U.S. Army Capabilities Integration Center
The generating force consists of a wide array of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army's capabilities for employment by joint force commanders. However, extended operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other parts of the globe since 2001 have led to a significant and growing reliance on the generating force to support directly operations, either through reachback or by deploying generating force assets into theaters of operations. This is because generating force organizations have inherent capabilities based on performing their primary missions that are also operationally useful, particularly during our current conflicts, which are based on full-spectrum operations that rely heavily on such unique capabilities. This trend is expected to continue. The fundamental issue is how should the Army better leverage generating force capabilities in support of operations without interfering with the conduct of generating force primary missions.
Only in the last 2 years has the Army formally articulated the realities of this increased reliance by the operating force on the generating force, with the publication of Field Manual
1-01, Generating Force Support to Operations. This doctrinal publication presents a comprehensive overview of how the generating force has responded to the current needs of the operating force. The purpose of TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 is to follow up with an expanded view that-
Examines desired ways and means to expand, improve, or develop new capabilities, organizational efficiencies, and improved processes that will enable more effective employment of generating force capabilities in support of future joint operations.
Presents meaningful observations and implications based on this research.
Makes recommendations on initiatives and areas of further study to improve the effectiveness of generating force support.
Despite 8 years of evolving support to operations by generating force assets, research has shown that responses to validated or perceived requirements by the operating force were generally reactive as opposed to anticipatory, ad hoc in nature, and often slower than desired. Generating force organizations have demonstrated innovation, adaptability, and a willingness to reprogram internally in order to provide the best support, but have often done so in spite of – or because of – shortfalls in Army, Department of Defense, and congressionally mandated policies and processes that do not foster needed flexibility in quickly resourcing manpower and funding. The Army's challenge is in determining how to address realistically such concerns.
This study focused specifically on generating force support to operations and not on the conduct of their primary missions, although the two areas are inextricably linked. In addition, the line between the generating force and operating force is not a fixed one, as the Army adapts organizations to the evolving demands of today's operations. To better utilize generating force capabilities, these realities must be addressed. Other challenges include that no single approach can be applied to the wide diversity of generating force organizations; that joint and Army generating forces increasingly overlap; and that generating force support will be expected to enable full-spectrum operations from crisis response and expeditionary efforts to enduring operations and support to civil authorities.
This study provides a framework to move forward, both in the near term and for the future of 2016-2028, to develop more flexible, anticipatory, and institutionally enabled ways and means to ensure more effective generating force support, without damaging the primary missions of these assets. It will also help leaders, planners, and Soldiers to better understand the opportunities and challenges presented by generating force support. It is appropriate that this study is subtitled "Innovation and Adaptation in Support to Operations," as generating force organizations have shown the greatest initiative in providing such support to operating forces in peace and war.
The generating force (GF) consists of a wide array of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army's capabilities for employment by joint force commanders. Because of capabilities inherent in performing this primary mission, GF organizations also possess operationally useful capabilities for employment by or in direct support of joint force commanders, either through reachback or by deploying GF assets into theaters of operations. The demands of Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) led to a major change in the way the Army now leverages the abilities of GF organizations to support operations, resulting in a significant increase in requirements both in capabilities and capacities. This expanded reliance on GF support has established an expectation for such support in future operations.
This expanded support to operations by GF organizations evolved over time through a variety of processes, many of them informal and stovepiped. Because there is no homogeneous entity called the "generating force," oversight of this increasing support by a widely diverse array of organizations has been a challenge. Only in April 2008, with the publication of Field Manual (FM) 1-01, Generating Force Support to Operations, did the Army for the first time aggregate the broad range of ongoing support by GF assets. FM 1-01 delineated three capability areas where the GF provides support to operations:
Adapting to the operational environment.
Enabling strategic reach.
Developing multinational partner capability and capacity.
FM 1-01 remains the single major comprehensive resource for the operational Army to understand how the GF has responded to the current needs of the operating force, but the FM is not meant to determine the way ahead. The purpose of this GF study is to take the next step in reviewing GF support, including the latest ongoing efforts; examine desired ways and means to expand, improve, or develop new capabilities, organizational efficiencies, and improved processes that will enable more effective employment of GF capabilities in support of future joint operations; present meaningful observations and implications based on this research; and make recommendations on initiatives and areas of further study to improve the effectiveness of GF support.
