a. The entire GF appears to be well-postured to provide comprehensive reachback support to operations in support of deployed joint and Army forces, as well as to other USG agencies and partner nations. The depth, breadth, and responsiveness of reachback capabilities have expanded during the course of recent operations and have been enhanced by the development of an expeditionary mindset within GF organizations. Operating forces have multiple means of accessing reachback capabilities without difficulty. Improvement and expansion of reachback support are achievable if the need arises, but at present no significant capability gaps appear to exist with respect to providing such support. In some instances, capacity gaps undoubtedly exist, and further gaps may arise depending on the volume of requests for support.
b. Because reachback requests fall outside the global force management process, no uniform mechanism exists for tracking requests for reachback support, as well as other mechanisms to support reachback, such as administering databases and blogs; the ability of GF organizations to do so on an individual basis is not clear. As a result, the Army is not able to quantify or assess either the demand signal for reachback support or the resource costs of providing the support. This issue is developed further in chapter 7.
Generating Force Roles in Building Partner Capacity in Support of Operations
a. The Army routinely engages in activities that contribute to building partner capacity (BPC) with its allies and partners on a global basis. However, the demands of OEF and OIF significantly expanded Army requirements in this area, generating a comprehensive response that has largely been ad hoc in nature until recently. In both conflicts, deployed operating forces have accomplished the great majority of BPC tasks.
b. Conversely, GF organizations have played only a small role with respect to support of such operations in theater (with a few exceptions). However, substantial additional capacity and new capabilities have been created within the GF in the course of their conducting their primary missions to generate operating forces, but with the improved capability to perform capacity building activities. Reliance on general purpose forces (GPF) for building partner capacity, particularly with respect to security force assistance, is now being institutionalized as Army policy. As a result, direct support by the GF to BPC is not likely to grow significantly.50
a. This chapter focuses on GF roles in building partner capacity in support of ongoing operationsthrough a discussion of the growth in significance of BPC as a military mission; an examination of the operational experiences of the U.S. Army in this area during the current, ongoing conflicts; a description of how Army policy is now institutionalizing BPC capability within the force; and a review, through informed speculation, regarding if and how GF roles could be expanded to provide more or better support to operations in this area.
b. What is building partner capacity? At this time, BPC is not an official joint military term; that is, it is not defined in the most recent version of Joint Publication 1-02. In addition, neither FM 1-02 nor FM 3-07 defines the term. However, definitions from other sources do exist and are presented below.
(1) Building partnership capacity, as defined by the Quadrennial Defense Review BPC Execution Roadmap, is, "… targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the DOD and its partners."51 (2) A new proposed definition originating from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) is, "… the ability to assist domestic and foreign partners and institutions with the development of their capabilities and capacities – for mutual benefit – to address U.S. national or shared global security interests."52 (3) An Army policy paper on stability operations, approved by the HQDA Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, defined capacity building as, "… the process of creating an environment, supported by appropriate policy and legal frameworks, which fosters institutional development, community participation, human resources development and enterprise creation, and the strengthening of managerial systems."53 c. Over the past 6 years, DOD and Army emphasis on BPC has grown significantly as a result of the demands of OEF and OIF, and is marked by the approval of numerous policy and doctrinal documents that raise BPC activities to a level of central importance.
(1) DOD Directive 3000.05 states that, "… stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the DOD shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DOD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning." It further states that the DOD "… shall develop greater means to help build other countries' security capacity quickly to ensure security in their own lands or to contribute forces to stability operations elsewhere."
(2) National Security Presidential Directive 44 established guidance and a framework for a whole-of-government approach for BPC under the overall direction of the Department of State (DOS).54 (3) The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review articulated the concepts of stability operations and BPC as important elements for future national security and directs that joint ground forces "… possess the ability to train, mentor, and advise foreign security forces and conduct counterinsurgency campaigns".55 (4) The 2008 National Defense Strategy notes that the essential ingredients of future success in conflict will often depend on U.S. activities that support partner nations in the areas of economic development, institution building, establishing the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation and good governance, providing basic services to the people, and training and equipping indigenous military and police forces. The June 2008 Army policy paper, Stability Operations in an Era of Persistent Conflict, asserts several times that the absence of sufficient interagency participation in BPC compels the U.S. military, and especially the Army, to fill critical gaps in executing or coordinating many of these nonmilitary tasks. This can be expected to continue until other USG agencies develop more effective and robust capabilities in these areas.
