Seek, Strike, and Destroy: U.S. Army Tank Destroyer Doctrine in World War II, September, 1985. This brief example is cited here primarily to illustrate errors that can easily occur, but must be avoided in rapid equipping. Dr. Gabel characterizes the tank destroyer as a failure for three primary reasons: the doctrine underpinning the system was invalid; the Army failed to anticipate advances in armor protection and armaments (armor got better, but guns got bigger); and branch parochialism resisted the integration of the weapon system into a combined arms structure.
Dickson, p 5. Dickson also notes that the Army established the Limited War Laboratory at Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD, during the war, achieving some success in accelerating development and delivery of selected new materiel capabilities to units in-theater.
Dickson, pp 7-9.
In general, discussion of the REF often cited a 90-day standard for project fielding, perhaps owing to a memorandum in August 2004 from then-VCSA GEN Richard Cody to LTG Joseph Yakovac, then the Military Deputy to the ASA(ALT), in which GEN Cody noted 90 days as the target (as cited in Dickson, p 42). A recent REF briefing posits a 180-day goal from requirement determination to delivery. In contrast, the DOD joint rapid acquisition cell adopted a 120-day standard for capability delivery.
126 Secretary of Defense Gates has iterated his concern about over optimizing solutions during a time of persistent conflict, and has suggested that an "80% solution" to materiel requirements needed by deployed forces is a reasonable metric. ". . . I concluded we needed to shift away from the 99-percent exquisite service-centric platforms that are so costly and so complex that they take forever to build, and only then in very limited quantities. With the pace of technological and geopolitical change and the range of possible contingencies, we must look more to the 80-percent solution, the multi-service solution that can be produced on time, on budget and in significant numbers. As Stalin once said, "Quantity has a quality all of its own." Remarks by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 16 April 2009 (http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=4404).
This mission statement continues to characterize REF activities to the present day. However, its current purview extends beyond lethality, survivability, and force protection to include communications, alternative power sources, medical capabilities, and training aids.
Dickson, pp 55-56.
Dickson, p 58.
As of the end of 2008, the JIEDDO organization comprised 3,600 people, of which 2,600 to 3,000 are contractors.
JIEDDO Annual Report, FY2007, undated, p 15. The Asymmetric Warfare Group (AWG) tactical advisory teams perform a similar predeployment function.
JIEDDO Annual Report, FY2007, p 6.
JIEDDO Annual Report, FY2007, p 7.
135 JIEDDO Fact Sheet, JIEDDO Web site, https://www.jieddo.dod.mil/ABOUTJIEDDO/AJFAQ.ASPX, 13 January 2009.
This COIC, focused on "attack the network," is not to be confused with JIEDDO's Joint Training C-IED Operations Integration Center (JTCOIC), charged with "train the force"; the JTCOIC is currently operated in Newport News, Virginia, by the TRADOC G-2.
JTCOIC overview briefing.
Marjorie Censer, "DOD Says JIEDDO Has 'Enduring Value', Should Be Institutionalized," Inside the Army, 22 September 2008. Pressure to reduce supplemental funding may result in less reliance on supplementals in the future and instead increasing the baseline budget for JIEDDO.
JIEDDO Fact Sheet. Although the activities listed in this short paragraph were carried out under JIEDDO's purview, it should be noted that some of them are service initiatives funded by JIEDDO; an example of this is the HTT effort, originated under Army auspices.
Marjorie Censer, "House Investigators: Measuring JIEDDO's Performance 'Impossible'," Inside the Army, 24 November 2008. A key quote from this document: "In general, it is difficult to relate any of JIEDDO's specific initiatives to the measures it uses to demonstrate success."
141 The rapidity in which the AWG was established stands in stark contrast to the delays experienced by the REF, perhaps owing primarily to the fact that the REF deliberately blended operational, combat development, and acquisition functions, thereby introducing a level of complexity and inherently antagonistic functions that had to be reconciled.
Equipment includes items like four-season clothing, knee pads, modular lightweight load-carrying equipment, other protective gear, improved first aid kits, ballistic spectacles, spotting scopes, miniature binoculars, and laser target location systems.
