The ways and means by which GF organizations have and are adapting to operational requirements through the expansion of their expeditionary capabilities are as diverse as the GF itself. The organizational initiatives described in this chapter generated significant benefits on behalf of the supported commands. However, many of these initiatives likely would not have been undertaken without the availability of supplemental funding. Questions remain regarding to what degree the improvements in expeditionary quality of the GF will be institutionalized and made permanent.
a. For the purposes of this chapter, the term "expeditionary quality" is used somewhat narrowly to mean the capability of GF organizations to readily (and, when necessary, rapidly) deploy and employ elements in direct support of operating forces in theaters of active operations in response to requests for forces or capabilities, or to meet other requirements for in-theater support that may emerge from either internal assessments or other sources, such as HQDA. In most cases, these expeditionary direct support elements are deployed for fixed periods of time sufficient to meet specific requirements. In some cases, the requirement is enduring, often resulting in a rotational approach, managed internally by each GF organization, to maintain the capability in-theater.12
b. The capability of operating forces to reach back to GF organizations for specific kinds of support not requiring in-theater presence could also be considered to be a component of expeditionary quality. A strong historical record exists regarding the value and utility of reachback support from the GF, but it is also true that reachback support is often best facilitated by the in-theater presence of deployed support teams or forward liaison elements from the GF organizations. Many GF organizations that deploy forces and individuals establish dedicated reachback support for them in order to maximize their efficiency and effectiveness. (This also highlights a trend with many GF parent organizations to create a seamless capability from national to tactical levels that spans from the homeland to forward-deployed assets; in some cases, parent GF HQs retain command and control of their deployed units). In many other cases, reachback support often occurs outside the visibility of a formal requirements process through direct, but often undocumented, contact between deployed operating forces and GF organizations. For these reasons, the question of reachback support is addressed below when it is a specific function of GF expeditionary elements deployed in direct support of operations, while the second form of reachback support will be examined separately in chapter 3.
c. In the context of the discussion in this chapter, it is prudent to recall that many GF organizations maintain a permanent presence outside the continental U.S. (OCONUS) in support of combatant commands by virtue of their OFTC, which are normally assigned to ASCCs. They also retain operating forces that are identified by HQDA as globally available (OFGA) for deployment to meet validated requirements. The USAR and ARNG are the most conspicuous examples of these mixed organizations. Other GF organizations also have subordinate operating forces, including AMC (37 OFTC and 70 OFGA units), USACE (10 OFGA units), INSCOM (118 OFTC and 4 OFGA units), NETCOM (26 OFTC and 9 OFGA units), and CIDC (2 OFTC and 37 OFGA units).13 In contrast, TRADOC has no OFTC or OFGA units, while MEDCOM only has two and one, respectively. These numbers are illustrative for FY2009, but regularly change as GF assets are altered to meet evolving requirements or are recategorized. For example, in FY2010 USACE will have assets designated as OFTC, OFGA, and OFGL.
d. GFTC forces inherently represent an expeditionary quality in the execution of their primary missions in support of ASCCs. However, because they are designated as operating forces and their support to ASCCs is defined as their primary mission, GFTC organizations generally fall outside the scope of this study. The exception to this point are those GFTC that have been specifically created during the course of recent operations to address operational needs, since they can be viewed legitimately as examples of organizational innovation that expands GF expeditionary quality.
e. Deployed OFGA units from parent GF commands, in contrast, often represent a temporary or semipermanent expeditionary response to emergent operational requirements, including an inherent reachback connection. In some cases, they also involve organizational innovation, including the deployment of new organizations created for the express purpose of addressing in-theater capability shortfalls.
f. Because of the diversity of the GF, there is no single approach to how the GF writ large has become more expeditionary in the past, nor how the GF can expand its expeditionary quality in the future. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter focuses on a number of specific initiatives undertaken by GF organizations to expand expeditionary capability and quality in concert with the caveats stated above. Because it is neither feasible nor desirable to document every instance of such initiatives, the chapter illuminates those that are particularly noteworthy or significant. GF organizations covered below include USACE, IMCOM, AMC, MEDCOM, the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), and TRADOC. Each of the examples can be viewed as a specific case study that ultimately defines a collective set of experiences, from which some common elements can be derived in the conclusion in the chapter.
