a. Under U.S. policy, "The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is the lead U.S. government agency for U.S. foreign assistance planning and programming. It works in fragile states and post-conflict environments which often require program adjustments without compromise of its overarching mission to improve the capacity of local institutions, improve the host country's ability to assure stability, and achieve sustainable development."59 The policy directs all of USAID's operating units to cooperate with DOD in joint planning, assessment and evaluation, training, implementation, and communication in all aspects of foreign assistance activities where both organizations are operating. However, it also cautions that cooperation with DOD will not divert USAID resources from their primary development mission or the principles of development assistance.60
b. Army units and organizations have developed fruitful cooperative approaches with USAID in pacified areas. However, Army activities fill an important gap to support reconstruction in areas which still remain unsafe. In addition, the reconstruction activities carried out by Army forces in Iraq and Afghanistan tend to focus on smaller-scale projects that have an immediate pay-off with regard to improving local stability. A third distinction is the use of the commander's emergency response program (CERP), a funding stream established by Congress for the express purpose of producing rapid funding efforts to meet immediate local needs for reconstruction and infrastructure development, as identified by U.S. military operating force commanders. In almost all cases, projects funded by CERP can be initiated far more rapidly and sometimes even completed before USAID can obtain the approval necessary through its quick impact project funding program.61 c. The Army has devoted significant, nontraditional efforts in this area in both Iraq and Afghanistan by three primary means: activities by Army operating forces; work performed by the USACE districts in Iraq and Afghanistan; and Army support to provincial reconstruction teams.
d. Operating forces. Since the initiation of stability operations in both OEF and OIF, many operating force units have been involved in reconstruction. In some cases, units have employed their own resources for small projects, such as construction of schools or clinics. However, the largest volume of such projects originated through CERP-funded projects initiated by unit commanders, in conjunction with local authorities, leaders, NGOs, and USAID, with the advice and assistance of USACE forward elements, using either U.S. contractors or indigenous companies to perform the work.62
e. Theater-level initiatives have also made important impacts on economic and infrastructure development. In Iraq, for example, MNF-I enabled Iraqi businesses to support forward operating bases with a wide variety of services. The command also introduced a "buy Iraqi first" program and created opportunities to develop the Iraqi scrap and bottling industries, truck stops, gas stations, and other endeavors to expand economic opportunities.63
f. Although these activities have been extremely helpful to strengthening local infrastructure and economies, this chapter will not discuss them further, since they involve activities by operating forces rather than elements of the GF. For the same reason, this chapter omits discussion of the routine activities conducted by Army special operations forces worldwide.
g. USACE engineer districts.64 (1) USACE districts are the execution agents for major construction activities and have a specified geographic area of responsibility. This greatly constrained USACE in establishing organizations necessary to effectively manage and execute the level of construction effort required in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Initially, USACE gained HQDA approval to establish a forward division and three subordinate districts in Iraq and one independent district in Afghanistan in order to support reconstruction operations. But the time required to gain approval of the required organizational structure to execute large-scale reconstruction operations restricted the ability to rapidly deploy these capabilities into a theater of operations. To mitigate this constraint, USACE developed and gained approval of a concept plan that enabled USACE to retain the district organizational structure developed for Iraq in a requirements-only status which could be rapidly activated when required.
(2) The concept plan also approved the permanent formation of a deployable contingency division HQ that will provide command and control of these deployable districts as required. Only on 29 September 2009 was the CETAD activated and aligned with the CENTCOM AOR, replacing three USACE organizations in place for several years to meet the immediate needs of OEF and OIF. TAD is organized into five districts, four of which are forward deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, along with a forward-deployed HQ element. The TAD HQ and the fifth district are stationed at Winchester, Virginia. The future of the TAD organization will depend on the workload demanded to support OEF and OIF.
h. Provincial reconstruction teams (PRT).
