(q) As of early 2008, four CSBs were established under ASC as numbered, MTOE operating force units, each oriented regionally in accordance with the original intent that units align with the ASC's existing AFSBs located around the world.31 Each CSB is commanded by a colonel, dual-hatted as the principal assistant responsible for contracting for one of four Army contracting agency operations outside of the U.S., which include Europe, Korea, Southwest Asia, and the Americas.32 The CSB commander is responsible for executing the Army's contracting mission to support local installations, CONUS commands and subordinate commands, and Army service component commands. When deployed, the CSB commander commands all of the deployed contingency contracting teams and battalions in a theater, in concert with the AFSB, to ensure seamless contracting support to the combatant commander.33
(r) The efforts within AMC to grow contracting capability and stand up the MTOE organizations described above demonstrated significant initiative by a major GF organization to address seriously under-resourced, in-theater requirements.34 Under normal circumstances, creating the new array of contracting teams and management structures would have taken 3 to 4 years. However, new circumstances soon intervened to expand the scope of the program and the oversight structure intended to direct its activities. In 2007, the Secretary of Defense commissioned the former Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), to lead a panel charged with reviewing Army expeditionary contracting. Based on extensive research and more than 100 interviews, the commission released its report on 2 November 2007 after briefing the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of the Army. Overall, the commission concluded that extensive reform was urgently needed to ensure that future in-theater contracts would be effective, efficient, and transparent. In concert with a comprehensive set of specific findings, the commission summarized its 40 recommendations into four major areas for immediate action:35
Increase the stature, quantity, and career development of military and civilian contracting personnel, especially for expeditionary operations.
Restructure organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and CONUS operations.
Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations.
Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting effectiveness in expeditionary operations (Office of the Secretary of Defense in the lead, with Army support).
(s) The USD(AT&L) assessed personnel reforms as the most important of the four, stating that, "Contracting – from requirements definition through contract management – is not an Army core competence, but it should be."
(t) Despite the explosive expansion in contracting during OEF and OIF, the report found that the civilian and military contracting workforce was stagnant or declining. It noted that only 3 percent of the Army's contracting personnel were active-duty military, a group which also included no general officers.36 While the problem of insufficient contracting personnel was a concern for all of DOD, the commission judged that it was particularly pronounced in the Army.
(u) In contrast, the Air Force had a significantly larger military acquisition workforce than the Army, despite far fewer procurement actions. The Air Force staffed 67 percent of the Joint Contracting Command in Iraq and Afghanistan, according to the USD(AT&L) commission report, and the Air Force handled many of the most complex contracts. The report recommended that the Army augment its contracting workforce by 400 military and 1,000 civilian personnel, representing about a 25 percent increase. The report also advised a 583-person increase in Army personnel at the DCMA specifically to support Army contracting operations.
(v) While adding people was crucial, the commission stated that career development is as important to ensure that the contracting workforce is qualified and competent. The report recommended that Army military personnel – both officers and enlisted – start their contracting careers significantly earlier than they did at the time, and that there be higher-level positions to ensure promising career opportunities. Moreover, since future conflicts are likely to be similarly expeditionary and dependent on contractors, the report asserted that the role and importance of contractors should be taught in military courses and colleges.37
(w) In addition to personnel changes, the commission advocated creating a single Army contracting command, to be responsible for the transformation of Army contracting into a "high-quality core competence." The report acknowledged that this change likely would not come about quickly, but said it is crucial to addressing both the in-theater acquisition problems that have plagued the Army recently, as well as effectively supporting contracting and Army-wide materiel acquisition.
(2) The ACC.
(a) Following a few months of evaluation of the USD(AT&L) commission report, then-Secretary of the Army took Army contingency contracting a major step forward in February 2009 by announcing the Army's intent to move the Army Contracting Agency38 under AMC, and combine it with the emergent ASC contracting directorate into a new major subordinate command – the ACC. The AMC deputy commanding general, stated, "By consolidating the contingency contracting mission into AMC, we can provide a full range of contracted combat support and combat service support needed by our deployed forces."39
(b) This decision was motivated in large part by the recognized needs to expand Army contracting capabilities beyond those contemplated in the initial ASC-based approach. At the same time, operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan also required an approach to expeditionary contracting that was more responsive to warfighter requirements. "One of the things we're learning in Iraq and Afghanistan, especially with doing reconstruction and stabilization work, is that contracting is a lot more complex than just buying gravel. We need to get the contracting people to have much deeper analytical skills and contracting skills. That's one of the reasons we're looking at bringing this [the Army Contracting Agency] into AMC, because the complexity of contracting we do in AMC associated with weapons, large services, even some large installation-type services, will give these military new training opportunities."40
(c) Moving quickly, the ACC (provisional) stand-up ceremony was held on 3 March 2008.41 On 8 October 2009, the ACC was declared fully operationally capable, about a year after the ACC was formally established. The ACC now executes over 60 percent of the Army's contract dollars. ACC is moving forward on all 22 actions recommended in the commission report. ACC will continue to increase in workforce size, with the expectation to reach about 1,400 military and civilian personnel by 2013.
