From the Director U. S. Army Capabilities Integration Center



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The Army Force Modernization Proponent System, recognizes TRADOC centers of excellence, but continues to define the term as TRADOC once did, with a significant opening caveat: "Designated by HQDA, a center of excellence is a premier organization that creates the highest standards of achievement in an assigned sphere of expertise by generating synergy through effective and efficient combination and integration of functions while reinforcing unique requirements and capabilities." While quite a number of organizations are currently called Joint Centers of Excellence, Joint Publication 1-02, does not define the term.






48 Of special note is JCISFA's recently released SFA Planner's Guide – Foreign Security Force Development, 1 December 2009.





49 Network implementation and support from NETCOM/9th SC(A) is a continuous activity that supports all phases of operations. It includes network defense and information assurance. The degree to which NETCOM responds to specific requests for support from operating forces is not clear.





50 This mission area is under constant review, to include ensuring that GF structure is right-sized in order to prepare GPF for BPC missions as needed for worldwide contingences.





51 Quadrennial Defense Review BPC Execution Roadmap, 2006, p 4. Building partnership capacity has been used in the past as a synonym for the activities involved in building partner capacity, whereas building partnership capability is considered to be a set of capabilities rather than activities or tasks.





52 Building Partnerships Framework and Lexicon, presentation by the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, 17 April 2009. This presentation notes that the terms widely used throughout DOD with respect to building partnerships and building partner capacity are not widely understood and are often confused.



53 Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict, Army Policy Paper, HQDA G-3, 12 June 2008.





54 Cited in Building Partner Capacity/Security Force Assistance, Scott G. Wuestner, LeTort Paper, U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, February 2009, pp 8-9.





55 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report.





56 Cited in Stability Operations, Army Policy Paper, p 7.





57 Ibid., p 14.





58 FM 3-07, Stability Operations. Note that these five tasks essentially align with the stability, security, transition, and reconstruction components of DODD 3000.05.





59 USAID Civilian-Military Cooperation Policy Statement, July 2008, p 3.





60 Ibid.




61 Some recent assessments are calling into question the relative value of CERP, in part over the issue of second-order effects in local areas when limited reconstruction projects are not followed up on with other efforts. As with any initiative that is attempted during operations, regular assessments as to their effectiveness are necessary. In the case of CERP and the quick impact project program, a more thorough analysis of these two programs can help to determine their relative effectiveness in different operational environments. A major success of CERP was the very fact that significant funding was made available to commanders, along with wide latitude on how it was applied based on local conditions. A major shortfall was in the short-notice decisions required to designate projects when CERP was initially instituted. Lessons learned from this period were applied in how CERP was later administered.






62 The FY2009 budget request for CERP funding amounted to $1.7 billion.





63 Top Ten Strategic Lessons Learned of the War in Iraq, PowerPoint presentation, BG Steve Anderson, HQDA G-43 Director, with the assistance of the Reverse Collection and Analysis Team Program, Fort Lee, Virginia,
3 March 2008. Lesson #2 is the idea that logisticians can empower nation building.


64
 Chapter 2 describes the establishment and activities of USACE engineer districts in Iraq and Afghanistan.


65
 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – An Interagency Assessment, Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction/DOS, Joint Center for Operational Analysis/U.S. Joint Forces Command, Bureau of Policy and Program Coordination/U.S. Agency for International Development, 5 April 2006, pp 5, 11. At the time of this assessment, 22 PRTs were operating in-country.


66
 Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Pre-Doctrinal Research White Paper No 07-01, JFCOM Joint Warfighting Center, 21 November 2007.


67

 Provincial Reconstruction Teams: How Do We Know They Work?, Carter Malkasian and Gerald Meyerle. LeTort Paper, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2009, p vii.



68
 Malkasian and Meyerle, p 32, provide data on three "unsafe" provinces in the south that shows that PRT project funding exceeded that USAID and the ANSP in size by factors of from 5 to 15 in those areas.