(1) PRTs are viewed as being the primary means in Afghanistan of using relatively large-scale construction projects to improve security and stability. Virtually all sources attest to their effectiveness, although their employment has not been devoid of challenges and problems. However, "PRTs have been an effective tool for stabilization in Afghanistan. They have strengthened provincial and district level institutions and empowered local leaders who support the central government. In many locations, PRTs have helped to set the conditions where increased political, social, and economic development is possible. . . . PRTs also delivered reconstruction and humanitarian assistance in remote, violent areas where no other developmental actors have been willing or able to operate. They also made significant contributions to security through their presence, and through support to the Afghan National Police and Army, the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration program, and the disarmament of illegal armed groups program."65
(2) Initiated in late 2002, the PRT program operates under the auspices of the DOS, but is implemented by DOD. The program began as an interagency initiative in response to the need to develop governance and economic infrastructure in Afghanistan. The PRTs operate in cooperation with USAID, coalition forces, and the Afghan National Solidarity Program under the national-level guidance of the PRT executive steering committee.66 Although reconstruction is the focus, PRTs also contribute to stability through direct effects on security, governance, and community political participation. In addition to their primary function of initiating and executing reconstruction projects, PRTs meet with village, district, and provincial leaders in the interests of improving understanding, forestalling disputes, and engaging leaders in the decisionmaking process. The first PRT arrived in January 2003 in the city of Gardez and was quickly followed by six more stationed in other parts of the country that same year. As of early 2009, there were 26 PRTs operating in Afghanistan, 12 under U.S. commanders.67
(3) PRTs are designed to operate in semipermissive environments and have access to CERP funds. They fill a gap in the achievement of BPC goals in Afghanistan (as like organizations do in Iraq for similar reasons) because they operate where USAID and the Afghan National Solidarity Program do not, and because they are able to initiate and complete projects more quickly.68 (4) Although PRTs are often described as a mix of military and civilian personnel, in practice the teams in Afghanistan only include a small number of civilians. Teams consist of between 50 and 100 personnel, commanded by a serving field-grade officer. In the beginning, the Army and USMC provided all the PRT commanders; today, commanders are sourced from all services. The DOS, Department of Agriculture, and USAID each are supposed to provide a senior member co-equal with the military commander, but not all teams have been fully staffed in this fashion.69 In addition, the Afghan Ministry of Interior provides a team member for coordination with local police authorities.
(5) The PRT's military component includes an administration and operations element, a combat service support team, a full platoon for force protection, an engineer advisor and/or project manager, a military police team, and up to eight or nine civil affairs officers.70 Tour lengths are one year. The size and nature of the teams depend on the unique conditions within the provinces in which they operate, including level of security, status of infrastructure, effectiveness of governance organs, and the presence of other private, intergovernmental, or nongovernmental organizations performing similar functions.71 Figure 4-1 shows a core task organization.
Figure 4-1. Core task organization for U.S. PRT in Afghanistan72
(6) Despite their effectiveness, PRTs in Afghanistan have not lived up to their full potential because of a number of endemic problems, some of which continue to be present. Some of the more significant obstacles and shortfalls include:
(a) PRT effectiveness suffered from a lack of common vision and strategy at theater level.
(b) Relationships with civilian development agencies, such as USAID and NGOs, were not always as cooperative as is desirable due to institutional resistance within the civilian agencies to work with military forces, which they felt tended to compromise their standing with the population.73 (c) In the past, the lack of explicit guidance led to confusion about civilian and military roles in the U.S. PRTs.
(d) Support for the civilian members of the team was not always sufficient.
(7) For years, teams lacked adequate training and fully qualified staff members, and tour lengths were not standardized or synchronized.74 Initially, teams were formed in theater with all the attendant challenges in that approach in terms of readiness, effective teamwork, internal coherence and confidence, and sufficiency of training. A new approach began in 2006, described below, that addresses most of these shortfalls. The publication of a PRT Handbook in 2006 further enhances effectiveness and unity of effort internal to and between PRTs.75 Today, most of the U.S. teams are attached to a U.S. brigade commander in the U.S.-led Regional Command-East, but two U.S. teams fall under International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Regional Commands-West and -South, which are commanded by other coalition partners.