(d) The ACC is a two-star-level command with two one-star-level subordinate commands. The first subordinate command is the ECC, focused on contracting support to forward-deployed and forward-stationed forces. The second is the Mission and Installation Contracting Command (MICC), focused on contracting support for CONUS installations. The ACC commander is charged with directive authority over all Army contracting capabilities and provides a single source for status and readiness of the Armywide contracting force.
(e) The ACC commands the contingency contracting organizations previously commanded by the ASC. The recent VCSA approval of a contracting FDU package expands Army contracting numbers considerably to comprise 7 CSBs, 8 CCBns, 14 SCCTs, and 69 CCTs, totaling 673 active Army contracting Soldiers assigned to the ECC. This FDU also fields an additional 3 CCBns and 83 SCCTs or CCTs to provide RC surge capability. CSB force structure includes contract planners for routine collaboration with supported force planners. Policy changes to accelerate the accession of officers and NCOs by 2 to 3 years (at the 5 to 6-year career mark) are now in place. Internal estimates project that the ACC will reach full strength in 2013, when all recently-approved contracting force structure authorizations are in place. The ECC is an example of establishing a deployable MTOE contingency contracting force structure to support OCONUS operations, further enabled by expertise from HQ ACC and MICC, either through augmentation or reachback. These units perform contracting missions as part of their training when not deployed, but the Army established this force structure to support deployed forces and not to perform enduring garrison contracting workload. The RCs field similar MTOE contingency contracting force structure.
(f) The ACC identified requirements for 594 additional civilian TDA authorizations to carry out the enduring contract administration workload. Army staff validated ACC's workload and manpower analyses, and continues working a resourcing plan. The ACC's TDA workforce in the ACC contracting centers, the ECC, and the MICC also provide reachback contracting support to deployed ECC contracting units and joint contracting commands, as required. This ACC initiative to fully resource contract administration staffing addresses a recognized Army weakness, as well as better supports the increasing role of ACC TDA force structure in providing reachback contracting support to deployed operating forces.
d. U.S. Army Reserve sustainment command (ARSC).
(1) In parallel with the formal establishment of the ASC, the USAR initiated the ARSC, an organization capable of augmenting the ASC and other sustainment, contracting, and acquisition GF assets when surge capabilities are required in the conduct of their Title 10 missions and/or in support of operations worldwide. The ARSC is designed as a set of modular packages with separate derivative unit identification codes (UIC) and that are permanently aligned with a wide range of organizations. The mission of ARSC is to provide an immediate, available pool of trained and ready operational teams and detachments or individual personnel, which are aligned with the organizations they augment and can perform assigned tasks during surge requirements and exercises, contingencies, and deployments. In peacetime, these ARSC elements provide part-time support to their supported organizations (and are colocated with them, where possible), with a focus on training and skills development. ARSC HQ is an administrative entity responsible for oversight of day-to-day readiness of these modular assets.
(2) The strength of the ARSC concept is that it can focus on certain specialties (notably the acquisition career field, including program management, contracting, research and engineering, and systems automation), creating capability synergy amongst its teams and capable of rapid cross-leveling of personnel, if necessary. Establishing the ARSC replaced the requirement for individual RC augmentees and for mobilization TDAs to the organizations it is designed to support.
