From the Director U. S. Army Capabilities Integration Center

Appendix B Principles of Employment of GF Capabilities in Support of Operations

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Appendix B

Principles of Employment of GF Capabilities in Support of Operations

The following principles of employment of the GF in support of operations are compiled from FM 1-01, operational experience during OIF and OEF, and implications derived from this study.

a. GF organizations derive their operational utility from the performance of primary functions, but must also possess the inherent organizational versatility and agility to tailor capabilities to support unique operational requirements. GF capabilities are normally configured to meet primary missions, but can be reconfigured to meet and support operations.
b. GF organizations perform the same sort of missions in support of operating forces as they do in generating and sustaining Army capabilities, but under different conditions.
c. GF capabilities will often support and enable other U.S. non-DOD governmental activities; a significant example is assisting in building partner capacity.
d. GF organizations will deliberately adopt an expeditionary mindset and establish an inherent capability for rapid, timely support to operations, encompassing reachback, virtual presence, and exportable and deployable capabilities. GF organizations will design a tiered approach to generating these responsive capabilities.
e. The GF will employ capabilities in support of operating forces that are both standing (institutionalized by TDA) and ad hoc in nature; however, limiting the degree of reliance on the ad hoc formation of capabilities will improve timeliness, reduce internal disruption and risk to primary missions, and better enable anticipatory rather than reactive support.
f. If needed, a common regional framework will be adopted and applied to GF organizations as a means of improving adaptation to the operational environment.

g. Although the GF's primary missions determine its overall capacity, the requirements of the future OE place a premium on processes and measures that will enable the generation of a surge capacity for support to no-notice/short-notice contingency operations.

h. Under certain conditions, the operational Army will support GF tasks and missions. GF capabilities will not be applied to perform security functions and are normally not capable of independent (self-sustaining) operations.
i. ASCCs are the nexus where GF capabilities are incorporated into military planning and from where requirements for GF support emerge, but effective employment of GF capabilities further requires visibility of and planning for GF capabilities above and below the level of the ASCC.
j. GF capabilities must be balanced between the active Army and RC based upon deliberate metrics (such as responsiveness, scale, capacity, uniqueness, level of demand, cost, risk, and others).

k. Operational significance represents the foundational metric for judging the need for DOTMLPF change within the GF to support operations.

l. An overarching joint GF construct may emerge to better illuminate, rationalize, prioritize, monitor, and direct employment of GF capabilities to support joint operations.

Appendix C

C-1. Introduction

The following assumptions form an informed foundation, not a prediction, of the conditions that will affect the future employment of the GF in support of operations.

C-2. DOD and joint strategic level

a. Although an era of persistent conflict will characterize the next 10 to 20 years, the requirement to maintain a full spectrum, capable joint force will continue.

b. Operations will continue to be executed within a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational environment, but the ongoing failure of the U.S. government interagency to provide critical capabilities across the other elements of national power at a time and on a scale required for operational support will not be resolved.

c. U.S. forces will largely be CONUS-based, with some forward deployed and forward presence forces.
d. Current trends toward increasing joint and multinational integration, interoperability, and interdependence will continue.
e. BPC capability and capacity, and potentially nation-building, will comprise new joint and Army core competencies, with significant implications for change across the DOTMLPF domains.
f. Joint and Army capability for stability operations will rise to a level of significance for force planning and development equal to that of major combat operations.
g. The joint network envisioned in current developmental and conceptual documents as the backbone for network-enabled operations will exist and work as forecasted.
h. The DOD budget will follow a line of slow growth and not increase significantly.

C-3. Army Level

a. The Army will remain a hybrid force of light, medium, heavy, and special purpose forces that continues to be organized around the principle of full spectrum capability and readiness.

b. Modularization of combat, combat support, and sustainment units will be complete; the basic building block of the operational Army for tactical operations will be the BCT. However, the actual mix of forces and size of the Army may be subject to significant change due to any number of unforeseen factors.
c. Army end-strength will not increase beyond 600,000, will remain an all-volunteer force, and will retain its current share of total operating authority.

d. ARFORGEN will be fully implemented and the Army will continue with a cyclical readiness paradigm.

e. The operational tempo that has characterized Army deployments abroad since 2002 will not exceed its current rate and may fall as Army forces withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan. Even relatively near-term trends can be difficult to predict, however. Possible emphasis on BPC in the future could keep demand high.
f. The blurring of the line between the GF and operating forces will continue, and may increase. HQDA will continue to categorize GF and operational Army assets in the Army global force pool with the evolution of force designs and assigned missions.
g. The trend of hybrid forces where operating force and GF units and HQs are interleaved will continue. The driver will remain the desire to establish integrated functional capabilities from national strategic to tactical levels.

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