(8) PRTs in Iraq. The PRT program expanded to Iraq in 2005, with some notable differences in implementation. To begin with, a senior foreign officer rather than a military officer most often commands these teams. Size varies from 50 to 85 personnel, with the military component comprising less than half the total. Most of the PRTs operate independently, while others are embedded with BCTs. The embedded PRTs work directly with the brigade commander and receive support from the BCT. Iraqi PRTs also do fewer reconstruction projects than those in Afghanistan. Instead, they concentrate on coaching, mentoring, and training local government officials. PRTs operate under the overall supervision of an executive steering committee composed of senior representatives from MNF-I, the U.S. Embassy, and the government of Iraq. As of November 2007, 25 PRTs were active in Iraq.76
(9) Military members of PRTs in Afghanistan are sourced within the joint global force management process as individual augmentees and then form up and train as a team during a 90-day training program for both Soldiers and civilian members at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Although the training program clearly could be viewed as a pure GF activity, it has been conducted under the auspices of the 189th Infantry Brigade since 2006.77 In contrast, Soldiers for Iraq PRTs receive no formal training, with the exception of some undergoing civil affairs orientation training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Predeployment activities for these personnel also include visits to the Foreign service Institute in Washington, DC and 5 days at the Foreign Affairs Counter-Threat Course at Dunn Loring, Virginia, the latter consisting of counterterrorist driving, explosives training, and weapons familiarization.
i. SFA. FM 3-07 defines SFA as, "the unified action to generate, employ, and sustain local, host nation, or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority." These activities are often informally referred to as "train-advise-assist." FM 3-07.1 states that SFA is normally part of a larger security sector reform effort, while in other instances SFA is not tied to reform but to building partner capacity. FM 3-07.1 is based on two primary foundations: the Army policy on SFA that has evolved to its current state over several years, and the operational experiences of HQs and operating forces during the course of OEF and OIF. These two foundations will be discussed below, beginning with a brief operational history of SFA in OEF and OIF.
j. Operational experience in SFA for OEF and OIF.
(1) Following the defeat of the Iraqi regular army and the transition to long-term stabilization of the country, commanders and planners realized early on that a significant effort would be required by U.S. forces to rebuild what became known collectively as Iraqi security Forces (ISF). These forces were a critical component of the overall stabilization and democratization of the country and the establishment of the rule of law. From the beginning, commanders and planners relied almost exclusively on the use of operating forces committed in theater to carry this out.
(2) Under the short-lived coalition provisional authority, two initial organizations were created to train Iraqi army and police forces: the coalition military assistance training team and the civilian police assistance team. In addition, the joint HQ advisory support team stood up to develop a command and control system and assist in operational and strategic planning. All three of these missions were consolidated in 2004 into the Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I).
(3) MNSTC-I served as the theater-level organization under MNF-I charged with the development, organization, training, equipping, and sustaining of the military and police forces of the ISF. MNSTC-I's subordinate organizations included separate theater advisory and planning teams for the Iraqi Army; Air Force; Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard; Joint HQ; Ministry of Defense; Ministry of Interior; national police; and intelligence organizations. It also assisted Iraqi special operations forces through the Iraqi National Counterterrorism Task Force, and included a security assistance office to help in the purchase of equipment and U.S. training.78 In execution of this mission, MNSTC-I employed a combination of two tailored approaches, the first using general-purpose operating forces to partner with ISF to build capacity and capability, and the second using transition teams in concert with GPF.
(4) On 1 January 2010, as part of the drawdown of U.S. forces in Iraq, U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) was activated as a consolidated command, subsuming a number of HQs that had been operating in theater. These included MNF-I, Multinational Corps–Iraq (MNC-I), MNSTC-I, and Task Force (TF) 134 (which oversaw theater detainee operations). MNSTC-I's missions transitioned to USF-I Advise and Training, a subordinate element of USF-I.
k. Transition teams.