2-3. GF organizations
a. USACE. The USACE has demonstrated a high degree of innovation, adaptability, and responsiveness in its efforts to meet the operational requirements for both OIF and OEF. Notable among these efforts are the establishment of forward engineer support teams (FEST) as resourced MTOE units vice TDA organizations, the proposed (re)establishment of the Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Division (CETAD), and the stand-up of its own deployment center to facilitate the Corps' support to operations.14 These initiatives are discussed in sequence below.
(1) Field force engineering (FFE): FEST-advance and -main (FEST-A, -M).15
(a) Background. As was clearly demonstrated in both OIF and OEF, the initiation of large-scale contingency operations typically generates a large volume of requirements for engineering support that exceeds both the capacity and capability of tactical engineer units, particularly throughout the stabilization period. In fact, for long-term stability operations, non-tactical engineering requirements often build to a huge volume in support of U.S. and coalition forces and the host nation, to address such needs as:
Construction of roads and airfields.
Base camp design, construction, protection, and survivability.
Base camp close-out.
Infrastructure assessment, repair, and reconstruction (bridges, waterways, utilities, and so on).
Force protection engineering.
Environmental assessments and baseline surveys.
Real estate acquisition and disposal.
Construction contracting support.
(b) Although much of the work involved in these areas is contracted out, a comprehensive demand exists for USACE expertise for project management, oversight, planning, and assessment. USACE's FFE program, approved in May 2003 by HQDA, established an initial framework for expanding capacity to respond to theater requirements, but lack of resourcing and other obstacles continued to create significant gaps in implementation. Two years later, the Army's Task Force for Stability and Reconstruction Operations, directed by the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) to assess Armywide capability gaps in planning for and conducting stability operations, developed 25 specific initiatives. One of these initiatives called for HQDA to "Designate the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Director of Military Programs, to lead efforts to institutionalize and improve the responsiveness and readiness of civilian capabilities to mobilize in support of ASCCs." In compliance with this approved directive, USACE proposed to expand its FFE program substantially. The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA) approved the USACE proposal on 4 January 2007; since that time, USACE has ardently been pursuing both the resourcing and force design approvals necessary for it to succeed.
(c) The basic concept underpinning the FFE program was to employ deployable, modular engineering support teams in theater and dedicated planning teams stateside to enable reachback and ready access to the vast capabilities resident with USACE districts, divisions, laboratories, and centers distributed throughout the U.S. However, these new, small teams were largely unresourced and only organized on an ad hoc basis. The FFE program included the establishment of dedicated base development teams (BDT), the USACE Reachback Operations Center (UROC) in the continental U.S. (CONUS), and four forms of deployable support teams: FEST-A and FEST-M, contingency real estate support teams (CREST), and environmental support teams (EnvST). Lacking manning authorizations, all of the support teams deployed prior to 2009 were manned by civilian volunteers from various engineer district TDA units. Thus, the critical element within the expanded FFE program is the transformation of the ad hoc teams into MTOE units with organic mobility and communications capability.
(d) A major component of the expanded FFE program is the establishment of active component FEST-A and FEST-M. The FEST-A is intended to provide support at brigade and division levels. Comprised of seven officers, including an O-4 (major) commander, each possessing specific engineering specialties, and one senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) construction supervisor, the FEST-A has the capability to support operating forces and attain regional objectives in the areas of engineer planning and design, real estate acquisition and disposal, contracting, infrastructure assessments, and technical assistance. The much larger FEST-M operates at theater level in support of the ASCC or Engineer Command. FEST-M provides command and control of all USACE support teams within the theater of operations and can provide liaison officers, as required, to subordinate commands. Commanded by an engineer O-6 (colonel), the full-up FEST-M is a flexible, self-sustaining organization with 37 personnel (25 officers and 12 enlisted), encompassing engineer specialties that cover the full range of engineering requirements within the supported command. Both types of FEST depend on supported organizations for security and life support, as do the deployable CREST and EnvST. The expanded FFE program includes:
2 FEST-M (37 personnel each).
8 FEST-A (8 personnel each).
8 EnvST (4 personnel each).
8 CREST (4 personnel each).
8 BDT (12 personnel each).
1 UROC (8 personnel).16 (e) Current status. All FEST-A and FEST-M have been formally identified as numbered Engineer Detachments. Additional full-time USACE cadre will also likely be required to train and support the expanded program and finalize design requirements. Interim funding was required in 2009 to employ the support teams. Programmed funding has been requested in program objective memorandum (POM) years 2010-15.