What this study does not do is to review or assess the primary mission sets of the various GF organizations. This study strictly focuses on GF support to operations, but it is mindful that such support has normally been at the expense of the ability of the GF to carry out these primary missions. Balancing these demands and prioritizing resources is a fundamental issue for GF organizations. Despite this, the inherent capabilities that are derived from primary mission support will necessarily be drawn from in the future, as it will normally be difficult to replicate them in the operational Army. In some cases, in fact, the operational Army has provided assets to carry out GF tasks because of a shortfall in resources, or because of unique considerations in matching capabilities against tasks. This blurring of the lines between the GF and operational Army is another phenomenon of recent operations, and one that will continue. As the Army builds enterprises to provide seamless, global support to operations, we will continue to see layering of GFs and operating forces under command and control constructs charged with worldwide functional integration, such as logistics, intelligence, and networked communications.
The GF study researched seven themes:
Improving the expeditionary quality of the GF.
GF reachback support to operations.
GF roles in building partner capacity in support of operations.
GF support to improvements in strategic responsiveness of operating forces.
Accelerated materiel development and equipping the force.
Incorporating GF capabilities into the joint global force management process.
Mitigating strategies to reduce the impact on GF primary missions.
The study methodology comprised four main lines of effort. The start point and foundation for the GF study was FM 1-01. With the complexity and diversity of the GF, the study relied upon close collaboration with subject matter experts from each of the GF organizations making significant contributions to ongoing operational requirements, with an integrated concept team as the framework for teamwork. A comprehensive research effort focused on three perspectives: relevant historical experience; the recent operational experience of GF elements in support of OEF and OIF; and in-depth investigation into the innovation introduced within specific GF organizations to respond to operational requirements. Finally, the study effort employed the Unified Quest 2009 series of seminars as a means of collaboration and concentrated examination of specific study issues and themes.
Despite 8 years of evolving support to operations by GF assets, research has shown that responses to validated or perceived requirements by the operating force were generally reactive as opposed to anticipatory, ad hoc in nature, and sometimes slower than desired. GF organizations have demonstrated innovation, adaptability, and a willingness to reprogram internally in order to provide the best support, but have often done so in spite of – or because of – shortfalls in Army, Department of Defense (DOD), and congressionally-mandated policies and processes that do not foster needed flexibility in quickly resourcing manpower and funding. The Army's challenge is in determining how to address realistically such concerns. Highlights of the observations and conclusions made by this study include the following.
Capacity shortfalls within GF organizations to accomplish their mandated primary missions and to support operating forces represent the main challenge to expanding and improving GF support to operations. Most often, critical capabilities for both mission sets must come from the same source of personnel and resources.
Capacity shortfalls within the GF will likely be exacerbated in the future by the diminishing volume of supplemental funding as deployed forces are drawn down, as well as by the current Grow the Army strategy, which projects reductions in the size of the GF.
Because of the absence of a surge capacity in GF organizations, ad hoc measures that were based largely on redirecting resources from primary missions characterized the great majority of GF initiatives to adapt to requirements to support operations. Reliance on ad hoc solutions was the default approach due to the lack of anticipation that exists within the overall Army regarding requirements for GF support.
Decisions and effective action to institutionalize change to GF organizations in order to place them on a firm, sustainable foundation to support recurring requirements for support to operations almost always require an inordinate period of time, owing to the requirement to establish force design updates (FDU), manpower authorizations, and funding lines. This is a prime example of fundamental policy issues that must be reexamined.
The long-term existence of expeditionary capability created in the GF to meet operational requirements remains in question, especially once the pressures of OEF and OIF diminish. This suggests the need for an approach that is scalable, permitting the maintenance at least of skeletal or cadre-like organizations, on-the-shelf organizational documents, and standing contract mechanisms that can be quickly activated or expanded as needs increase.
The commitment of GF capabilities to support operating forces suffers from a lack of visibility, with concomitant negative impacts on resourcing and management of the requirements.
Committing operating forces to execute GF tasks, notably in the conduct of training, will remain an unavoidable response to GF capacity constraints.