(1) The U.S. Army began using transition teams in early 2004 as the operational focus shifted to developing self-reliant security forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Essentially, in Iraq transition teams became the primary instrument to execute the MNSTC-I mission, alongside BCTs that were partnered with Iraqi units. Initially, forces in theater staffed the teams, but were given minimal focused training and few resources. In response to the training gap, in 2005 the Army established training activities at Fort Carson, Colorado, Fort Hood, Texas, and Camp Shelby, Mississippi. In March 2006, FORSCOM consolidated transition team training at Fort Riley, Kansas with the 24th Infantry Division in charge of the training. Five months later, responsibility transferred to the 1st Infantry Division at Fort Riley, Kansas.79 In 2009, the transition team training mission was institutionalized at the Joint Readiness Training Center, Fort Polk, Louisiana, under the 162d Infantry Brigade.80
(2) MNSTC-I established the Iraq Assistance Group (IAG) in 2005 as the primary administrative and support organization for the growing volume of transition teams required to deal with the enormity of the task of rebuilding the ISF. Transition teams are assigned to the IAG, but then attached to the BCTs in whose area they operate, under the direction of the BCT commander.81 The IAG also runs Camp Buehring in Kuwait, where deploying transition teams are acclimatized and equipped for their tour. Transition teams then go to the Phoenix Academy in Baghdad, which is their final training venue before their attachment to a BCT. The IAG synchronizes transition team rotation, closely monitors activities, maintains a country-wide assessment, and ensures transition team support requirements are met.82 (3) Transition teams are embedded within the ISF elements they support. Teams rely on the BCT for command and control and for logistical support. Transition teams can request close air support, indirect fire, and medical evacuation in concert with their partner unit. The teams are task organized depending on which echelon they are assigned, and thus will vary in design, size, and composition. In Iraq, there are five primary applications of transition teams:
(a) The majority of transition teams are military transition teams charged with training and advising the Iraqi army.83 The standard approach is to assign a division-level military transition team matched with an Iraqi division, with multiple brigade- and battalion-level military transition teams covering subordinate elements within the division, all under the command and control of the U.S. BCT that is partnered with that Iraqi division.84
(b) National police transition teams embed within the paramilitary Iraqi national police and the Iraqi police service. National police transition teams normally include a contracted U.S. civilian police officer to provide expertise in law enforcement.
(c) Police transition teams train and advise local police forces, so their size and composition vary in accordance with local conditions.85 (d) Border transition teams are embedded within elements of the Ministry of Interior's Department of Border Enforcement at the regimental and battalion levels. Border transition teams assist the Iraqi border forces in the areas of patrolling, border control, and prevention of infiltration of insurgent, terrorist, and criminal elements.
(e) The fifth primary transition team is the port of entry transition team, which is embedded with Department of Border Enforcement units at Iraq's major ports of entry. In addition to the border control functions described for the border transition teams, these teams also focus on illegal shipments and smuggling. Both the border and port of entry transition teams normally include maintenance and communications personnel not found in other transition teams because of the remoteness of their locations and/or their nonattachment to a U.S. BCT.
(f) Other specialized transition teams found in Iraq and Afghanistan train, advise, and assist in the areas of administration, logistics, base security, corrections, and transportation.
(g) The typical military transition team numbers between 10 and 16 personnel, depending on the specific requirement.86 Field-grade officers lead the teams, which are staffed with subject matter experts in specific warfighting functions, but organized much like a traditional staff. A brigade-level military transition team cited in a U.S. military journal in 2006 included the following personnel elements: Field artillery lieutenant colonel, serving as the team chief' field artillery major, executive officer; engineer captain, S-1; military intelligence major, S-2; military intelligence captain, assistant S-2; infantry major, S-3; field artillery captain, assistant S-3; quartermaster captain, S-4; signal corps sergeant, S-6; and, field artillery staff sergeant, NCO in charge.
(h) Transition teams are sourced Armywide from both operating forces and GF organizations, based in part on demands for specific skills, through the joint global force management process. Teams are comprised of individual augmentees who converge on the designated CONUS training center, where they participate in a 60-day training program.87 Subsequently, the teams deploying to Iraq receive theater orientation training as well as personal and team equipment and familiarization at Camp Buehring. The teams then move to the Phoenix Academy at Camp Taji in Iraq for training focused on counterinsurgency, advisory skills, and language training, as well as hands-on training on communications and mobility equipment. Transition teams headed for Afghanistan deploy directly to Afghanistan and receive final training at Task Force Phoenix in Kabul, which combines the preparation efforts described for Iraq transition teams.
(i) Like any rapidly instituted, ad hoc approach to a new operational mission, the employment of transition teams in concert with GPF suffered growing pains. Some of the shortfalls cited in defense news articles and post-operation interviews include the following.
Predeployment training: lack of meaningful detail on how transition teams actually operate in practice and the challenges facing them.
Predeployment team formation: late arrivals within the team, uneven quality of personnel.
