005, a total of nearly $5 trillion dollars over the period. U.S. home mortgage debt relative to GDP increased from an average of 46% during the 1990s to 73% during 2008, reaching $10.5 trillion.
U.S. household debt as a percentage of annual disposable personal income was 127% at the end of 2007, versus 77% in 1990.
In 1981, U.S. private debt was 123% of GDP; by the third quarter of 2008, it increased to 290%.
From 2003-07, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial leverage. These five institutions reported over $4.1 trillion in debt for fiscal year 2007, about 30% of U.S. nominal GDP for 2007. Lehman Brothers was liquidated, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were sold with the help of Fed intervention, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks, thereby becoming subject to more regulations. All except Lehman were beneficiaries of government bailout programs. Figure 4 shows the leverage ratios of major investment banks. The leverage ratio, which is total debt divided by stockholders equity, is a measure of the risk taken by a firm. A higher ratio indicates more risk. Figure 4. Leverage ratios of major U.S. investment banks
GSEs owned or guaranteed nearly $5 trillion in mortgage obligations at the time they were placed into conservatorship by the U.S. government in September 2008.
These seven entities, the five investment banks and the two GSEs, were highly leveraged and had $9 trillion in debt or guarantee obligations--an enormous concentration of risk; yet they were not subject to the same regulations as depository banks.
2.5.7 Financial Innovation
Financial innovation, or financial engineering, describes the creation of more and more specialized investment instruments designed to meet specified risk exposure profiles or diverse funding instruments, which can aid in credit flow. Examples pertaining to the financial crisis are ARM (adjustable-rate mortgage), CDO (collateralized debt obligation), CDS (credit default swap),13 CMO (collateralized mortgage obligation) and MBS (mortgage-backed security). All of these instruments gained in popularity prior to the crisis and some can be very difficult to value when the market for trading them becomes illiquid. An even more extreme example is the “CDO-square” instrument. This is a CDO whose underlying reference entities are themselves other CDOs. Such complex instruments became commonplace leading up to the crisis.
Besides making credit more accessible and allowing for more specialized risk distribution, some financial innovation was designed strictly as a way to bypass regulations. An SIV is one such instrument, which allowed using accounting techniques to mask liabilities. Martin Wolf wrote in June 2009: “...an enormous part of what banks did in the early part of this decade – the off-balance-sheet vehicles, the derivatives and the 'shadow banking system' itself – was to find a way around regulation.”14
New trading strategies developed to take advantage of these new instruments. CDOs are often divided into tranches of decreasing priority in the waterfall including senior, mezzanine and equity classes. Before the crisis, hedge funds began to set up correlation trading desks operating on the concept that if defaults across firms or industries were highly correlated then it didn’t matter which class of CDO you invested in, they would all suffer significant losses. One way of being “long correlation” involved buying the equity classes (lower rated and thus cheaper) and selling the mezzanine class (higher rated and thus more expensive).
2.6 Incorrect Risk Pricing
Pricing risk involves adding fees or higher interest rates to compensate an investor for taking on higher risk. There are several reasons why market participants failed to accurately price the risks embedded in their investments. One example is the structural risk that CDO investment introduced into the financial system. The average loss for senior CDO tranches was 68% while mezzanine tranches lost 95% on average. These massive losses left banks crippled with massive write-downs.
Another instance of incorrect risk pricing relates to CDS. A CDS contract has one party paying a periodic premium and a counterparty that pays a lump sum in the case of a credit event, such as the default of a pre-specified company. Bondholders used CDS as way of credit insurance. AIG was a major player in the CDS market. When defaults mounted, it was unable to meet its obligations as a default insurer and was taken over in 2008 by the U.S. government. $180 billion in government funds were needed to fulfill its obligations to its CDS counterparties, including many large financial institutions. The bailout of AIG was argued to have prevented many more failures through the fulfillment of its CDS obligations.
As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were reassured by the fact that both the rating agencies and bank regulators, who came to rely on agencies, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be in practice. George Soros commented, “The super-boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves. Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility.”15
2.7 Collapse of the Shadow Banking System and the Trouble in the Credit Markets
In a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the NY Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner, who in 2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury, placed significant blame for the freezing of credit markets on a “run” on the entities in the “parallel” banking system, also called the shadow banking system. These entities, investment banks and hedges funds in particular, became increasingly important as a source of credit in the economy, but were not subject to the same regulatory controls that applied to depository banks. Further, these entities were vulnerable because they borrowed short-term in liquid markets in order to fund purchases of long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in credit markets would make them subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their long-term assets at depressed prices. Geithner described that, “in early 2007, asset-backed commercial paper conduits, in structured investment vehicles, in auction-rate preferred securities, tender option bonds and variable rate demand notes, had a combined asset size of roughly $2.2 trillion. Assets financed overnight in triparty repo grew to $2.5 trillion. Assets held in hedge funds grew to roughly $1.8 trillion. The combined balance sheets of the then five major investment banks totaled $4 trillion. In comparison, the total assets of the top five bank holding companies in the United States at that point were just over $6 trillion, and total assets of the entire banking system were about $10 trillion.” He continued by saying that the “combined effect of these factors was a financial system vulnerable to self-reinforcing asset price and credit cycles.”