(2) CETAD17 (a) Background. The CETAD was originally established in 1991 to support the comprehensive reconstruction activities that emerged following the Gulf War of 1990-91. When requirements for reconstruction support declined, the original CETAD was reduced in size to a general officer-led Corps of Engineers Transatlantic Programs Center (CETAC). This was a project-funded activity that was sized to support DOD military construction requirements within the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) (minus the Horn of Africa) and in support of CENTCOM foreign military sales (FMS) and theater security cooperation programs. However, the volume of support requirements generated during OIF and OEF exceeded the capacity of CETAC, driving the creation of two new "requirements only" organizations in 2004: the Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (CEGRD), consisting of three subordinate districts and the general officer-level HQ in Iraq; and the Corps of Engineers Afghanistan Engineer District (CEAED).
(b) Under this structure from 2004 to present, both the CEGRD and CEAED report to USACE HQ. Personnel fill is primarily satisfied through a USACE civilian volunteer program based on temporary duty orders from other USACE commands. Military personnel requirements are satisfied for the CEGRD through a CENTCOM joint manning document, and the CEAED by various USACE active Army and RC sources.
(c) Current challenge. After 5 years of operations, USACE has determined the need to transition from this essentially ad hoc organization to a single institutionalized command with authorizations to hire additional USACE government civilians. Major benefits in such hiring authority are simplifying management and reducing the impact on USACE commands that are currently dealing with the absence of over 500 personnel serving in 6- to 12-month deployment rotations. USACE districts are mainly nondeployable engineer organizations that have area responsibility and are sized based upon labor funding allocated against specific projects. Although these districts can respond effectively to short-duration emergencies, such as disaster relief and recovery operations in CONUS, they do not have the capacity or organizational flexibility to surge rapidly for long-duration OCONUS contingency operations without severely degrading their ongoing military construction and civil works missions. Simultaneously, engineer organizations within operating forces do not have the capacity, capability, or structure to satisfy large-scale construction and reconstruction operations in-theater. Thus, USACE requires an expanded, institutionalized capability and adaptive organizational structure to allow formal integration of USACE capabilities into long-term stability operations, as well as to enable response to unforeseen future requirements.
(d) CETAD concept. Given the challenge and conditions described above, USACE proposed the consolidation of the three existing, but separate, USACE commands in the CENTCOM AOR (CETAC, CEGRD, and CEAED) into a single command – the CETAD. The CETAD would coordinate and synchronize nontactical engineer services within the CENTOM AORs in support of U.S. and coalition forces and of host nations in the following areas:
Construction project management.
Water resource initiatives.
Real estate management.
Base camp construction.
Other security cooperation requirements.
(e) The CETAD must provide focused, operations-driven support in Iraq and Afghanistan and traditional enduring support to the remainder of the CENTCOM AOR. Therefore, USACE proposed that the CETAD structure include three active engineer districts, three unresourced districts, and a division forward HQ and staff augmentation team to meet unexpected surges in requirements within the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of operations. Two active districts would be structured for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, with the third support district organized to maximize reachback support to USACE in the areas of design, general administration, and contract processing. The division forward HQ and staff augmentation team would allow the CETAD to deploy a forward command and control element when needed in order to provide oversight of two or more deployed engineer districts.
(f) Theater engineer commands (TEC). The proposed establishment of the CETAD would also take into account another enduring challenge in the CENTCOM AOR – the absence of a TEC in a theater of operations characterized by a significant level of both tactical and non-tactical (notably construction) engineering operations. Although the CEGRD de facto executes this synchronizing function, it is designed primarily to carry out contract construction, not oversee tactical engineer units, or conduct theater engineer management. Instead, engineer commands were designed to perform the latter functions, and action has been taken at HQDA to convert the engineer command to a TEC, with two deployable command posts (DCP). Thus a possible action could have been to deploy a DCP to replace the CEGRD HQ in order to assume the TEC role for Iraq, as well as to provide oversight of the nontactical USACE missions performed by CEGRD districts.
(g) Transition plan. USACE developed a three-phased transition plan to convert the three existing, but separate, USACE commands into the CETAD-level command over several years, without negatively affecting ongoing support operations. In the first phase, the CEAED and CETAC organization would be aligned under the CETAD HQ at an initial operating capacity. The second phase would draw down the CEGRD HQ, less the program management capability. This element and the three CEGRD districts would also move under the CETAD, while an Engineer Command would deploy a general officer-led DCP to assume the TEC role in Iraq and assume tactical control of the CETAC elements, the remaining HQ element, and the three districts. In the third phase, the former CEGRD districts would reduce their assigned strength as requirements diminished and combine missions into a single enduring district, the Baghdad Engineer District. Throughout the transition and thereafter, HQ USACE would retain the documentation for the two requirements only districts as a means of rapid expansion for any future contingencies that require district-level contract support.