(5) DOD Guidance for Development of the Force, FY2010-2015, 12 May 2008, specifically calls for action to reduce capability gaps in the following areas:56
(a) Increase capabilities to build partner capacity by training, advising, and assisting foreign security forces . . . in performing large-scale civil-military operations needed for stability operations and enabling transition to civil authorities.
(b) Reduce gaps in GPF capability to deploy, plan, and execute missions with indigenous forces and the capability to synchronize and support stability operations.
(c) Increase DOD capability and capacity to train and equip foreign forces at operational and tactical levels and to advise foreign defense ministries and military institutions at the strategic level. Efforts should focus on closing gaps in the capability and capacity to train, advise, and assist foreign forces for the purposes of foreign internal defense, stability operations, and counterinsurgency.
(6) DOD Directive 3000.07 further reinforces the significance of and provides direction for DOD activities to create safe, secure environments in fragile states through activities that fall under the rubric of building partner capacity.
d. The Army's response to these policy directives includes a variety of initiatives, one of which is the establishment over the past 4 years of a solid doctrinal base to guide Army forces. That base includes FM 3-0, FM 3-07, FM 3-24, FM 3-07.1, and FM 7.0. Collectively, these doctrinal manuals comprise an integrated, internally consistent foundation for current and future activities in support of BPC, with primary emphasis on security force assistance.
e. It is clear from this discussion of definitions and policy directives that BPC encompasses an enormous breadth of tasks that require a whole-of-government approach from the U.S. From the military perspective, BPC will normally involve activities that are defined elsewhere as security assistance, security cooperation, security sector reform, peacetime engagement, humanitarian assistance, security force assistance, and others. The Army maintains on a routine basis a broad set of organizational capabilities that address many of the functions listed above; however, at the Department of the Army level the responsibility for these various Title 10 and 22 authorities, to include oversight, management, and policy, reside across the Secretariat staff and Army staff. These include:57
(1) Within TRADOC, the Security Assistance Training Directorate, G-3/5/7, manages TRADOC's assigned Title 22 Security Assistance responsibilities (per Army Regulation (AR) 12-1) within the Army's FMS enterprise construct through established USG security assistance channels and process, and by means of two internal organizations:
(a) The Army Security Assistance Training Field Activity has the mission to manage U.S. Army-sponsored security assistance training programs (Title 22) and selected DOD programs (Title 10) that bring approved international military students and civilians to U.S. Army-managed training in CONUS in accordance with AR 12-15. In FY2008, the activity oversaw the Army's efforts to train and educate over 8,000 students from 161 countries at 86 CONUS locations. This included FMS, international military education and training, DOD counternarcotics program, and DOD counterterrorism fellowship funded programs supporting all six geographic COCOMs.
(b) The Army Security Assistance Training Management Organization (SATMO) has the mission to plan, form, prepare, deploy, sustain, and redeploy CONUS-based security assistance teams, primarily in support of FMS equipment or system sales; about 400 personnel deploy annually. These teams execute OCONUS security assistance missions in accordance with AR 12-7 by providing technical assistance, extended training services, mobile training teams, and predeployment site surveys. In FY2008, SATMO deployed or sustained 47 security assistance teams in 31 countries to support security assistance efforts. These teams logged more than 80,000 workdays overseas.
(2) USASAC, under AMC, is the Army's executive agent for security assistance materiel and services programs. It coordinated over $5 billion in FMS in 168 countries in FY2007. As of 2008, the total program value across all geographic COCOMS amounted to over $62 billion.
(3) ASCCs are also the primary Army agents in the planning and execution of the joint worldwide training and exercise program managed by U.S. Joint Forces Command, which constitutes a fundamental element of peacetime engagement. In addition, Army military groups, country attaché teams, and elements within offices of defense cooperation have long been established in individual countries in support of BPC objectives.
(4) Because these GF organizations carry out these missions as their primary tasks, they fall outside the scope of this study, which is centered on GF support to operations. Within the study's scope, since military participation in BPC in theaters of conflict is often associated with stability operations, it is possible to narrow the focus of BPC to the five main task areas that characterize stability operations: civil security, civil control, restore essential services, governance, and economic and infrastructure development.58 The goal is to strengthen partner capacity in each of these areas as a means of reducing instability and enabling the partner nation to eventually accomplish these tasks with minimal or no assistance from the U.S. This chapter focuses its discussion on how the Army has conducted BPC during the course of OEF and OIF in reconstruction and infrastructure development and in security force assistance, which align with two of the five tasks above – respectively, economic and infrastructure development, and civil security. Taking this approach in the study is desirable in that it limits the discussion to the two areas in which military contributions to BPC have the greatest effect on current operations, while also identifying the corollary benefits that ensue to areas such as governance and civil control.