69
 In 2008, USAID personnel included about 1,000 foreign service officers (FSO) and 6,000 contract and foreign national personnel. DOS FSOs numbered about 6,000 FSOs. Wuestner, p 7.


70
 Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, p 9.


71
 The Italian, German, Canadian, and British PRTs also exceed 100 personnel in size and generally include considerably more civilians. The German team in Kunduz numbers nearly 500 personnel. Malkasian and Meyerle, p 6. Other U.S. government agencies may also participate in PRTs.


72
 Provincial Reconstruction Teams, Pre-Doctrinal Research White Paper No. 07-01, FORSCOM Joint Warfighting Center, 21 November 2007, p 8; Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan – An Interagency Assessment,
p 31.

73

 Malkasian and Meyerle, p 1.

74

 The best discussion of PRT shortfalls is found in the S/CRS report, An Interagency Assessment. The discussion above only covers the most significant problem areas.

75


 The CALL also produced a PRT handbook for Iraq.


76

 JFCOM White Paper, Provincial Reconstruction Teams, pp 12-13.

77

 The 189th Infantry Brigade is a First Army TDA organization that has active Army and RC Soldiers assigned to allow it to perform its assigned mission.

78

 MNSTC-I Web site, http//www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/.

79

 Transition Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams Enduring Training Capabilities, Collective Training Directorate, U.S. Army CAC, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 27 May 2008.

80

 The transition of this training capability is an interesting case study in the application of time, funds, facilities, units, and Soldiers. In March 2008, Fort Polk was notified that it would be taking over the mission of training Army, Navy, and Air Force combat advisors. The 162d Infantry Brigade, activated on 1 May 2009 for this specific mission, had less than a year to prepare for the mission before the arrival of the first combat advisors at Fort Polk on 29 August. The 162d had the same amount of cadre as 1st Brigade/1st Infantry Division. By 9 September, the brigade was manned to 97%, with more than 70% of its Soldiers having combat experience and 19% of the cadre having combat advisor experience. To support the transition of the mission, more than 100 Soldiers from 1st Brigade/1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley were assigned to the 162d. Most of the equipment used to train combat advisors at Fort Riley was transferred to Fort Polk – more than 12,000 pieces of equipment, ranging from vehicles to weapons to night vision devices, sent in eight force packages from April to November. Upon receipt of the mission, the construction of facilities began on North Fort Polk. The Army spent about $168 million on unit headquarters, barracks, and other amenities that are essential to the operation of the training mission. In addition to personnel trained at Fort Polk, the 162d is responsible for training combat advisors that are organic to their deploying brigades. Mobile teams from the 162d will be responsible for training active-duty Soldiers at their brigade's home station. This training will take place in three phases prior to deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan.


81

 Initially, transition teams operated under the direction of the IAG, but operational experience proved that attaching them to BCTs partnered with Iraqi units was a more effective way of employing and supporting the transition teams. Thus, attachment to a specified BCT has been the desired approach for command and control of transition teams, and military transition teams in particular, since 2007.

82

 Iraq Assistance Group Supports the Feature Performance, SFC Jennifer Schwind, U.S. Central Command Public Affairs Office, 17 May 2007

83

 Operational data from 2008 suggest that approximately 75-80 percent of deployed transition teams were military transition teams, border transition teams, and national police transition teams. Transition Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams, p 7.

84

 Mosul Security Force Assistance Case Study, MAJ Robert Thornton, JCISFA, Fort Leavenworth, KS, April 2008.

85

 U.S. military police brigades have often been charged with manning national police and police transition teams. An example cited in August 2006 by the DOS described how U.S. military police were embedded at 100 police stations in Baghdad and augmented by 150 international police observers for a particular operation. See also Iraqi Police Learn Rule of Law, Concept of Tolerance, Gerry J. Gilmore, Armed Forces Press service, 26 January 2007.


86

 Some military transition teams were as much as three times larger than this standard size, owing to their particular scope or level of focus.

87

 The U.S. Army Military Police School runs its own SFA course at Fort Leonard Wood, MO, to train military police soldiers in the skills needed for police transition teams.