(3) Combining this proposed CETAD structure with the FEST capability described earlier would create an overall capability for an effective, enduring, scalable response to meet both short- and long term requirements in multiple AORs, during the course of long-duration, simultaneous campaigns, while also mitigating the risk to the performance of CONUS military construction and civil works missions. If the CETAD were not implemented, USACE would have been compelled to continue the ad hoc, reactive approach relied upon with the expansion of OIF and OEF support, retaining risk in its capability to both support current and emerging OCONUS operational requirements and the execution of primary CONUS missions.
(4) On 29 September 2009, the CETAD was activated and aligned with the CENTCOM AOR, and replaced three major USACE organizations operating within that AOR: the Gulf Region Division in Baghdad, the Afghanistan Engineer District in Kabul, and the Transatlantic Programs Center in Winchester, Virginia. TAD's mission is to provide design and construction services and related engineering services on behalf of USACE to establish conditions for regional security, stability, and prosperity. To accomplish these functions, TAD is organized into five districts: in Iraq, the Gulf Region District in Baghdad and the Gulf Region South District in Tallil; in Afghanistan, the Afghanistan Engineer District-North in Kabul and the newly formed Afghanistan Engineer District-South in Kandahar; and the Middle East District (also stationed at Winchester). While the majority of the TAD staff is based in Winchester, the forward-deployed element of the HQ is in Iraq, where the TAD commander is dual-hatted as the senior engineer on the Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I) staff. TAD HQ was staffed at about 30 people at activation, with the expectation to double personnel after a few months. The division is expected to manage a $4 billion annual program of military construction and interagency and international support missions. The chief of engineers has stated that activating TAD helps to fulfill a longstanding plan to align a USACE engineer division with each of the geographic combatant commands.18
b. IMCOM – Expeditionary base operations (BASOPS) concept19
(1) The proliferation of base camps, forward operating bases, forward operating sites and locations, and other forms of fixed installations of varying size is a notable characteristic of long-term stability operations, fully borne out by the U.S. experience in OEF and OIF. This constellation of installations can be expected to continue at a significant scale for years to come in current active theaters of operations, and to expand to other parts of the globe in the projected era of persistent conflict. Despite support costs and security challenges associated with operating forward-deployed fixed sites, the requirement to enable enduring landpower presence for the foreseeable future will be met with such bases, ranging in purpose, scale, and population. Over the past 6 years, the establishment and operation of these installations have largely been handled by two primary means: comprehensive contracted support for larger installations; and, for smaller bases, ad hoc detailing of operating force elements from the parent commands in charge of those bases. In the latter case, the dedication of operating force elements to run installations has two fundamental drawbacks. First, it represents a reduction in available operating force capabilities that could be employed in accordance with their more traditional operational missions. Second, operating force elements generally lack the skills and expertise for installation management.
(2) In 2006, in response to a formal memorandum from the commanding general, FORSCOM to the CSA, IMCOM initiated examination of an expeditionary BASOPS concept for application in specific circumstances. The FORSCOM memorandum addressed the issue of management of the Soto Cano installation in the U.S. Army South (USARSO) AOR (specifically, in Honduras). Noting that BASOPS is not a core competency for USARSO, the memorandum requested IMCOM and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management (ACSIM) to consider assuming responsibility for BASOPS at Soto Cano. On 5 July 2006, the CSA directed ACSIM to review the ability of IMCOM to provide expeditionary BASOPS support to the joint task force BASOPS at the installation. Over the following 15 months, ACSIM and IMCOM developed an approach and deployed an expeditionary BASOPS organization with initial operational capability on 1 October 2008, subsequently achieving full operational capability in April 2009.
(3) The Soto Cano initiative essentially represents a pilot program for the institutionalization of an expeditionary BASOPS capability, the need for which became more apparent in 2008 as reports of accidental deaths of service personnel by electrocution surfaced in the news media, with strong political interest that rose to the level of Congressional inquiry. As a result of this scrutiny, the Undersecretary of the Army directed an effort be undertaken to examine how the Army might form and employ an expeditionary capability to provide standardized base operations management and services worldwide, including improved oversight of contractor-operated facilities.