(3) Despite its title, ARSC provides augmentation to a wide range of generating force assets outside of ASC, to include not just other AMC major subordinate commands, but also organizations outside of AMC. This array of formally supported assets includes the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology (ASA(ALT)); DCMA at four locations; DLA; and for AMC – HQ AMC G-3, RDECOM, logistics support activity, U.S. Army Chemical Materials Agency (CMA), Joint Munitions Command, U.S. Army Security Assistance Command (USASAC), Aviation and Missile Life Cycle Management Command and two of its depots, Communications-Electronics Life Cycle Management Command, Tank-Automotive and Armament Life Cycle Management Command, LOGCAP and the LOGCAP support unit, ACC, and, the ASC. Of particulate note is support to ACC and ASC, where Soldiers are aligned in augmenting teams across a wide range of MTOE units, to include a number of CCTs, CCBns, AFSB HQs, LSEs, and BLSTs, some forward deployed. While authorizations are sourced by AMC, ASA(ALT), and DCMA, HQ AMC provides direction on missions and utilization. ARSC assumed command and control of all subordinate elements on 31 January 2009.
(4) ARSC has faced several challenges in its activation that can be expected with other RC initiatives similar to this one. A two-year cycle had to be accommodated from the date the concept was approved to the effective date of the unit; acquiring Soldiers, both officer and enlisted, in critical specialties and able to rapidly deploy took time; mission creep occurred, as additional augmentation missions were assigned over the course of the ARSC's stand-up; supported organizations themselves went through transformations due to the requirements of supporting a U.S. military on extended deployment; and the ability to enable deployments of Soldiers was hampered because of Army organizational policies. While in carrier status prior to its effective date, ARSC was unable because of policy restrictions to directly mobilize its Soldiers, relying instead on still-standing mobilization TDAs and on the individual mobilization augmentation process.
e. SDDC joint task force-port opening (JTF-PO).
(1) JTF-PO is a joint organization construct initiated by the U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) in 2006 to address a set of recurring shortfalls in force deployment. SDDC, the ASCC to USTRANSCOM, plays a major role in the organizational structure, activities, and success of the JTF-PO. Prior to the creation of JTF-PO, port opening operations had posed a number of challenges to U.S. forces over the past 20 years of expeditionary operations. In essence, port opening operations were not sufficiently institutionalized within the force. After action reports describe an ad hoc approach that compromised sustainment flows and failed to ensure that logistics-enabling forces arrived early enough in the force flow. Specific shortfalls included the lack of adequate joint command and control at the port, clogging the port with excess cargo awaiting directed onward movement, and lack of the in-transit visibility capability needed to track cargo by radio frequency identification or other means.
(2) In response to these recurring shortfalls, USTRANSCOM developed a concept for an on-call port opening organization. This was initially oriented on aerial ports of debarkation (APOD), but was subsequently expanded to include sea ports of debarkation (SPOD). Tested and certified in 2006, JTF-PO is intended to open and establish PODs and initial distribution networks for joint distribution operations in contingency situations.
(3) In the past, the mission of port opening and initial distribution resided with the geographic combatant commander. Situations may dictate where the geographic combatant commander continues to utilize and control traditional port opening forces. However, with the establishment of JTF-PO, USTRANSCOM assumed authority and responsibility for providing the ability to rapidly open and establish PODs and initial distribution networks for joint distribution operations supporting humanitarian, disaster relief, and limited contingency efforts. This includes the authority to employ its internal assets to deploy the JTF-PO outside the constraints of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD), a key factor that enables a rapid and flexible response to particular conditions and under specified military operations. While the services continue to retain port opening capabilities, the initial deployment of the JTF-PO is conducted under the authority of USTRANSCOM in support of the requesting combatant command/joint force command. There are two basic configurations of the JTF-PO.
(4) JTF-PO APOD is commanded by an Air Force colonel and consists of an air element from U.S. Air Force's Air Mobility Command and a surface element from SDDC. A joint assessment team deploys first to assess port capabilities, and also includes members from both components. The entire team numbers approximately 130 persons, with potential augmentation of 60 more personnel to carry out air traffic control, airfield management, and security functions. The SDDC element numbers 55 persons, sourced from the rapid port opening element (RPOE), which is assigned to the 597th Terminal Transportation Group within SDDC, and carries out functions connected to cargo transfer and movement control. Both Air Force and Army elements are equipped with mobility, communications, logistics automation, command and control, and radio frequency identification capabilities. The latter suite of technology enablers for automated identification provides the means to establish and maintain in-transit visibility for both the JTF-PO commander and the COCOM staff.