The Army's ability to employ contractors, notably through supplemental funding, to accomplish GF activities in theater continues to be an indispensable component of operational success. It is the most flexible means to support rapid response, adaptation, and termination in theater, and to maintain the viability of GF organizations at home station to perform primary missions.
The Army has not been able to exploit fully its large contingent of general service civilians effectively in expeditionary operations. Current initiatives to establish a civilian expeditionary workforce are moving slowly.
Interoperability and support requirements must be captured for deployed GF assets.
The Army's current approach to building partner capacity and security force assistance is incomplete and does not account for all the variations of GF support that will be required in these areas in the future.
There is a critical need to institutionalize fully processes for accelerated capability development and equipping.
Because GF organizations differ significantly from each other in mission, design, and oversight, single solutions cannot be applied to them in a wholesale fashion. Initiatives must be deliberate and measured, focused on specific components of the GF, and balance risk to GF primary missions and resource demands against operational utility. With these caveats in mind, the following recommendations are presented, in no order of priority.
The Army and DOD should evolve the integrating authority and processes to improve visibility, oversight, management, and tasking of GF capabilities, including incorporation of GF capabilities in the global force management process.
Assess a tiered approach to generating responsive capabilities, with a balance between standing assets institutionalized by approved tables of distribution and allowances (TDA) and by ad hoc measures.
Improve the expeditionary quality of GF assets, including a surge capacity for support to no-notice and short-notice contingency operations, development of a civilian expeditionary workforce, and the ability to provide tailored exportable assets.
Better enable the capacity to provide reachback support to operations, including resourced operations centers fully enabled by the global network.
Better leverage GF capabilities for support to building capability and capacity in partner nations, with a focus on reconstruction and security force assistance.
Institutionalize the capability for accelerated materiel development and equipping in response to urgent operational needs.
Identify options to mitigate the negative effects of diverting capabilities normally committed to GF primary mission performance, as well as developing metrics to determine readiness of GF organizations.
In addition, possible means to enhance the ability of GF organizations to support operations are presented, organized under seven the themes used in this study. Due to the critical link between GF primary missions and support to operations, a TRADOC concept for GF support to operations is not recommended at this time. Because Headquarters (HQ), Department of the Army (DA) is the HQ that oversees the GF, an alternate could be an Army-level strategy. Recommendations for further investigation are below and not in any order of priority.
Explore expanding the capability within the reserve components (RC) to function as an "operational reserve" to GF organizations, to include the idea of deliberately building more GF capability into the RCs in order to respond directly to requests for GF capability or expanded capacity to support operating forces. The overarching goal would be to achieve the optimum balance between the active Army and RC in this regard.
Examine solutions to the command, control, and support challenges that occasionally complicate the effectiveness of the employment of GF elements deployed in support of operating forces.
Assess the utility of incorporating a more deliberate regional orientation within GF organizations beyond what already exists with respect to theater committed forces under GF parent commands.
Analysis of the long-term effect on GF organizations in meeting the surge of requirements for support to ongoing operations.
Examine capacity shortfalls that may arise within the GF with the current "Grow the Army" strategy, which projects the reduction in size of the GF, this despite the expectation for continued or even expanded support to operations by the GF, and at the same time that primary mission capacity must increase to meet the needs of a larger Army. This includes consideration of expected long-term, uninterrupted demands for stability operations, and the impact of diminished supplemental funding that has sourced expanded contractor support to the GF.
Assess in greater detail how GF organizations in all components of the Army support homeland defense and provide direct support to civil authorities, as well as future opportunities and challenges for such support.
Explore how the Army can better leverage joint GF capabilities that reside outside of the service.
Determine specific emerging GF capabilities that may be required for future operational requirements for 2016 and beyond.
Additional applications of GF study results are: (1) inform the proponent for FM 1-01 on the latest initiatives for GF support to operations; (2) provide a perspective to the HQDA Enterprise Task Force on this aspect of GF organizations; (3) support the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) leads for the warfighting functions in the conduct of their capabilities-based assessments (CBA); and (4) support TRADOC in determining required capabilities for the capabilities needs analysis (CNA) process for FY2014-19 and beyond.
FOR THE COMMANDER:
OFFICIAL: JOHN E. STERLING, JR.