(4) Although not yet approved at HQDA for implementation, the expeditionary BASOPS concept was developed through a collaborative effort between IMCOM, ARNG, USARC, FORSCOM, TRADOC, U.S. Army Central (ARCENT), USARSO, and HQDA G-3/5/7. The concept begins with definitions and a deliberate approach to apply a practical scope to the overall requirement. The concept identifies two basic kinds of OCONUS installations. Enduring bases are defined as facilities, outside the U.S. and U.S. territories, with stationed operating forces and robust infrastructure and further characterized by command and control structures, permanent support facilities, and strengthened force protection measures. Examples cited by IMCOM are Soto Cano and permanent U.S. bases located in Kuwait and Kosovo. Non-enduring bases, in contrast, are scalable locations outside the U.S. intended for rotational use by operating forces. Locations may have prepositioned equipment and modest permanent support facilities. Non-enduring bases include the capability to sustain security cooperation, training, deployment, and employment operations on short notice (for example, Camp Victory, Baghdad).
(5) The concept proposes that enduring bases adopt an IMCOM TDA per a standard garrison organization (SGO) model and under the command of an IMCOM garrison commander, with technical command and control exercised by HQ IMCOM. A site visit to Area Support Group-Kuwait and Area Support Group-Qatar completed in January 2009, affirmed that an IMCOM SGO, per the Soto Cano model, is feasible and desirable at those locations. The visit report notes four specific benefits from this approach: it separates mission and base operations support functions; it enables standardized TDA development; it enables civilian staffing based on current IMCOM garrison job descriptions; and it enables delivery of common levels of support in accordance with IMCOM guidelines.
(6) For the non-enduring bases, the concept is more complex in that it is founded on the incorporation of IMCOM TDA positions within regional support groups (RSG), which are assigned to ASCCs and operated by RC forces under the command of the RSG commander, with technical command and control of IMCOM elements exercised by HQ IMCOM. The concept further proposes a rule of allocation that would limit the application of the latter to base camps of 6,000 personnel or more.
(7) Originated in 2006, the mission of the RSG is to deploy as a command and control HQ to provide oversight of contingency and expeditionary BASOPS support, with responsibilities for managing facilities, providing administrative and logistical support of Soldier services, and ensuring the security of personnel and facilities on a base camp.20 When not deployed or committed to homeland security, homeland defense, or civil support missions, the RSG provides command and control for training, readiness, and oversight of mobilization of assigned forces. Currently, an RSG is authorized 63 personnel, although a force design update being staffed would increase personnel to 84. Pending decision in Total Army Analysis 2010-15, there are 42 RSGs in the force – 17 ARNG and 25 USAR. The rule of allocation for RSGs is one per base camp without an existing base command structure and with a population of 6,000 or greater. It requires co-location with one or more operational force commands (brigade or higher) to meet its dependency requirements.
(8) As noted, the IMCOM concept proposes the augmentation of the RSG with a tailored IMCOM TDA, scaled to the requirement and based on the SGO model. The IMCOM TDA is intended to address BASOPS capability gaps within the RSG and enable reachback for technical expertise and services.
(9) Although the fit between IMCOM and the RSG appears to be both reasonable and natural, implementation of the concept in each instance will require the synchronization of training and deployment activities. IMCOM assesses that those training requirements can be planned for execution in accordance with the ARFORGEN process and would include such activities as: RSG training partnerships with IMCOM garrison staffs; RSG staff attendance at IMCOM training courses; RSG commander attendance at pre-command courses; and employment of IMCOM mobile training teams to RSGs identified for deployment. Implementation will further require a pilot program as proof of principle and organizational adaptation at IMCOM HQ to manage this new expeditionary capability. Work continues to further refine the concept, including deliberate collaboration with the U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center (MANSCEN) base camp integrated concept development team, as force design update requests move through the force management process and resourcing requirements are prepared for POM 2012-17. IMCOM is also examining how a similar augmentation approach might be feasible with respect to emergent USAR and ARNG functional support brigades or other similar command and control HQs of comparable capability.
(10) Overall, the implementation of the expeditionary BASOPS concept is envisioned to generate the following benefits and efficiencies:
(a) Reduced burden on operating forces for BASOPS functions.
(b) Improved standardization of BASOPS management and services.
(c) Expanded employment of a trained, core competencies-based workforce.
(d) Establishment of a single coordinating agency to assure component systems interoperability.
(e) Capability to better utilize IMCOM management skills and centers of excellence (such as the safety center).