(5) JTF-PO SPOD requires two surface elements, one provided by the Army through SDDC, and the other provided by the Navy through the Military Sealift Command. The current sourcing solution for the SPOD JTF-PO is to dual-qualify the RPOE for both air and sea port operations. To manage effectively port operations during an SPOD mission, SDDC augments the RPOE with elements from a regional terminal transportation group's deployment and distribution support team (DDST) and a contracting officer from the appropriate contracting support brigade. The JTF-PO SPOD is commanded by a regional SDDC transportation battalion commander lieutenant colonel (usually the commander of the sourcing DDST) or an SDDC-designated colonel. The size of the SPOD operation – to include members from the RPOE, DDST, and the Military Sealift Command – is scenario dependent. Both Army and Navy elements are equipped with the required capabilities to accomplish the assigned mission.
(6) JTF-PO is viewed as an extraordinarily flexible capability that enhances the overall expeditionary quality of the deploying force. The combination of the employment of the joint assessment team for immediate assessments, rapid assembly of the air and surface elements and their enabling capabilities, and USTRANSCOM's authority to use its own assets to rapidly move the JTF-PO, collectively creates a highly responsive, expeditionary capability that directly addresses operational needs.
f. TRADOC human terrain system (HTS).
(1) The establishment of the HTS, to include human terrain teams (HHTs) deployed in support of current operations, is another example of how GF organizations act to improve expeditionary quality. Among the principal challenges that emerged during OEF and OIF was the recognition of the absence of significant capability within the force to develop a comprehensive understanding of the human environment in which U.S. forces have been operating. This environment includes political, social, cultural, and demographic factors. Historically, the absence of this kind of understanding led to major errors in the planning and conduct of military operations, as well as the generation of unforeseen second- and third-order consequences with local populations and governments that fueled major operational setbacks. An important initiative to correct this capability gap, and one that has drawn a great deal of positive and negative attention, is the creation of HTTs by TRADOC. The initiative took root in 2006 within the broader context of a HTS as a means of improving cultural and social knowledge with concomitant positive effects on operational effectiveness. HTS is based on seven key pillars: the HTTs, reachback research cells, subject matter expert networks, a data management toolkit, human terrain information, techniques, and specialized training.
(2) The basic building block of the HTS is the HTT, which is a five-person team comprised of three military personnel (team leader, research manager, and intelligence analyst/ and/or debriefer) and two civilian experts from the fields of anthropology, regional studies, sociology, linguistics, and like disciplines.42 The teams are intended for attachment at the brigade combat team (BCT) level to advise commanders and staff, interpret the local environment for its implications on BCT planning and operations, and assess the outcomes and effects of military operations. The intent is for the HTT to serve as fully integrated members of the BCT staff. However, in practice, manning a sufficient number of teams to support all deployed BCTs has not yet proved feasible; team composition has also varied considerably.43 Team deployments are intended to overlap unit deployments in order to ensure continuity and to cement lessons learned from one unit rotation to the next. In addition, human terrain and analysis teams (HTAT) are provided to division, corps, and combined joint task force (CJTF) staffs. In 2009, at least 27 HTTs and HTATs were deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq.44
(3) The Research Reachback Center supports the deployed teams with research and analysis through access to a large network of knowledge centers, references, databases, and on-call subject matter experts inside and outside DOD. The reachback center is split into two cells; the Afghanistan cell is colocated with the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center's (CAC) Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and the Iraq cell is colocated with the HTS HQ at Newport News, Virginia. HTT and HTAT personnel may rotate between field assignments and duty with the Research Reachback Center.
(4) The data management toolkit employed by HTTs and HTATs is the mapping the human terrain (MAP-HT) toolkit, an integrated suite of hardware and software designed and developed specifically to support HTS operations. MAP-HT facilitates research, analysis, storage, archiving, sharing, and other applications of socio-cultural information relevant to the unit commander's operational decisionmaking processes. The MAP-HT toolkit is updated constantly with feedback, but the degree to which it has been successfully applied in field conditions is not clear at present. The MAP-HT toolkit includes maps (for example, spatial distribution of tribes and related social entities), link charts (for example, power structures and social networks in informal economies), timelines (for example, time sequence of key religious holidays), visualization (for example, topographic views of Iraqi infrastructure), and reports (such as the role of ethnicity in Iraqi power sharing).
