a. The demands of the era of persistent conflict and the continuation of high operational tempo will require improvement in the manner in which GF capabilities are employed to support full spectrum joint operations.
b. The GF will continue to be comprised of military, civilian, and contractor personnel, with increasing reliance on government civilians to serve in an expeditionary posture for deployment as individuals or in teams. Dependence on the private sector to support future joint operations in-theater, ranging from individual contracted augmentees to theater-level functions provided primarily by contractors, will continue, especially when a surge in a capability is required.
c. Some GF organizations will be best served by establishing a regional orientation to carry out primary missions and/or support to operations.
d. Technology advances will change the way the GF trains, educates, and employs "reach to" capabilities to support its primary missions and joint operations.
e. The GF will both support and be subject to the ARFORGEN process.
a. The extreme diversity of GF organizations – with their wide range of assigned missions, capabilities, designs, and manning – call into question the realistic identification of all-encompassing "GF required capabilities" in support of operations, as opposed to identifying specific tasks for individual organizations.
b. In addition, applying GF capabilities in support of operations does not always readily align with the Army warfighting functions, especially when dealing with the national strategic through tactical links often enabled by applying GF assets. Instead, they more often align with mission and task sets, such as BPC and "expeditionary contracting," which in turn would either rely on identifying a specific task that would be most appropriate for a specific GF organization or on ensuring required capacity is available for a functionally-oriented operation. A review of the UJTL, Army universal task list, and joint capability areas would support a more detailed assessment of applicable tasks and functions that could apply to GF support to operations.
c. Some key capabilities that could be applied across a wide range of GF assets appear more as enablers, notably the establishment of manned and equipped operations centers that would support efficient reachback, or assignment of personnel to an expeditionary workforce.
d. Finally, some required capabilities for support to operations would overlap capabilities necessary for many GF organizations to conduct their primary missions and thus might be addressed outside of the JCIDS, CBA, and CNA processes that normally apply to operating forces. Many of these will translate into issues of policy and law as much as of resources; for example, developing institutional processes for accelerated materiel development, fielding, and life-cycle management. Support to civil authorities within the U.S. can take advantage of contingency-focused initiatives and may inspire unique GF efforts, but legal issues will also have to be addressed.
e. All of these considerations were reasons why this Generating Force Study focused on the seven identified themes, as opposed to another construct, such as the Army warfighting functions, the joint capability areas, or the Army core enterprises.
D-2. Enhancing GF support
a. With qualifiers in mind, a review of possible means to enhance GF support to operations would establish one framework for further assessment. Sources include FM 1-01, the 2009 TRADOC mini-CBA on doctrine for GF support to operations, and findings of TRADOC Pam 525-8-1. The themes of this study will serve to organize this discussion. There is no attempt to match the TRADOC CNA format for required capabilities, to create a thorough list, or to prioritize. Instead, this review is in line with the TRADOC commander's directive for TRADOC Pam 525-8-1 to identify desired ways and means of developing new capabilities, organizational efficiencies, and improved processes that will enable more effective employment of GF capabilities in support of future joint operations.
b. Improving the expeditionary quality of the GF.
(1) Establish the means to identify and track skill sets of all civilian and military personnel beyond standard occupational specialty data.
(2) Establish a tracking system with online access that provides current deployability readiness data (medical, dental, family care plans, wills, and others) for selected civilian personnel, similar to the information available for military personnel on Army Knowledge Online.
(3) Foster training regimes for identified civilian personnel to maintain skills required for deployment and operations in-theater.
(4) Expand the civilian expeditionary workforce concept to better enable no-notice and short-notice crisis response operations.
(5) Integrate some GF TDA organizations into the ARFORGEN cyclic process, based on applicability and need for enduring deployed capabilities.
(6) Establish a regional focus for GF TDA and MTOE assets where resources allow and the conduct of primary mission or support to operations is improved.
(7) Create modular designs in selected GF TDA organizations for ease in rapid deployment, and/or to support the ARFORGEN cyclic process for enduring deployed capabilities. Such modular designs could include deployable augmentation cells assigned at parent GF HQs, with either a specific capability focus or flexible assets to carry out assessments or similar tasks.
(8) Expand the ARSC model to other applicable organizations in order to provide dedicated, modular augmenting elements for both GF and operating force organizations. These could be TDA or MTOE organizations.
(9) Establish approved on-the-shelf organizational designs that can be quickly activated, manned, equipped, and funded as needed. As appropriate for functioning organizations, maintain augmentation TDAs and mobilization TDAs. Where more rapid responses may be required, stand up cadre-style organizations that can be expanded as required; these organizations can also establish planning, training, and support relationships with operating forces and non-DOD entities.
(10) Develop flexible, standing contracts linked to funding lines that could be activated with short notice to provide an interim or surge capability. The need for specific contracts would be assessed against the utility of current constructs, such as LOGCAP.
(11) Enable a planning capability in GF organizations that allows for links with operating forces on developing support plans and identification of capabilities. This would include both planners to work with operational forces and technical staff, such as JOPES and JCRM operators, to ensure organizational data entries are current and direct links into the GFM process are maintained.