(f) Expanded capability for reachback for technical resources.
(g) Reduction in the contracted workforce.
(11) Additional operational aspects of establishing nonenduring bases need to be considered. For example, expeditionary BASOPS that start with Army expeditionary theater opening capabilities as part of the theater opening mission may be integrated early on with RSG and IMCOM assets to ensure seamless BASOPS planning and execution, handoff of command and control of these facilities, and the management, storage, distribution, and movement of materiel to support BASOPS.
c. AMC. In addition to its life cycle management commands (LCMC), which provide expeditionary support to operating forces via temporary and rotational forward liaison elements and support teams, as well as through LCMC-directed depots such as Red River, Anniston, and Tobyhanna, AMC has three major subordinate commands that have adapted significantly during the course of current operations to improve and expand support to operations – the Army Sustainment Command (ASC), the SDDC, and the new Army Contracting Command (ACC).
(1) ASC expeditionary initiatives.
(a) Established on 22 September 2006, the ASC provides sustainment-level logistics from the strategic through the operational to tactical level by synchronizing acquisition, logistics, and technology support. As described by the then AMC commanding general, "The ASC is AMC's face to the field, designed to better support the operational Army both in CONUS and forward deployed around the world. We've incorporated lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan, Germany, Korea, and within the U.S. to build an organization which incorporates maintenance, acquisition, research and development, contingency contracting, and materiel management … all incorporating logistical support."21 The ASC also serves as the Army's operational logistics organization responsible for integrating logistics support with joint and strategic partners, and is the linchpin that links the national sustainment base with the expeditionary Army. For the first time in one command, AMC created a direct line to the strategic capabilities of the life cycle management commands, program managers, research agencies, and manufacturers. ASC functions encompass the entire sequence of activities that characterize the operational tempo of the current force: predeployment, deployment, sustainment in theater, redeployment, and home station reset. Major service areas include: contracting services, logistics synchronization in support of ARFORGEN, Army prepositioned stocks (APS), field support, materiel management, and the logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP). As of March 2009, the command included 532 military, 1512 civilians, and over 10,000 contractors operating in 8 countries and 25 states.22 This study highlights the command's expeditionary initiatives in two areas: field support and expeditionary contracting in support of ongoing operations.
(b) Field support. ASC field support is executed through a comprehensive network of its own operating forces organized in modular, tailorable units. These include Army field support brigades (AFSB), Army field support battalions (AFSBn), logistic support elements (LSE), battalion logistics support teams (BLST), and logistics support teams, most of which are categorized within the Army force structure as theater committed (such as the AFSBs) or globally available forces. Almost all of the logistics elements described below are numbered, MTOE-based, operating forces, that fall under a GF parent command, the ASC, itself under AMC. ASC has deliberately elected to organize them as small, modular, tailorable units, with personnel top-heavy in terms of seniority and expertise. Their organizational characteristics enable them to be deployed quickly and be combined in ways to optimize support to operations. Moreover, they inherently possess the capability to adapt organization and/or location to meet the changing requirements of deployed Army operating forces, and with proper approvals, can even be shifted from one region to another. This entire organizational scheme strongly enhances the command's expeditionary quality and provides the high degree of flexibility and agility required in the current operational environment. While all of the AFSBs are numbered, MTOE units, they have a very small MTOE structure, relying on an organic augmentation TDA. The subordinate AFSBn themselves are TDA organizations. All of these organizations are scalable.
(c) Seven deployable AFSBs provide the ASC with a single command structure in strategic locations around the world, including Iraq, Kuwait, Korea, and Europe, as well as in the U.S. at Forts Bragg, Lewis, and Hood. The AFSBs serve to integrate and synchronize acquisition, logistics, and technology support to Army forces. In combatant command (COCOM) AORs, an AFSB is the AMC regional center of gravity and the single face of AMC to the warfighter. It is responsible for integrating, balancing, and providing global reachback to the LCMCs and AMC's Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM). The goal of each AFSB is to have one AMC person in charge with one focus – effective, timely, responsive support to the tactical level. Deployed AFSBs typically are augmented with additional staff to meet expanded and/or unique operational requirements, particularly in a distributed, rapidly changing operational environment.
(d) LSE23 and AFSBn are assigned to AFSBs and perform a role similar to that of the AFSB at the corps (at home station) and division level, respectively. They also provide area support to division and corps brigades. They may operate AMC forward field maintenance and repair facilities, and be augmented with additional AMC elements, such as from the Army Contracting Command or LOGCAP.24 Manning for these units varies, both in number and expertise, depending on the organizations that they support.25 The battalion logistics support team has four different configurations – aviation, heavy, infantry, and Stryker – that align to the deployed brigades they are normally assigned to support.