(5) While reports from supported BCTs confirm the utility and value of the HTT effort, this particular program has received negative comments from parts of the academic community, decrying its impact on "academic purity," since some civilian HTT members are drawn from academia. This underscores the reality that some innovative concepts developed to support operating forces will garner sometimes unexpected attention from outside DOD, to include the news media.
g. ARNG agribusiness development teams (ADT). These task-organized TDA organizations leverage civilian-acquired education and skills to improve local agricultural practices in Afghanistan (see figure 2-2). Use of these specialized assets has implications for security and stability in Afghanistan, as local welfare is improved through increased agronomy production and reduction of reliance on heroin poppies to support the economy. The success of ADTs in Afghanistan has opened the door to examining the development and use of other types of non-traditional organizations that address capability gaps. (In many ways, this is reminiscent of civil affairs force designs in the 1970s and 1980s, with small modular teams made up of subject matter experts devoted to a specific function in an area of governance or reconstruction.)
Figure 2-2. Agribusiness development team conducting an assessment at a produce market in Afghanistan (October 2009)
h. MEDCOM. Special medical augmentation response teams are an example of applying an innovative expeditionary mindset in providing increased consultation and advice to operating force medical personnel and organizations in the following areas: Trauma and critical care; nuclear, biological, and chemical incidents; stress management; medical command, control, communications, and telemedicine; pastoral care; preventive medicine and disease surveillance; burn; veterinary; health systems assessment and assistance; aeromedical isolation; and, occupational and environmental health surveillance.
(1) MEDCOM also has the capability to field special logistics medical response teams to assist deploying forces. In addition, MEDCOM medical treatment facilities and dental treatment facilities support the Soldier readiness process by ensuring that deploying Soldiers are fit to deploy and are in the best possible medical condition prior to deployment.
(2) MEDCOM has a variety of health service support assets available in the generating force to augment operating force medical capability. Preventive medicine assets available through the U.S. Army Public Health Command45 conduct health risk assessment for environmental and occupational health threats. They also provide technical reachback for medical and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear staffs. These assets can be deployed to collect, analyze, and communicate health risk data.
(3) The medical community's GF also assists operating forces in identifying, responding to, and countering unique threats encountered in the joint operations area (JOA). AMC develops medical technologies, including new investigational drugs that may be useful in responding to such threats. AMC's subordinate command, the U.S. Army Medical Materiel Agency, supports medical operational needs by procuring and fielding commercial off-the-shelf medical equipment solutions to assist in meeting emerging, unanticipated medical threats that develop in the JOA.
(4) Military treatment facilities provide critical logistical support to deploying units. Military treatment facilities at home station serve as installation medical support activities and provide medical supplies (class VIII) to deploying units.
(5) The U.S. Army Medical Department Center and School develops exportable or web-based training products to bridge identified training gaps based on lessons learned and after action reports. Its personnel perform site visits with units deploying to or redeploying from the JOA to ensure unit personnel have necessary capabilities. New equipment training teams and new organization training teams facilitate the integration of new medical equipment into the force.
i. The Office of The Surgeon General (OTSG). The OTSG leverages capabilities resident in the joint Military Health System and, when necessary, the civilian medical community. The purpose is to enhance care provided to deployed forces and to reduce morbidity and mortality among U.S. forces.
j. CIDC. The CIDC deploys individuals and teams to support the operating force in theater. The law enforcement professional program embeds experienced former law enforcement professionals at all echelons from corps to company in order to assist commanders with enhanced expertise and methodology to understand, identify, penetrate, interdict, and suppress a criminalized insurgency and criminal-like network enterprises and their employment of improvised explosive devices (IED). They also advise the commander on the role of forensic and biometric science and their relevance to battlefield information and intelligence. The U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory (USACIL) deploys joint expeditionary forensic facilities (JEFF) into theater to process and disseminate forensic information from the battlefield and facilitate reachback to the USACIL. The CIDC deploys a reinforced battalion HQ into theater to assume responsibilities as a forensic exploitation battalion. This HQ integrates battlefield forensics and JEFF information into the operations and intelligence organizations within the theater. The criminal investigation task force (CITF) deploys teams into theater to facilitate the integration of intelligence and criminal investigations in order to develop evidence to prosecute terrorists, insurgents, and war criminals. The CITF develops investigative products for prosecution by different legal systems; that is, international courts through such law enforcement organizations as the International Criminal Police Organization, U.S. attorneys for U.S. prosecution, and host nation prosecutors for prosecution within the host nation. The Major Procurement Fraud Unit deploys teams into theater to investigate and develop criminal investigations involving contracting fraud.