From the Director U. S. Army Capabilities Integration Center


Chapter 1 Introduction 1-1. Background



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Chapter 1

Introduction




1-1. Background

a. One of the distinctive features of the first 5 years of Army operations in OEF and OIF was the increasing employment of GF capabilities in direct support of operations. The operational significance of this support, as well as the realization that the lines that traditionally separated activities of the GF from those of operating forces were blurring together, informed a 2007 decision by the CG, TRADOC, to originate capstone doctrine to address GF support to operations. As this effort culminated in early 2008 in the form of Army FM 1-01, Generating Force Support to Operations, the CG approved a program directive on 29 January 2008, that instructed Director, ARCIC to develop a GF concept that moved beyond FM 1-01 to examine how the GF might transform further to improve and expand capability to support future operations in the 2020-2030 timeframe.1


b. The ARCIC Director assigned responsibility for the project to the Joint and Army Concepts Division (JACD). JACD rapidly initiated collaboration with representatives of GF organizations in order to clarify the scope of the project and shape the effort. Subsequently, however, the decision to develop a concept was reconsidered on the grounds of uncertain need. Instead, the ARCIC Director redirected JACD to conduct a GF study as a means of determining whether or not substantive grounds exist to write a formal concept.

1-2. Purpose

TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 examines the ways and means of developing new capabilities, organizational efficiencies, and improved processes that will enable more effective employment of GF capabilities in support of future joint operations.2


1-3. Scope

a. GF functions and capabilities extend across an extraordinarily broad range. They encompass all of the DOTMLPF domains and are applicable to the entire range of military operations and all phases of joint campaigns. Thus, establishing the appropriate scope for this concept was a fundamental start-point for an effective, manageable effort. From the beginning of collaboration with the community of GF experts, it became clear that many GF representatives preferred a scope that would encompass primary missions as well as support to operations.


b. The primary driver of this perspective was a widely shared concern that the commitment of GF capabilities in support of operations had introduced demands on their organizations that directly competed with, and possibly interfered with, the conduct of their primary GF missions due to resulting capacity shortfalls. Concentrating only on GF support to operations might divert attention away from the primary missions of GF organizations, the basis for the establishment of these organizations in the first place. Ultimately ARCIC concluded that such a scope was far too broad, would require a large effort and a great deal of time, and deviated too far from the intent expressed in the program directive. Thus, in April 2008, the concept scope (and subsequently the study) approved at TRADOC excluded consideration of GF primary missions and directed that the project "… focus on those components of the GF that have the greatest potential to enable more effective land force contributions in support to joint operations."

1-4. Defining the GF

a. The GF consists of Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army's capabilities for employment by joint force commanders. GF organizations perform functions which are defined or implied by law (most notably, Title 10) and addressed in Army regulations and DA pamphlets.3 Because of its performance of functions specified and implied by law, the GF also possesses operationally useful capabilities for employment by or in direct support of joint force commanders.4

b. HQDA categorizes organizations as part of the GF based on this basic definition, but it has already been noted that the line between the GF and operational Army continues to blur. Thus HQDA does reassess how it categorizes organizations in terms of formal oversight, and will realign an organization between the GF and the operational Army when deemed appropriate. At the start of the GF Study, the GF included the following organizations:
(1) HQDA.
(2) Three Army commands (ACOM): TRADOC, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), and U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC).
(3) Eleven direct reporting units (DRU):
(a) HQ, U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC).
(b) U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
(c) U.S. Army Installation Management Command (IMCOM).
(d) U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM).
(e) U.S. Army Medical Command (MEDCOM).
(f) U.S. Army Network Enterprise Technology Command/9th Signal Command (Army) (Network Enterprise Technology Command (NETCOM)/9th Signal Command (Army) (SC(A)).
(g) U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC).
(h) U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Command (CIDC).
(i) Military District of Washington (MDW).5
(j) United States Military Academy (USMA).
(k) U.S. Army Acquisition Support Center (USAASC).
(4) Non-ACOM and non-DRU: HQ, Army National Guard (ARNG).

c. Field operating agencies (FOA) such as the Center for Army Analysis and the U.S. Army Force Management Support Activity also fall within the GF. In addition, HQDA force management rules include Army service component commands (ASCC) as GF organizations, but ASCCs do not comprise part of this study because they are theater-committed organizations whose primary missions encompass support to operations. As of 5 May 2009, GF personnel numbered 95,373 Soldiers and 235,161 civilians, excluding contractors.6

d. The increasing complexity in differentiating GF and operating force organizations is highlighted with the HQDA effort to formally categorize Army forces.7
(1) While the terms institutional Army and operational Army continue to be used, HQDA identifies assets as GF or operating force, with a range of subcategories for each. Operating forces are also grouped under the Army global force pool construct to enable Army force generation (ARFORGEN) to integrate into the global force management process. FM 1-01's definition of "generating force" is applied in identifying GF organizations. The possible overlap of the two categories comes with the desire to explicitly identify as "available as required" those Army capabilities and forces within the GF that are not intended to deploy or rotate through the ARFORGEN cycle. These forces can be made available to deploy as needed (but these cannot be committed without HQDA approval, underscoring that HQDA remains the overseer and integrator of GF support to operations). In this way, some aspects of the GF can be linked to the global force management process.