88

 An interesting case study on how one BCT support battalion handled its multiple responsibilities can be found in Sustaining the Military Transition Teams, MAJ Andrew Hotaling and MAJ Jason McGuire, unpublished manuscript, JCISFA, June 2008.

89

 An excellent source for these observations is the SFA Case Study – Mosul, Iraq, by MAJ Robert Thornton, JCISFA, undated, but released in December 2008.

90

 Per the Army's Stability Operations White Paper (p 14), published in June 2008, the Army was then contributing "over 8,700 personnel in support of capacity building missions in Iraq and Afghanistan." In April 2009, the total number of Army individual augmentees to support operations in OEF and OIF exceeded 10,000 for the first time. The majority of these personnel perform duties as members of transition teams or PRTs. LTG Gerald Cribb, HQDA G-3/5/7, in oral comments at the U.S. Army annual Title 10 wargame, UQ 2009, Carlisle Barracks, PA. For comparison, the Army employed 300 advisors in South Korea in 1953 and thereafter to help create the 20-division Republic of Korea Army. At the peak of the Vietnam War in 1970, the Army committed 14,000 regular and 1,800 special operations forces advisors. Wuestner, p 5.


91

 MNSTC-I Web site, http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/history_of_mnstci.aspx, accessed 2 July 2009.

92

 U.S. Army Transformation in Operational Context, PowerPoint presentation, COL Robert Fix, Director, Army Transformation Office, HQDA G-3/5/7, 17 December 2008.

93

 A reorganization of ISAF command structure in October 2009 established a new ISAF three-star command focused on training of Afghan military and police, from the national level on down – the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A). However, U.S. forces' CSTC-A also remained in place, creating a unique challenge in coordination between ISAF coalition training efforts, U.S. unilateral training efforts, the work of PRTs, and operations of other military forces. Partly to mitigate this coordination challenge, the commander of CSTC-A is dual-hatted as commander of NTM-A.

94

 NTM-A now oversees ISAF's police OMLTs, but dual-hatting the command of CSTC-A and NTM-A offers the chance for closer coordination between these ISAF assets and U.S. PMTs and ETTs.

95

 CSTC-A Web site, http://www.cstc-a.com/mission/ARSIC.html.

96

 Transition Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams, p 2.

97

 Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Groups, posting by BG(Ret) Thomas A. Jordan on the Small Wars Journal Web site, 20 March 2008. The TMAAG concept retains substantial interest and support from SFA experts outside the Army and often surfaces in commentary, analysis, and articles in the defense press. Notable advocates include LTC(Ret) John Nagl, COL(Ret) Robert Killebrew, and Andrew Krepenevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment.

98

 HQDA Memorandum, Subject: Interim Guidance for Enduring Advisor Training Capability, 4 April 2008.

99

 Terminology at the time was "advise and assist brigade (AAB)" for a BCT configured for the specific mission of advisory and assistance training, to include transition teams; however, the two most current official terms are "brigade combat team augmented for security force assistance" and "modular brigade augmented for security force assistance" (in the latter case, Army policy now is that any brigade HQ – BCT, functional, or multifunctional – may serve in this capacity, with proper preparation and augmentation). See, for example, "Advisor Training Shifts to Fort Polk: Army Establishes Enduring Mission," Dennis Steele, ARMY Magazine, September 2009, pp 49-50. Other references claim that there is a distinction between an AAB and a BCT augmented for SFA. The 4th BCT/1st Armored Division is serving as the proof of principle for the AAB concept in Iraq, to be followed by up to eight more BCTs also configured and trained as AABs. These BCTs are assigned areas of operations and conduct conventional operations, as well as advise and assist tasks, often in concert with the PRTs operating in their area of operations (AO). Meanwhile, the BCT augmented for SFA is being implemented in Afghanistan, beginning with the 4th BCT/82d Airborne Division. Note that this BCT is specifically designated as an "advise and assist brigade." This BCT is not assigned an AO, but instead the majority of the force is broken up into transition teams and aligned with various ANA and ANP forces. This highlights the occasional confusion in terminology and definitions as concepts rapidly evolve. Other labels for the AAB have been Security Cooperation BCT, BCT-A (BCT-Advise), and BCT-S (BCT-Stability). For the remainder of the discussion in this study, the focus will be on the AAB as presented through Summer 2009.