Lieutenant General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commanding General/
Chief of Staff
History. TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 is the result of a Commanding General (CG) TRADOC, directive to develop a generating force (GF) concept that moved beyond Field Manual 1-01, Generating Force Support to Operations, and to examine how the GF might transform itself further to expand its capability to support future operations in the 2020-2030 timeframe. The study will serve as an underpinning for other documents within the Army Concept Framework.
Summary. TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 addresses the next step in reviewing GF support, including the latest ongoing efforts. It examines desired ways and means to expand, improve, or develop new capabilities, organizational efficiencies, and improved processes that will enable more effective employment of GF capabilities in support of future joint operations. The study presents meaningful observations and implications based on this research; and makes recommendations on initiatives and areas of further study to improve the effectiveness of GF support. This study does not review or assess the primary mission sets of the various GF organizations. This study strictly focuses on GF support to operations, but it is mindful that such support has normally been at the expense of the ability of the GF to carry out these primary missions.
Applicability. This study is part of future force development and subsequent developments of supporting concepts, concept capability plans, and the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) process. It supports experimentation described in the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) Campaign Plan and functions as a basis for developing solutions related to the future force within the doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. This concept applies to all TRADOC, DA, and Army Reserve component activities that develop DOTMLPF requirements.
Proponent and supplementation authority. The proponent of this pamphlet is the TRADOC Headquarters, Director, ARCIC. The proponent has the authority to approve exceptions or waivers to this pamphlet that are consistent with controlling law and regulations. Do not supplement this pamphlet without prior approval from Director, TRADOC ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 33 Ingalls Road, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1061.
Suggested improvements. Users are invited to submit comments and suggested improvements via The Army Suggestion Program online at https://armysuggestions.army.mil (Army Knowledge Online account required) or via DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Director, TRADOC ARCIC (ATFC-ED), 33 Ingalls Road, Fort Monroe, Virginia 23651-1061. Suggested improvements may also be submitted using DA Form 1045 (Army Ideas for Excellence Program Proposal).
Availability. This regulation is available on the TRADOC homepage at http://www.tradoc.
Executive Summary 5
1-1. Background 15
1-2. Purpose 15
1-3. Scope 15
1-4. Defining the GF 16
1-6. Methodology 19
1-7. Record of activities 19
Improving the Expeditionary Quality of the Generating Force 21
2-1. Synopsis 22
2-2. Introduction 22
2-3. GF organizations 23
2-4. Expeditionary mindset 45
2-5. Lessons learned 45
Generating Force Reachback Support to Operations 47
3-1. Synopsis 47
3-2. Introduction 47
3-3. GF knowledge and analysis centers 48
3-4. Conclusion 57
Generating Force Roles in Building Partner Capacity in Support of Operations 59
4-1. Synopsis 59
4-2. Introduction 59
4-3. Reconstruction and infrastructure development 62
4-4. Observations, conclusions, and recommendations 74
GF Support to Improvement in Strategic Responsivenss of the Operational Army 77
5-1. Synopsis 77
5-2. Introduction 77
5-3. Study constraints 78
5-4. Conclusion 82
Accelerating Materiel Development and Equipping 84
6-1. Synopsis 84
6-2. Introduction 84
6-3. Definitions 84
6-4. Historical perspective 85
6-5. GF adaptation from 2002 to 2008 87
6-6. Institutionalizing rapid equipping functions within the GF 99
6-7. Principles and guidelines for execution 101
6-8. Budgeting and programming principles 105
6-9. Concluding caveat 105
6-10. Related future studies 105
Integrating GF Capabilities within the Joint Global Force Management Process 106
7-1. Synopsis 106
7-2. Introduction 106
7-3. Projected benefits 107
7-4. The JCRM 108
7-5. Challenges to implementation 109
7-6. Conclusion 111
Mitigating Strategies 111
8-1. Synopsis 111
8-2. Introduction 112
8-3. Strategies 112
8-4. Conclusion 116
Observations, Conclusions, and Recommendations 117
9-1. Overview 117
9-2. Observations and conclusions 118
9-3. Recommendations 122
9-4. Suggestions for further study 123
Principles of Employment of GF Capabilities in Support of Operations 131
C-1. Introduction 133
C-2. DOD and joint strategic level 133
C-3. Army Level 133
C-4. Generating force 134
Review of Means to Enhance GF Support to Operations 135