(e) All the support elements assigned to AFSBs include logistics assistance representatives (LARs), which are DA civilian representatives of the LCMCs or of ASC. The LARs are the foot Soldiers and tactical scouts for AMC, the de facto eyes and ears of the command. LARs are highly respected LCMC solution-oriented technical experts who bring unparalleled added value to their supported units as sources of information and as combat enablers in their respective areas of expertise.
(f) Each AFSB is organized with a variable mix of assigned forces, tailored to the region or the warfighting command that they support, and widely distributed within their respective region. Depending on the assigned support mission and operational area, an AFSB can include a number of AFSBns, an LSE (at the home station of a corps HQ), logistics support teams, and APS units. For example, the 401st AFSB headquartered in Kuwait oversees logistics operations in three countries – Kuwait, Qatar, and Afghanistan – and includes three AFSBns (one each in Kuwait, Qatar, and Afghanistan), four logistics support teams (two in Afghanistan), and an Army watercraft equipment site at Kuwait Naval Base. In contrast, the 402d AFSB is considerably larger and distributed at about 35 sites throughout Iraq. Note that the AFSBn-Afghanistan executes joint operational area-wide logistics operations in support of all U.S. forces in theater. The size of AFSBn-Afghanistan and the two logistics support teams in Afghanistan are also unusually large. As of March 2009, ASC had 572 forward-deployed personnel supporting operations in that country.
(g) LOGCAP (and the LOGCAP support unit at Fort Belvoir, Virginia). The LOGCAP's mission is to support global contingencies, current forces, and future force development by leveraging corporate assets to augment current and programmed combat support and combat service support force structure.26 The first LOGCAP contract was awarded by CETAD in 1992 to KBR, Incorporated (formerly Kellogg, Brown & Root). This cost-plus-award-fee contract was first used in Rwanda, Somalia, and Haiti. Although LOGCAP has historically been used to provide logistical support to contingencies, it was supplemented by autonomous contingency contracting officers as early as 1995.
(h) Expeditionary contracting. AMC has also exercised significant initiative and innovation with respect to providing expeditionary contracting support to deployed operating forces. This form of expeditionary quality is manifested in the new ACC established under ASC. The creation of the ACC encompassed lessons learned over many years, including experiences using LOGCAP to perform contracting functions in deployed theaters.
(i) The extensive contracting requirements in support of operations that quickly expanded in Iraq after the major combat operations phase, as well as in Afghanistan in conjunction with the establishment of the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) base and support infrastructure, were largely handled by the LOGCAP. Initially established under the auspices of HQDA and USACE, LOGCAP moved under AMC in 1997 and is now in its fourth iteration (LOGCAP IV) of execution. LOGCAP has transitioned to a very broad umbrella contract mechanism – an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract construct.27 Because LOGCAP is now an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity, it requires no solicitations to establish support, relying instead on the more streamlined task-order process. The fact that virtually any funded requirement can be accommodated through the contract, plus the large group of subcontractors available to augment the prime awardees, ensures a very flexible vehicle for rapid contracting response. It also facilitates logistical planning, enabling the deliberate incorporation of contractor capabilities to support contingency operations. The contract further permits the prime contractor to maintain an initial-response capability on standby, thereby mitigating the delays that are inherent to a contracting approach for which a team of contractors has to be assembled. LOGCAP is also used by joint forces, non-DOD U.S. government (USG) agencies, coalition partners, NATO members, and the United Nations (for the United Nations, LOGCAP was first used in direct support of the United Nations mission in Haiti).28
(j) Although LOGCAP is viewed overall as a global capability, the AMC LOGCAP organization has the flexibility to tailor itself to regional requirements. Its contingency mission is executed primarily through the integrated activities of the LOGCAP support unit, in collaboration with AFSBs and ACC contracting support brigades, under the direction of regional deputy directors who lead the LOGCAP-forward elements in theater. Currently, LOGCAP includes four regional deputy directors, serving in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, and Europe. The deployed LOGCAP-forward team typically includes operational planners from the LOGCAP support unit, a primary contracting officer from ACC, an administrative contracting officer from the Defense Contracting Management Agency (DCMA), and a construction engineering representative from USACE. This matrix approach meets legal and regulatory requirements while ensuring collaboration with other organizations in-theater that are involved in contracting support to operating forces.