Paul Krugman put the collapse of the shadow banking system at the center of the crisis. “As the shadow banking system expanded to rival or even surpass conventional banking in importance, politicians and government officials should have realized that they were re-creating the kind of financial vulnerability that made the Great Depression possible—and they should have responded by extending regulations and the financial safety net to cover these new institutions. Influential figures should have proclaimed a simple rule: anything that does what a bank does, anything that has to be rescued in crises the way banks are, should be regulated like a bank.” This lack of regulation was deemed by Krugman to be “malign neglect.”
In September of 2008 there was a run on money market mutual funds. These funds typically invest in short term commercial paper, which is often used as a way for corporations to obtain working capital. Weekly withdrawals from these funds hit $144.5 billion, up from $7.1 billion the week before. Investors’ own fears for the safety of their money lead to corporations being unable to rollover their shot term debt.
The U.S. government responded by extending insurance for money market accounts analogous to bank deposit insurance via a temporary guarantee and with Federal Reserve programs to purchase commercial paper. The TED spread,16 an indicator of perceived credit risk in the general economy, spiked up in July 2007, remained volatile for a year, then spiked even higher in September 2008, reaching a record 4.65% on October 10, 2008, as shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. Long-term history of the TED spread
In a dramatic meeting on Thursday, September 18, 2008 then Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke proposed a $700 billion emergency bailout to key members of congress. Bernanke reportedly tells them: “If we don't do this, we may not have an economy on Monday.” The Emergency Economic Stabilization Act also called the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) was signed into law on October 3, 2008.
Economist Paul Krugman and current U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner explain the credit crisis in light of the implosion of the shadow banking system. Investment banks and other entities in the shadow banking system could not provide funds to mortgage firms and other corporations when their access to investor funds dried up.
This meant that nearly one-third of the U.S. lending mechanism was frozen or locked-up and continued to be into June 2009. According to the Brookings Institution, the traditional banking system does not have the capital to close this gap as of June 2009: “It would take a number of years of strong profits to generate sufficient capital to support that additional lending volume.” The authors also indicate that some forms of securitization are “likely to vanish forever, having been an artifact of excessively loose credit conditions.” While traditional banks have raised their lending standards, it was the collapse of the shadow banking system that is the primary cause of the reduction in funds available for borrowing.
2.8 The Commodity Bubble
Following the collapse of the housing bubble the global commodity market entered its own bubble. From early 2007 to mid-2008 oil prices skyrocketed from $50 to $140 a barrel then plunged to $30 by the end of 2008. The bubble has been attributed to the flight of capital from the housing market, pure speculation, increasing concern over the limited supply of natural resources and increased demand from growing, resource-hungry economies in Asia. With more money flowing to oil producing nations, economic growth in the rest of the world suffered under the increased cost burden.
Oil wasn’t the only commodity to undergo a boom followed by a bust. Other commodities also had very wide swings in prices, as shown in Table 1.
Table 1. The commodity bubble, Source: World Economic Outlook Crisis and Recovery
2.9 Capital Surplus and Manager’s Capitalism
Samir Amin, an Egyptian economist, gives an alternative view on the crisis that is rooted in a fundamental problem with western capitalism itself. Amin’s explanation centers on a growing capital surplus, which started in the 1970s as GDP growth rates in western economies, started to decrease. With fewer profitable outlets in the real economy, investors would place this surplus into the financial markets resulting in periodic booms and busts according to Amin. John Bellamy Foster of the Monthly Review attributes the slowing GDP growth since the 1970s to an increase in market saturation.
Another alternative view looks directly at the business culture that developed in American corporations. John C. Bogle looked in 2005 at the corporate managerial structure for answers: “Corporate America went astray largely because the power of managers went virtually unchecked by our gatekeepers for far too long. They failed to 'keep an eye on these geniuses' to whom they had entrusted the responsibility of the management of America's great corporations.” Some specific changes to corporate culture that he cited as fundamental to allowing the crisis to develop include:
“Manager's capitalism” which he argues has replaced “owner's capitalism,” meaning management runs the firm for its benefit rather than for the shareholders, a variation on the principal-agent problem
Escalation in executive compensation packages
Increased importance placed on share price as a measure of good business
The failure of gatekeepers, including auditors, boards of directors, Wall Street analysts, and career politicians.
2.9 Systemic Risk
Systemic risk covers the risk of an entire financial system or economy as opposed to the risk associated with a specific entity or sector of the economy. The systemic risk relevant to the crisis is overall financial system instability which is measured by the reliance of the system on specific key entities and can be compounded when certain key events occur. The idea of a firm being “too big to fail” refers specifically to the systemic risk posed by the exposure of the overall welfare of the economy to the success or failure of a specific firm.17 AIG’s large presence in the CDS bond insurance market exposed the entire system to the potential for massive failure as defaults mounted in the wake of the real estate bubble.