(2) GF assets are further identified as generating force, theater committed (GFTC), which are organizations whose sole purpose is to sustain an ACOM, ASCC, or DRU by continuing to support operational capabilities. They are also identified as, generating force, globally available (GFGA), which serves the role of available as required; and generating force, strategic asset (GFSA), which are Army capabilities and forces that do not deploy, but do, however, provide support with reachback capability. The operating force categories are more complicated, and include operating force, theater committed (OFTC), which are authorized primarily to meet enduring theater requirements. The operating force, globally available (OFGA), established for the primary purpose of fulfilling global operational requirements; and operational force, globally available low density (OFGL) rotational assets that exist in quantities that preclude them from being rotated at rates prescribed in the steady state rotational policy. Note that the parent ACOM, ASCC, or DRU retains administrative control of these forces, and is responsible for unit readiness. Such categorization has implications on asset visibility, readiness reporting, application of the ARFORGEN process, and resourcing.

(3) The total Army analysis (TAA) process had already been expanded to include both modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) and (TDA organizations (including augmentation TDAs), and in fiscal year (FY) 2010 is transitioning from a focus on MTOE and TDA categories to a focus on operating force and GF categories. Ultimately, resourcing issues for the GF, especially in organizational designs and personnel authorizations, must be resolved through the TAA process.
(4) As noted earlier, forces can be recategorized by HQDA through reassessments based on application of these definitions and the evolution of force designs and missions.
(5) Finally, the complexities of chains of command applied to GF organizations must be acknowledged. Administrative control and operational control of assets may often involve different chains of command, particularly for GF assets aligned with ASCCs or are deployed. In reality, policy, doctrine, and actual practice do not always match, and each GF organization must operate under unique alignments.

e. Three observations from the description of the GF are particularly noteworthy. First, the use of the term "generating force" is inherently misleading because it tends to create the image of a homogenous organization when, in fact, the opposite is true. The diversity within the GF is one of its most striking features. Unlike operating forces, every GF organization varies significantly from others in size and structure and performs unique, complex functions across a broad expanse of activities not duplicated elsewhere (with minor exceptions). As a result of this diversity, the GF is generally not subject to "one size fits all" kinds of change, except at the highest level, where common policy and procedures govern all Army organizations. Initiatives introduced in one GF organization to generate effective change, therefore, may not be meaningful for other GF elements.

f. Second, there are few "pure" GF organizations. Most major GF parent commands include subordinate organizations that are officially categorized as operating forces by HQDA. For example, AMC, INSCOM, and NETCOM all include theater-committed brigades or theater commands that are numbered operating forces, deliberately created and resourced to actively support operations as a primary mission. This is an important distinction to keep in mind during the course of this study, although the study will demonstrate examples of how the creation of MTOE-based units under GF parent command is one means of extending GF capability and functionality in support of operations. An illustrative example, described in greater detail in chapter 2, is the Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) under AMC. Subordinate MTOE contracting units in the ECC were established as operating force units created and resourced by the Army specifically to deploy in support of Army and joint forces. These units perform contracting missions as part of their training when not deployed, but the Army established this force structure to support deployed forces and not to perform enduring garrison contracting workload. The ARNG and the Army Reserve field similar MTOE contingency contracting force structure. Informally, this evolution of echeloned GF and operating force assets has been termed "hybrid" or "blended" organizations.8
g. Third, no single voice represents the GF. Although the Army Enterprise initiative will eventually group most GF organizations into four core enterprises,9 at the present time each GF organization functions as an independent advocate for its own interests with respect to size, structure, and resourcing.

1-5. Operational problem statement10

a. The study poses the following statements to describe the problem in the relevant operational context: The operational environment and challenges of the 21st century will continue to drive a high Army tempo, including an increasing demand for the commitment of GF capabilities in support of operations. However, given its primary mission to train, equip, and sustain the Army, the GF is not organized effectively to support operating forces in theater.

b. Although the GF has responded in creative ways to provide its capabilities in support of recent operations, with a few exceptions the response has been reactive (vice anticipatory), ad hoc in nature, and not as responsive as desirable. To increase operational effectiveness in future conflict, the Army needs to improve its ability to fully leverage GF capabilities in support of all phases of operations and simultaneously evolve the integrating authority and processes to improve visibility, oversight, management, and tasking of GF capabilities, including both reachback capabilities and those identified for employment in theater.




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