Information Paper, Rapid Fielding Initiative Pre-Mobilization Equipping for Reserve Components, PEO Soldier Web site, https://peosoldier. army.mil/RFI/index.asp.
Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject: Meeting Immediate Warfighter Needs, 15 November 2004.
Robert J. Buhrkuhl, "When the Warfighter Needs It Now," Defense Acquisition Technology and Logistics, November-December 2006, p 29. Dr. Buhrkuhl was the first director of the JRAC.
CJCSI 3470.01, signed out on 15 July 2005, amplifies the Deputy Secretary of Defense memo cited above and provides additional guidance on joint and service responsibilities for responding to JUONS.
147 Members of the JRAC core group include experts in acquisition, law, funding, logistics, contracting, and technology and who also have the authority to make decisions on behalf of their parent organizations.
Buhrkuhl, p 29.
Ibid., p 31.
The JRAC can also be viewed as having "four-star sponsorship," given the role of the USD(AT&L) in the JRAC process, its direct reporting requirements to the Secretary of Defense, and the CJCS role in validating immediate warfighter needs.
The AMDEO should also resist any trend to expand its purview beyond materiel to encompass other major responsibilities for non-materiel capabilities.
Kate Brannen, "Army Eyes Slate of Promising Efforts for 'Program of Record' Status," Inside the Army, 6 October 2008. Qualifying criteria for consideration of a capability as a program of record include: use in operational conditions for 120 days; operationally mature; evaluated in an operational assessment; capable of production with major modification; and clear relevance to an existing or future capability gap. As of September 2008, the rapid transition process had considered 417 capabilities, 32 of which were determined to warrant program-of-record status.
154 It is noteworthy that insurgents and terrorists in both OEF and OIF have used methods and devices first used in the Soviet-Afghan War.
An analogous situation has been the Army's experience with liaison detachments to coalition partners. Composed of people, transport, and communications capabilities, these detachments are always required in multinational operations, but are either not authorized in unit MTOEs or are documented but not sourced. Historically, liaison detachments are always created on an ad hoc basis, out of existing organizational resources. Initiatives to institutionalize them at division and corps levels have come to naught.
One example of an earlier attempt to establish a reporting process by a major GF organization in order to identify the ability of its subordinate assets to perform Title 10 missions was the "TRADOC Status Report," an internal report used in the early 2000s.
Recent work by HQDA G-37/FM classifies more than 30,000 positions within the Army as "generating force, globally available." Whether or not all of those positions and the capabilities that they represent would need to be incorporated into JCRM or how they might be incorporated are open questions.
This entire section is drawn from documents and briefing materials produced by the JCRM program office within JFCOM J-3/4. Updates are available online at https://JCRM_240.je.jfcom.smil.mil/JCRM.
159 Composed of the Deputy USD for Readiness, the Director of the Joint Staff, and the Deputy Commander of JFCOM.
These events were the GF Seminar in March 2009, the Staff Exercise in April 2009, and the capstone wargame in May 2009.
The JFCOM J-3/4 endorsed the initiative during a presentation in October 2008, but declined to take it for action, instead recommending that the Army take the action.
The desire to have DOD reduce reliance on contractors regularly emerges as an issue, both at home station and in-theater, for a variety of reasons. Concerns over deploying contractors extend to whether they can be subject to military orders and discipline, and the possible second-order strategic effects if a contractor commits a criminal act in-theater but cannot be prosecuted. In addition, there are certain tasks that are not necessarily appropriate for contractors, such as the care and custody of detainees.
163 Establishing the All Volunteer Force beginning in the 1970s, making decisions on where to take risk following reduction in forces (especially after Operation Desert Storm), and focusing military personnel on combat-related duties all led to the realignment of missions and tasks assigned to military assets over the past decades. This resulted in a significant evolution as to what capabilities remained resident in U.S. Armed Forces. Before such changes, many of the functions performed today by contractors in-theater or in GF organizations were carried out by military units. One driver in adopting LOGCAP was to divest military forces of such support requirements.