Lack of unity of effort between the three core elements involved in SFA – the U.S. BCT, transition teams, and the Iraqi partner units.
Maintaining effective relationships and equal situational understanding between the core elements of SFA.
Loss of progress as a result of transition team rotation.
Reliance on ad hoc practices to address systematic deficiencies.
Failure to use contractors to address some of the recurring, predictable requirements, which could have reduced the burden on transition teams and BCTs.
Failure to preidentify civilian skill sets in reservists assigned to transition teams that could be applied to SFA or support requirements.
(j) However, the most significant challenge may involve logistics support to the ISF and transition teams. This problem area is rooted in two main areas. First, in the course of organizing and training ISF units, the Army issued rolling stock, arms, and other equipment to the ISF without thorough fielding, training, and sustainment plans. As vehicles broke down and other equipment failed, sometimes from misuse, Iraqi units suffered clear loss of combat power. To avoid this problem, complex efforts were required to arrange services, obtain repair parts, and provide maintenance for the equipment. The second root is the routine absence of sufficient capacity within many BCTs to meet their own needs and respond to ISF logistics requirements as they occurred.88 Finally, support for the transition teams often had to be obtained through multiple sources (the IAG, the BCT, and others) rather than from a single, responsive source.89
(k) By December 2006, the number of transition team personnel in Iraq exceeded 5,000. Since that time, the numbers have increased further as U.S. emphasis continued to shift toward the accelerated development of the ISF to assume greater responsibility within Iraq as a necessary condition for the withdrawal of U.S. general-purpose forces in accordance with timelines agreed upon with the government of Iraq.90 In the 15-month period between April 2008 and June 2009, transition teams and U.S. general-purpose forces assisted in forming more than 115 army and police combat battalions. As a result of the surge effort, there are now more than 600,000 trained and equipped members of the ISF.91 Overall, HQDA G-3/5/7 reported 254 transition teams in action in OEF and OIF as of 11 December 2008.92
(4) Afghanistan training teams.
(a) In Afghanistan, the organization comparable to MNSTC-I is the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A).93 In partnership with the host nation and ISAF, CSTC-A plans, programs, and implements the generation and development of the Afghan national security forces in order to enable the state to achieve security and stability.
(b) Five Army regional security integration commands (ARSIC) accomplish the CSTC-A mission, matching up with the five Afghan national army corps: the 201st Corps based in Kabul; 203d Corps in Gardez; 205th Corps in Kandahar; 207th Corps in Herat, and the 209th Corps in Mazar-e-Sharif. Each ARSIC is comprised of a regional police advisory command and a regional corps advisory command. The police advisory command is responsible for training, coaching, and mentoring all organizations of the Afghan national police. The corps advisory command has the same mission, but for the Afghan national army corps and lower echelon units. Instead of transition teams, each organization possesses a number of police mentoring teams that work closely with the Afghan national police, and embedded training teams that perform a similar function with the Afghan national army. U.S. Army BCTs may also be assigned to ARSICs to perform combat operations and accomplish other civil security tasks.
(c) The jointly staffed police mentoring teams (PMT) and embedded training teams (ETT) are the backbone of the ARSICs. These U.S. Soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines train, coach, and mentor the Afghan national army soldiers and police forces in functions that range from daily mission planning and preparation to safety, unit training, and moral and ethical training.
(d) In addition to the PMT and ETTs, police operational mentoring liaison teams (OMLT) and OMLTs perform similar functions and work directly in support of the ISAF.94 There were 52 U.S. military embedded training teams in Afghanistan in 2009, as well as 59 NATO OMLTs on the ground as of October 2009. OMLTs are located in all five regions of Afghanistan and support the appropriate ARSIC.95 U.S. Army members of PMTs, ETTs, and OMLTs are sourced Armywide and participate in the training regimen described earlier.
(5) Army policy on institutionalization of SFA and PRT training.
(a) In July 2007, recognizing a long-term requirement for U.S. forces to participate more comprehensively in SFA, HQDA G-3/5/7 issued a memorandum directing TRADOC to initiate the development of an enduring transition team and PRT mission training capability. Pursuant to TRADOC's analysis, Decision Point 110 of the Army Campaign Plan was presented on 17 January 2008 to the VCSA, who made several decisions:96
The Army will institutionalize transition team and PRT training structure.
