a. Because GF organizations differ significantly from each other in mission, design, and oversight, single solutions cannot be applied to them in a wholesale fashion. Initiatives must be deliberate and measured, focused on specific components of the GF, and balance risk to GF primary missions and resource demands against operational utility. With these caveats in mind, the following baseline recommendations are presented, in no priority order.
b. The Army and DOD should evolve the integrating authority and processes to improve visibility, oversight, management, and tasking of GF capabilities, including incorporation of GF capabilities in the global force management process.
c. Assess a tiered approach to generating responsive capabilities, with a balance between standing assets institutionalized by approved TDA and by ad hoc measures.
d. Improve the expeditionary quality of GF assets, including a surge capacity for support to no-notice and short-notice contingency operations, development of a CEW, and the ability to provide tailored exportable assets.
e. Better enable the capacity to provide reachback support to operations, including resourced operations centers fully enabled by the global network.
f. Better leverage GF capabilities for support to building capability and capacity in partner nations, with a focus on reconstruction and SFA.
g. Institutionalize the capability for accelerated materiel development and equipping in response to urgent operational needs.
h. Identify options to mitigate the negative effects of diverting capabilities normally committed to GF primary mission performance, as well as developing metrics to determine readiness of GF organizations.
i. In addition, possible means to enhance the ability of GF organizations to support operations are presented in more detail in appendix D, organized under the seven themes used in this study.
9-4. Suggestions for further study
a. During the course of researching TRADOC Pam 525-8-1, the following topics emerged as fruitful targets for additional investigation.
b. Exploration of possibly expanding GF capabilities within the RC based on the concept of the RC functioning as an operational reserve.174 One such approach would be a comprehensive strategy in the USAR providing an organizational reserve for the GF – that is, not just serving as a source of individual augmentees, but also of a greater range of assets designed specifically to backfill, add capacity, or even add new capabilities to GF organizations. Another approach to consider would be deliberately building more GF capability within the RC to respond directly to requests for GF capability to support operating forces. A prime example of an integrated augmentation organization designed to expand other GF capabilities to perform both Title 10 missions and support to operations is the ARSC. The overarching goal in this investigation is to achieve the optimum balance between the active Army and RC with respect to meeting demands for GF capabilities in support of operations more effectively and responsively.175
c. Examination of the command, control, and support challenges that occasionally complicate the effectiveness of the employment of GF elements deployed in support of operating forces, with a view toward discovering potential solutions.
d. Consideration of the need and desirability of incorporating a regional orientation within GF organizations that extends beyond what already exists with respect to theater committed forces under GF parent commands.
e. Analysis of the long-term effect on GF organizations in meeting the surge of requirements for support to ongoing operations. In order to rapidly satisfy the needs of operating forces by realigning priorities, personnel, organizations, and funding, the issue is whether damage has been done to these organizations in meeting future requirements to carry out primary missions, retain manpower, and ability to reprioritize tasks.
f. It was noted earlier in this chapter that capacity shortfalls which exist within the GF may be exacerbated by the current Grow the Army strategy, which projects that the overall size of the GF may be reduced, while the size of operating forces will increase to meet the Army's new end-strength ceiling. The information in this study suggests that it would be prudent to revisit this aspect of the Army strategy for the following reasons.
(1) The Army already recognizes in its 2008 Stability Operations White Paper that the Army "lacks competence, capability, and capacity" in both the GF and operating forces "to accomplish nontraditional missions" connected to stability operations.
(2) Simultaneously, the Army's commitment to the idea that the Nation has entered an era of persistent conflict includes an inherent expectation that Army involvement in stability operations will be a frequent, perhaps even a constant, feature of the future OE, perpetuating demands for GF support to operations.
(3) In addition, the growth of the operational Army will increase requirements within the GF to man, equip, train, and sustain those new forces as they are established.
(4) It is reasonable to expect that contractor support enabled through supplemental funding on which many GF organizations currently rely will also suffer cutbacks.
(5) Under these conditions, the intent to implement reductions in the size and capacity of the military and civilian structure within the GF would seem to raise additional, serious doubts about the ability of the GF to meet continuing requirements to support operating forces and simultaneously satisfy an expansion of requirements regarding its primary GF missions.
g. Assess in greater detail how GF organizations in all components of the Army support homeland defense and defense support to civil authorities, and identify future opportunities and challenges. There are unique GF capabilities in the active Army, USAR, and ARNG that can support any Federal response, and some remain untapped.176 As an example, the concept of reachback for local, state, and Federal non-DOD entities represents a particular subset of the joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational philosophy, but which raise unique policy and access issues.
h. Explore how the Army can better leverage joint GF capabilities that reside outside of the service.
i. Determination of specific GF capabilities that may be required for future operational requirements with the potential to emerge in the more distant future (2016 and beyond), in concert with the development of updated Army concepts under the emerging Army Concepts Framework.