With the ongoing drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, there are now cases of using contractors – U.S., third nation, and host nation – to fill temporary manning requirements during transition periods of force reduction. See, for example, "Ali Base drawdown in full swing" by Master Sergeant Darrell Habisch, 407th Air Expeditionary Group Public Affairs press release, 9 January 2010: "To ensure mission success and continuity, positions vacated by departing airmen will be filled by contractors, many of whom will be Iraqi nationals." These include both service support and operational personnel.
DODI 3020.37, with Change 1, 26 January 1996, p 2.
Statement of Administration Policy re s.3001 (National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009), Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, 9 September 2008, p 1.
Acquisition and Contracting Improvement Plans and Policies: Saving Money and Improving Government, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, December 2009.
169 Stability Operations, p 26. The numbers quoted here are for DOD civilians, not just DA civilians.
DODD 1404.10, DOD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, 23 January 2009.
Civilian Expeditionary Workforce, PowerPoint presentation by Mr. Tony Whitehouse, Deputy Assistant G-1 for Civilian Personnel, HQDA, 5 May 2009.
For example, it is not often publicly recognized that the functions performed by the large body of contractors that have continuously sustained and supported deployed Army forces in-theater, encompassing both operational and generating force tasks, and without which large-scale operations today would be nearly impossible, were performed in major conflicts in the past primarily by uniformed personnel.
As Gen. Dempsey, CG TRADOC, noted on 5 May 2009 with the release of FM 3-07.1, "It's important to note that SFA occurs under a variety of conditions, and it is the conditions that will determine how and what organizations we use to accomplish the mission." Posted at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2009/05/security-force-assistance/.
174 The future status of the RC as an "operation reserve" may itself be in question. At issue is whether the expected drawdown of deployed forces in Iraq and Afghanistan over the next several years will return the RC to a pre-2001 philosophy, or if future initiatives applying the capabilities of the RC in an "era of persistent conflict" will leverage the efforts and lessons gleaned from RC support since the start of OEF and OIF. "With the drawdown of U.S. forces under way in Iraq and plans announced to begin reducing forces in Afghanistan after July 2011, LTG Jack C. Stultz, the Army Reserve chief, is facing [the] big question: 'How do you keep the Army Reserve relevant, and its soldiers motivated, if it's allowed to revert from an operational reserve to its pre-war strategic-reserve status?'" Donna Miles, "Army Reserve Prepares for Post-Conflict Requirements," 12 January 2010, American Forces Press service (http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=57471).
Consider the USAR. Current USAR GF assets encompass a wide range of organizations and capabilities: (1) institutional training commands; (2) collective training divisions and commands; (3) medical (installation medical support units, TDA hospitals, medical command augmentation units, medical readiness support groups); (4) military intelligence (intelligence groups, Army Reserve Intelligence Support Centers, augmentation to the National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency, technical intelligence companies); (5) transportation (assets under the operational control of SDDC, TRANSCOM augmentation); (6) other augmentation and supporting elements (regional support commands, USACE, CIDC, SOCOM, DOD and HQDA staffs, OCONUS commands); and (7) individual mobilization augmentees. Some highlights of recent support to operations by USAR GF include establishment and conduct of the Afghan Drill Sergeant School; support to the stand-up of the Afghan National Military Academy; filling institutional training staff positions in HQ MNSTC-I; supporting in-theater military transition teams in Iraq and ETTs in Afghanistan; providing intelligence analysis and support; supporting SDDC port operations; providing AMEDD Professional Filler System medical rotational staff; and backfilling TRADOC and other organizations who have deployed capabilities. Despite this expanded support to operations, the USAR GF is projected to be reduced by 17%, from 56K to 49K personnel over the period FY2007-2015. Along with reductions in the Trainees, Transients, Holdees, and Students account and IMA account, this is being done to increase USAR operating force strength, similar to efforts underway in the active Army. Source of information is United States Army Reserve Generating Force Information Briefing, 29 February 2009, Mr. John Schultz, USARC G-3/5/7 IT Division.
Just one example is the continuing evolution of the ARNG concept for chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive enhanced response force packages, which are aligned to ensure support within each Federal Emergency Management Agency region.