The Army will combine transition team and PRT training to the extent that there are common tasks and efficiencies to be achieved.
FORSCOM and TRADOC will share command and control responsibilities for the training.
Training will be relocated from Fort Riley, Kansas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, but remain independent from the colocated combat training center program.
(b) Simultaneously, TRADOC developed a concept for fulfilling SFA requirements through the establishment of theater military advisory and assistance groups (TMAAG). The concept proposed the assignment of TMAAGs to the theater ASCC to execute theater security cooperation tasks and activities in support of geographic combatant commanders. In practice, TMAAGs would provide ASCCs with dedicated GPF to support security assistance and SFA programs, support small-unit military exercise programs, and carry out other military-to-military engagements with partner nation military forces. Designed as a permanent (vice rotating) structure, a TMAAG was envisioned to include a 39-personnel HQ for planning and administrative control of and support to three security cooperation detachments. The 22-person security cooperation detachments contained personnel trained in languages and culture pertinent to the geographic command. The concept called for security cooperation detachments to focus at brigade level and below and to accept augmentation across specific functions particularly pertinent to stability operations. Note that the security cooperation detachments were not intended to address all the tasks that characterize SFA activities in OEF and OIF, such as combat advisory roles or training to host nation special operations.97
(c) Ultimately, departmental considerations moved away from the TMAAG concept in early 2008, and in April 2008 the CSA disapproved the implementation of the concept. Instead, HQDA issued updated guidance that backed away from the creation of specialized units for the SFA mission.98 This established a different approach which has since solidified into Army policy centered on the development of the "advise and assist brigade" (AAB)99 and the institutionalization of transition team and PRT training at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The memorandum stated the following.100
The Army will utilize, to the greatest extent possible, full-spectrum modular forces. The ARFORGEN model will provide elements of BCTs, functional units, and multifunctional units to execute capacity building missions. Teams generated by SATMO should receive appropriate advisor training prior to deployment.
The enduring training requirement is to train units, teams, and individuals to perform capacity building missions on a worldwide basis.
At initial operational capability, the training mission must be capable of meeting forecasted OEF and OIF demand in FY2009.
Advisory training will be performed by a standardized TDA that allows for scalability as training throughput requirements shift over time.
The primary focus of the advisor training center is advisor skills. The advisor training center will also be capable of training required force protection, survivability, and theater-directed predeployment requirements.
(d) The Army Strategy issued on 22 August 2008 confirmed the 4 April 2008 memorandum as Army policy, reinforcing the following ideas:101
The Army will extend the SFA mission to GPF.
The Army will develop an enduring capability to train individuals, teams, and units for SFA.
The ASCCs must have the capability to plan for and coordinate SFA.
The Army will examine regional focus for BCTs in ARFORGEN as a means of reinforcing enduring capability.
(e) After breaking from the TMAAG concept and committing to an approach to SFA centered on GPF, the Army began work in earnest in the spring of 2008 on a concept for a BCT-based capability for SFA. Initially described as the "security cooperation BCT," the organizational approach evolved through several iterations before being labeled the "AAB," with yet another evolution now being termed the "BCT augmented for security force assistance." During the course of this developmental process, CAC and JCISFA also collaborated on and produced a draft of FM 3-07.1, which was approved in April 2009. In releasing the FM, the TRADOC CG, stated, "It's important to note that SFA occurs under a variety of conditions, and it is the conditions that will determine how and what organizations we use to accomplish the mission."102
(f) The TRADOC commanding general further stated that, "Under conditions of active conflict where we have direct responsibility for security – as in Iraq and Afghanistan – tactical commanders will have a security force assistance mission to train, advise, and assist tactical host nation forces. This mission is accomplished using the resources of the modular brigade augmented as necessary based, again, on conditions."103 The AAB is one of the Army's primary organizational solutions to the SFA requirements described in the statement. The first AAB (the 4th Heavy BCT/1st Armored Division) deployed to Iraq as the pioneering "proof of concept." Prior to its deployment, the brigade went through a 10-month reset and training period, in conjunction with ARFORGEN, receiving over $60 million in new equipment. Some civilians from the PRTs that the 4th BCT now supports in-theater participated in the brigade's mission readiness exercise at the end of its ARFORGEN cycle.
