From the Director U. S. Army Capabilities Integration Center


-8. Budgeting and programming principles



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6-8. Budgeting and programming principles

a. Funding flexibility. Experience unequivocally demonstrates that the dynamic nature of rapid materiel development and equipping requires both a reliable, predictable funding line and a flexible means of using that funding line, with access to additional funding in the budget year, if needed. That suggests that the approach currently pursued by both JIEDDO and REF – establishment of a base budget in the POM, with access to existing supplemental funding (or support through new supplemental legislation) – is an appropriate funding strategy for a future AMDEO. In addition, designation of base budget dollars as multiyear funding would further enhance flexibility.

b. Authority to commit funding and rapid access to contractors. Selected persons in the AMDEO and its forward support teams must have the authority to commit funding quickly to meet project deadlines. That authority could include direct purchases under a specified ceiling without use of a contract vehicle, as well as the capability to execute contracts very rapidly via warranted contracting officers on staff or a dedicated, priority support relationship from an existing government contracting office.

6-9. Concluding caveat


As described in paragraph 3, the historical record exists of previous attempts to institutionalize a capability for accelerated materiel development and equipping. However, circumstances always arose in the past that resulted in decisions to disestablish that capability. Generally, those circumstances included reduced demand for rapid development and equipping, coupled with budget pressure. The Army will likely face those circumstances again in the near-term. Should they lead to decisions in the future not to retain a standing organizational capability in this area, the least that the Army should do to remain somewhat prepared for the re-emergence of such requirements is to retain the TDAs and supporting documentation that could be used to quickly reinstate the capability.155

6-10. Related future studies

This chapter focuses heavily on rapid materiel development and equipping as a GF function that should be institutionalized and improved in order to enhance GF support to operating forces in active theaters. Related studies that could be considered for future work include the development of an accelerated fielding process that operates in parallel with the existing deliberate process, and the deliberate identification of key technology vectors and their applications that will likely be needed in the future joint operating environment.



Chapter 7
Integrating GF Capabilities within the Joint Global Force Management Process




7-1. Synopsis


During the course of OEF and OIF, Army GF organizations have frequently committed a significant measure of their capabilities in support of ongoing operations in theater. Although the employment of GF capabilities has contributed favorably to operational success, the response to theater demands has often been slow, ad hoc, and reactive in nature. To better support joint and Army commanders in planning, exercises, and operations, they require improved visibility of and access to the operationally useful capabilities resident with Army (as well as joint) generating force assets. To more fully optimize this visibility and access, GF capabilities should be incorporated within the joint global force management (GFM) process and reflected in the JCRM.

7-2. Introduction

a. One of the unexpected and distinctive characteristics of OEF and OIF is the comprehensive employment of Army GF capabilities in support of operating forces. The long-term commitment of the Army to these COIN and stability operations placed demands for capabilities (and sometimes capacities) within operating forces that necessitated expanded reliance on GF organizations outside of their traditional missions. This blurred the lines that had previously existed between operating forces and the Army GF, as it was realized that successful execution of the extraordinarily wide range of functions and activities inherent within irregular warfare required capabilities that only existed within the GF or could be more readily created within the GF. Encompassing both direct and reachback support, GF support to operations has manifested itself in a variety of forms from individual augmentation, to small capabilities-based functional packages, to the creation of completely new capabilities. The cumulative effect of these efforts has been judged as having high operational significance, particularly after the conclusion of major combat operations in those campaigns.

b. Despite the fact that the employment of the GF in this fashion constitutes a notable success story, more often than not the response to the need for GF support to operations has been ad hoc and reactive in nature, rather than anticipatory and planned. Since no redundancy exists within the Army GF to perform these functions, the commitment of GF capabilities also produced significant stress and strain on the ability of some GF organizations to accomplish their primary Title 10 missions. In addition, much, if not most, of the employment of GF capabilities in reachback support has occurred outside the scope of the force management process and so lacked visibility. The unpredictable and ad hoc nature of the vast majority of demands for reachback support has introduced longstanding management challenges. The lack of adequate visibility of all requirements being placed on the GF also makes it difficult to accurately quantify costs and risks. In short, the Army cannot quantify the demand signal that the GF is meeting, nor the costs and risks associated with those requirements.

c. Simultaneously, efforts to measure the readiness or effectiveness of GF organizations are hindered by the absence of meaningful metrics. However, given the diversity of GF organizations and the functions that they perform, devising a means of measuring readiness and the impact of task loads on these organizations will likely need to be adapted to each organization. Past studies to examine this issue have not produced actionable, effective solutions because the nature of Title 10 functions resists quantification and effectiveness metrics.156 Growing the Army over the next several years will unquestionably require simultaneous evolution and adaptation of the GF even while support to ongoing operations will still be expected. The challenge is in assessing the balance of missions and the resources required for GF organizations under this changing set of conditions. All of the factors described here introduce complexity and uncertainty with respect to decisions regarding GF structure, management, and resourcing.

d. It could be argued that the conditions described above are a temporary anomaly that will decline significantly when U.S. forces are drawn down from Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, one of the fundamental assumptions in the current administration and DOD is the expectation that the demands of an era of persistent conflict will drive the continuing long-term commitment of U.S. forces abroad. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the future will require expansion of, and improvement in, the manner in which GF capabilities are employed to support full-spectrum joint operations. The challenge is made more difficult by the indispensable need for the GF to maintain its ability to perform its primary, routine missions within the level of its current capacities, which are projected to decrease, not increase, in the future. Although some operational demands for GF capabilities have been met by other services, the record shows that the Army has borne most of that burden. It is appropriate to assess where other services could increase their role in meeting future requirements, and where the Army must retain or expand capabilities, based on inherent Army expertise or assigned executive agent responsibilities. In addition, certain joint GF assets (though often still sourced directly by the services) could also expand support to operations.
e. All of these factors support the supposition that joint Army force overall will be well served by deliberate action to incorporate Army, other service, and joint GF capabilities into the GFM, with their inclusion into JCRM.




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