(12) Foster a capable planning and coordination capability at ASCC HQs, due to the critical role that ASCCs play in validating, prioritizing, and applying GF capabilities to support operations, as well as their ability to enable a regional focus for assets.
(13) Ensure a readiness reporting process for GF organizations that includes an assessment of both primary missions and support to operations.
(14) Refine deployment processes for both individual augmentees and teams from the GF, including the CONUS Replacement Centers and combat training centers for readiness exercises. Consider the utility of major GF organizations operating their own deployment centers, such as the USACE Deployment Center.
(15) Ensure that APS and theater equipment force pools have, where applicable, accounted for equipment necessary to deploy GF assets.
c. GF reachback support to operations.
(1) As appropriate, ensure GF organizations have operations centers to support reachback, enabled with the proper personnel and secure communications, and that can surge to the necessary operating hours with minimal notice. Specific capabilities depend on the GF organization.
(2) Not all reachback operations require or would benefit from centralized oversight, but develop a reasonable means to track workload generated by reachback support.
d. GF roles in BPC in support of operations.
(1) Establish a base design, with expandable options and derivative UICs, for a military-based, interagency organization that can conduct provincial reconstruction team-like operations in unsecure areas. Some number of these could be standing elements (including rapidly deployable components) in the GF, leveraging civilian and military skill sets, and trained in part through peacetime engagement activities.
(2) Maintain a funded program similar to the commander's emergency response program, and which can be applied across the spectrum from peacetime engagement to conflict to stability operations and applying to governance, construction/economy, and security.
e. GF support to improvement in strategic responsiveness of operating forces.
(1) Develop a theater design construct that more effectively applies certain GF capabilities by providing an organizational framework which would foster coordination and integration of support. The USACE model of forward deployed divisions and districts is a possible model. For certain theaters, such a construct could be in place and working with the combatant commander for peacetime engagement. Organizational entities able to be activated and rapidly deployed would be another facet of this construct. This framework might be a baseline support structure into which certain GF assets could plug into to ensure uninterrupted support.
(2) Enable a robust deployable, contingency installation management capability, with a consideration to link with early port opening activities. A tiered approach that coordinates GF and operating force assets for installation management would be most realistic.
(3) Ensure that prepositioned equipment stocks can support specified deployable GF assets, to include basic mobility, protection, and communications capabilities not otherwise resident in these TDA and MTOE organizations (including training support).
f. Accelerated materiel development and equipping the force.
(1) Institutionalize a flexible and rapid materiel development and fielding process, complementing mainstream JCIDS processes that ensures required capabilities needed to support new or evolving operations are provided. Ensure that the emerging BCT modernization strategy concept is applied as appropriate to other Army forces.
(2) For materiel developed under urgent need and outside the mainstream JCIDS process, actively assess the opportunity to bring materiel under standard life-cycle management and for wider fielding in the Army. Eliminate as quickly as possible the fielding of those items judged to have limited applications to the force following the urgent need.
(3) Expand the partnership of TRADOC capability managers, TRADOC Center and School Capabilities Development Integration Directorates, and operating forces as currently seen with the BCT warfighter forums.
g. Incorporating GF capabilities into the joint GFM process.
(1) Establish a reasonable reporting process that supports understanding of available force capabilities, readiness, and risk assessments if assets are diverted from primary missions.
(2) Augmentation or backfill requirements needed to reduce risk in the deployment of GF assets are identified beforehand.
(3) Applicable GF assets have load planning data and derivative UICs.
(4) Leverage the RC training and mobilization structure for innovative applications in the ARFORGEN process and to help to adapt or develop new capabilities in operating forces.
h. Mitigating strategies to reduce the impact on GF primary missions.
(1) Establish out-of-cycle or compressed processes that allow for rapid creation or adaptation of TDA and MTOE organizational designs, personnel authorizations, and funding lines in order to reduce timeline gaps experienced with FDU, TAA, POM, and other mainstream processes.
(2) Contingency-based funding lines should be available to support crisis response and rapid adaptability during extended operations, and should be properly overseen and audited from the very start of operations, using focused GF capabilities to maintain good management.
(3) Have the capability to surge contractor personnel, either to backfill GF organizations at home station or to deploy to establish forward support, through ready contract and funding mechanisms.
(4) Establish flexible concepts for reserves – GF organizations established in the active Army and RC specifically to augment or provide additional capabilities or capacities. Timelines for availability will be based on specific functions, scenarios, and standing plans.
(5) Integrate GF efforts for support to operations with Army executive agent and Army support to other services responsibilities to improve force effectiveness and efficiencies.
(6) Train joint and Army personnel on the GF to ensure that commanders and staffs at all echelons of the operating force understand the opportunities and challenges in applying GF support to operations. Planners at all echelons are high priority.
(7) Leverage joint and other services' GF capabilities to provide the best mix of support to operations, and without an undue burden on Army GF organizations in cases where other capabilities are better postured.