(g) The Army's advisory and assistance training was moved to Fort Polk, Louisiana in 2009, and encompasses training of transition teams, PRTs, and the augmented BCTs assigned advisory missions. The training program for the 4th BCT/1st Armored Division as an augmented BCT included 2 weeks of civil affairs training at Fort Bragg, North Carolina; a city manager's course in Austin, TX; on-site work with city planners and managers in El Paso, TX; a 5-day course with the U.S. Border Patrol; and a rotation at the National Training Center.104 A stability and support transition team, the core of which is a group of field-grade officer advisors specially trained for SFA, augments the BCT.
(h) The 4th BCT is assigned to Multinational Division-South (34th Infantry Division) and operates within the three southern Iraqi provinces of Dhi Qar, Mayson, and Al-Muthanna. The BCT exercises command and control over the 21 transition teams already present within the region and supports the four PRTs working there.105 As the Army continues its developmental program of up to eight AABs,106 transition teams rotating to Iraq are envisioned as being formed within the brigades during their ARFORGEN ready cycle, then deployed and redeployed with them to ensure fully integrated operations during their year of employment.107 This approach is intended, in part, to reduce or eliminate the need for externally sourced individual augmentees or transition teams. As AABs become trained and available, the intent is to allocate them regionally, but not to align them permanently as is currently done with such organizations as the MIBs and AFSBs. It is also envisioned that AAB elements may train and deploy below brigade level for specific missions that do not require the entire BCT.108
(i) Coincident with the development of the first AAB, the Army reactivated the 162d Infantry Brigade (foreign security forces–training teams) on 1 May 2009 at Fort Polk, Louisiana becoming a new element in the GF training base as the advisor academy anticipated in the policy decisions cited above. Taking over the mission previously performed by the 24th and 1st Infantry Divisions, the 162d Infantry Brigade consists of approximately 825 Soldiers augmented significantly by contractor staff. It is tasked to prepare about 5,000 individuals from all services each year for SFA activities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Future student volume will go up or down depending on operational requirements.109 (6) Other Army initiatives to build capability to conduct BPC.
(a) The discussion above covers major initiatives undertaken by the Army to improve its capabilities within operating and generating forces for BPC, but this chapter would be incomplete without listing other actions that also support improved capability. Important examples include the following.
The authorization of 1,300 new civil affairs positions distributed within the active Army and RCs.
The setting of "Grow the Army" goals ranging from 16 to 53 percent growth for civil affairs, engineers, military police, and special forces, plus 129 percent growth for psychological operations. The functions associated with these forces are relevant to BPC activities.
The establishment of the TRADOC Cultural Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona.
The establishment of the UFMCS at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
The establishment of HTTs, described in chapter 2.
The establishment of ARNG ADTs for deployment to Afghanistan to assist farmers in that country.
The assignment of proponency for stability operations and security force assistance to CAC and designation of commander, CAC as the director for the JCISFA.110
The agreement with SOCOM to cosponsor and staff the JCISFA, established at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
Action by USAFMSA to develop systems, organizational designs, and force management designs to help Afghan and Iraqi police and defense officials to manage their forces, as well as training provided by USAFMSA to those officials.
(b) Two observations gleaned from this list are particularly noteworthy. First, many of the initiatives require institutional change within the GF. Second, with the exception of HTTs, the changes within the GF fundamentally represent reachback capability to support the action of operating forces in theater that are conducting BPC, rather than deploying GF capability to provide direct support. (GF reachback support in the area of BPC is described in chapter 3.)
(c) A challenge in identifying personnel who could support BPC efforts is ensuring visibility of people with critical skills. One initiative being explored at this time is the documentation of civilian acquired skills for RC personnel. An application of this program would be the assignment of the best people with the skills required to fill augmentation positions which support BPC. Just one example would be identifying individuals with necessary skills supporting civil affairs tasks and assigning them to mobilization TDA positions that augment civil affairs units and BCTs, expanding unit capabilities by utilizing civilian-acquired skills and education, but without the need to take Soldiers out of standing MTOE assets and reducing their readiness.