(k) LOGCAP maintains habitual relationships with its operating force customers through an exercise program and through its planning capability. The latter is particularly important to fostering expeditionary preparedness, since it sets conditions through pre-existing plans for a rapid contracting response that has already been matched up with anticipated requirements that cannot be met by assigned forces. Such plans exist today in all five geographic combatant commands and cover a wide range of contingencies and functional areas. They include such standing requirements as the construction of extensively designed 5,000-person base camps and pre-agreed-upon contractor internal management procedures. In addition, responsibilities of the supported unit customer in using LOGCAP are clarified through these interactions and reinforced by the Team LOGCAP Forward.
(l) A rapid response requirement for LOGCAP is based on an official notice to proceed (NTP) and includes four demanding metrics for contractor response:29
Advance team deployment by NTP + 3 days.
Capability to receive and support up to 1,500 persons a day by NTP + 15 days.
Capability to receive 3,000 persons a day and bed-down of 25,000 persons by NTP + 30 days.
Capability to bed-down and support up to 50,000 persons by NTP + 180 days.
(m) The volume of work enabled through LOGCAP in Iraq and Afghanistan totaled almost $35.5 billion between December 2002 and April 2008, involving the commitment of over 67,000 contractor personnel in support of operational requirements. Despite this huge effort, by 2006 it had become quite apparent that LOGCAP alone was insufficient to meet all the expeditionary contracting requirements emerging in current operations. In addition, increasing evidence began to mount of significant waste and fraud within the overall OCONUS contracting effort. Both corrective action and more capability were required to meet all the emerging demands while simultaneously ensuring full, effective oversight.
(n) Although these shortfalls existed across the entire joint force, the Army independently recognized them and began to take corrective action. In particular, the Army realized that it lacked the numbers and quality of contracting staff that the current operational environment requires. Thus, near simultaneously with the establishment of the ASC in 2006, HQDA issued activation orders on 28 July 2006 to establish two contingency contracting battalions and 14 contingency contracting teams (CCT) as part of ASC. The 72 Soldiers assigned to the battalions and teams at that time represented 30 percent of the Army's contingency uniformed contracting force structure.
(o) These activation orders represented only the initial increase in capability projected under a wider plan for much broader expansion. Overall, the concept for expanding contingency contracting was based on a modular construct involving four echelons of capability:
At the lowest level, five-person CCTs of three officers and two NCOs formed to provide brigade-level contracting support. In the active Army, there is an O-4 (major) in charge, and in the RC (both ARNG and USAR), there is an O-5 (lieutenant colonel) in charge.
Next, senior contingency contracting teams (SCCT), also five-person teams, were envisioned as aligning with operating forces at the corps or division level. In the active Army, there is an O-4 in charge, and in the RC, there is an O-5 in charge.
The 13-person contingency contracting battalions (CCBn) also aligned at the corps level, with the mission to provide planning support, C2, and management of a variable number of CCTs and SCCTs to the corps. A recent FDU adds 5 enlisted Soldiers to the CCBn, increasing the total number of personnel from 8 to 13 per CCBn.
At the top of the hierarchy, the contracting support brigade (CSB) was established to align alongside the ASC's AFSB at the ASCC echelon, again to provide C2 and management of all of the ASC contracting elements in theater, and to provide planning support to the ASCC. The CSB is a 24-person multicomponent (COMPO) organization (active Army and USAR only), comprised of 10 commissioned officers, 1 warrant officer, and 13 enlisted Soldiers. The by-component breakdown is: 10/1/13 = (active Army 9/1/12) + (USAR 1/0/1). The next FDU will add one warrant officer and four enlisted Soldiers.
(p) The overall plan envisioned an expansion over time in concert with Total Army Analysis 2008-15, to include USAR and ARNG organizations, as depicted in figure 2-1. (As will be seen in the next section, the Army has now fully separated out contracting assets from the ASC in order to establish a separate Army Contracting Command [ACC] directly under AMC. The entire structure shown in this figure is now realigned under the ACC.)
63/0/56 (active Army)
Brigade Combat Teams
Active total (515)
Active Officer (261)
Active NCO (254)
ARNG total (272)
ARNG Officer (130)
ARNG NCO (142)
USAR total (98)
USAR Officer (49)
USAR NCO (49)
Total Force: 885
(O-6) / Contracting
*PARC: Principle assistant responsible for contracting