100

 Transition Teams and Provincial Reconstruction Teams, p 3.

101

 Army Position on SFA, presentation by HQDA, DAMO-SS, undated but released after August 2008.

102

 General Martin E. Dempsey, 5 May 2009, http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/05/security-force-assistance/, "Announcement of Release of FM 3-07.1, Security Force Assistance."

103

 Ibid. This statement of policy that the Army will rely on general-purpose forces for SFA highlights the decision to develop capabilities within the Army's modular brigades. At the operational level, however, different organizations would be relied upon. As General Dempsey noted, SFA "at the Institutional Level will be accomplished by a Security Transition Headquarters organized under the Joint Task Force. This Security Transition Headquarters partners with the U.S. Embassy Country Team and evolves over time into an Office of Security Cooperation."

104

 Gary Sheftick, Army News Service, 1 May 2009.

105

 According to a 17 June 2009 news release, the 21 transition teams are advising an Iraqi division, national police, three provincial police forces, a border enforcement brigade, and a logistics hub. The support role to PRTs was often emphasized in various news releases regarding the 4th BCT deploying to Iraq. Although the brigade is focused primarily on SFA, its support to the PRTs may involve both enhanced security and involvement in PRT reconstruction activities.


106

 Comments by LTG William Caldwell, Commander, CAC, reported by Kate Brannen, Inside the Army, 28 March 2009.

107

 The desirability of introducing transition teams into BCTs augmented for SFA during the ARFORGEN cycle and prior to deployment can be traced to post-operations interviews of transition team chiefs and members, who stressed the benefits that can be achieved by associating transition teams with the BCTs with which they will partner during the ARFORGEN train-up cycle.

108

 Stability Operations, pp 19, 22.

109

 The 162d Infantry Brigade heritage includes combat operations in World Wars I and II.

110

 HQDA G-3/5/7 Memorandum, Subject: Army Force Modernization Proponency for Stability Operations and Security Force Assistance, 22 January 2009. SOCOM is the joint proponent for SFA.

111

 Stability Operations, p 13. Although this citation speaks directly to stability operations, it is appropriate to view BPC as being a fundamental element within that form of operations, although it is not limited to stability operations.

112

 Ibid., pp 15-16.


113

 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-6, proposed future deployment goals that were based on OSD goals promulgated in a variety of documents. The draft Army Power Projection Program Master Plan currently under development by HQDA G-3/5/7 and G-4 has adopted these goals and proposed a plan to achieve them. Army Power Projection Management Plan, 20 May 2009, pp 15-24. If implemented, the master plan has wide-ranging consequences for Army installations and the deployment process.

114

 DPMO briefing, "Standardizing Installation Deployment Support Functions," 2009,

115

 JFCOM JDPO briefing, "Joint Deployment Process Owner Information Briefing," February 2008.

116

 TRANSCOM briefing, "U.S. Transportation Command Initiatives," 28 April 2008.

117

 It has been suggested that this chapter should expand its scope to deal with the larger issue of accelerated capability development. This suggestion was declined on the grounds that capability development is a primary mission for many GF organizations and that it does not necessarily translate into support of operations. The study proponent agrees that accelerated capability development that includes all DOTMLPF domains should be a high priority for future study.

118

 AR 71-9, Materiel Requirements.


119

 This section relies heavily on COL Bennett Dickson's historical report on the REF.

120

 The Army employed teams of Army ground force observers. Their reports constitute one of the most interesting historical records of air and ground operations during World War II.

121

 President Franklin Roosevelt projected the need for the U.S. to become the Arsenal of Democracy for the Allies in his fireside speech of 29 December 1940, almost 1 year before Pearl Harbor.
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