Gender and Violence in Algeria Women’s Resistance against the Islamist Femicide Zahia Smail Salhi University of Leeds



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Gender and Violence in Algeria


Women’s Resistance against the Islamist Femicide

Zahia Smail Salhi

University of Leeds

In this lecture I aim to investigate and analyse the roots, reasons and forms of Islamist violence against women in the context of Algeria, and to scrutinise women’s reactions to violence and the various resistance strategies they have adopted in the face of this violence.


Setting the Scene:

In Algeria’s modern history the 1980s was the decade which witnessed the birth of the movements for democratic liberties. Actors within civil society took over the street1 and expressed various demands which in the essence were fuelled by a deep identity crisis.

After what started in the 1970s as a conflict between the Arabophones and the Francophones as they competed for power, other tendencies were growing and becoming rife and at the same time hostile to each other. These main tendencies were known as the Amazigh/Berber movement and the Islamist movement. While the first claimed Berber as the language and the identity of at least 30 percent of the Algerian population, the second was directly linked to the Arabophone faction in power and claimed Islam as the Religion of the state and Arabic its sole national language.

Islamism, as a political current in the Algerian context goes back to the colonial period when the Association of the Muslim Ulema formed around Ibn Badis in the 1930s and then merged with the National Liberation Front in the 1950s. In the two decades following independence, the Muslim and Arab aspects of the new nation stood in a parallel line along that of the secular and leftist tendencies in power resulting in the nation being torn between two pulling forces; one Islamist/conservative and the other secular/modernist.

As such, the Islamists saw themselves as the main political and ideological opposition to the ruling elite and excluded all other tendencies which might contribute with a third political voice such as the MCB: Berber cultural movement which was opposed by both the state and the Islamists, mainly because the Berbers were calling for the safeguarding of the Berber language and culture and for freedom of thought and speech, which directly opposed the Islamists’ wholesale Arabisation and Islamisation project. The Algerian regime for its part violently repressed the Berber demonstrations in April 1980, and accused the Berbers of being separatists and pawns in the hands of the ex-colonialists.

To control the Berber Cultural Movement, the regime supported the Islamist clergy, using Islam as a rampart against civil society. In return, it had to compromise with the clergy on many vital issues. The question of language put aside, the other vital area where the Islamists pressed for radical changes is the Personal Status Law, with demands that targeted women’s civil rights condemning them to a status of minors for life.

The Islamic conservatives endlessly argued that educated women were easy targets for Western imperialism and that their conduct was reminiscent of French colonialism.

What is interesting at this point in time is how the Berber Cultural Movement and the nascent women’s movement were both accused of conspiring with the West, which in view of Algeria’s colonial past signifies treason against the principles of the national revolution and therefore the lack of legitimacy of their movements, while on the opposite side of the spectrum stands the Islamist movement which enjoys wider legitimacy which is directly derived from Islam as the religion of the nation which helped it resist colonialism and safeguard its identity. For this reason alone, Islamists felt empowered to stand in the way of everything which opposed the way of Islam and claimed the right of using all means, including violence, to protect Algeria’s Islamic identity. The various verbal and physical attacks, throughout the 1970s and 1980s on women whose conduct was deemed non-Islamic, are but a few examples of such violence.


Violence against Women in Algeria

Violence is often defined as an assault on a person's physical and mental integrity. It is an underlying feature of all societies, and an undercurrent running through social interaction at many different levels.

The World Health Organisation defines violence as the “…intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation”2

Violence against women reflects culturally-defined notions of masculinity and femininity which serve to reinforce women's subordinate position. It is in most cases, perpetuated by men against women and it embodies the power imbalances inherent in patriarchal societies.

Two levels at which violence may strike women's lives across the Middle East and North Africa can be identified as Private violence and Public violence. The forms that these two types of violence may take differ from one region to another according to cultural norms and religious beliefs.

In Algeria, women are stranded between a patriarchal society hostile to women’s presence in the public sphere and a set of laws in the form of the 1984 ‘Family Code’ which institutionalises discrimination against women and therefore constitutes a form of public violence against them.

The discriminatory provisions of the Family Code have facilitated violence against women, legitimized discrimination in practice and made it particularly difficult for women to deal with the consequences of widespread human rights abuses.3

In a briefing to the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Amnesty International ( 2005) shows that Algerian women “have little prospect of obtaining justice and redress for abuses they have suffered and that current laws and practice continue to discriminate against women and facilitate violence against them, ”.

It has always been the case in Algerian society that male and female spaces are strictly designated in the public sphere; women are not welcome in male souks, cafes, and leisure places in general. With the rise of Islamism, harassment in the public sphere often amounted to extreme physical violence. Such violence is often justified by the Islamists’ ‘re-Islamisation from below’ project, which justifies as religious duty all actions they take to correct whatever they see as wrongdoing.

As early as the late 1970s women became a clear target for the fundamentalists, whose aim was to bully them out of the public sphere through intense harassment in the form of verbal abuse which quickly escalated into physical attacks in the street against women who dressed up ‘indecently’, by throwing acid on their bodies, and attacking them with knives.

In the face of these brutal attacks which often disfigured the victims, the government offered no rejoinder. It is often reported that when women complained to the police about their assailants they were told: they brought it upon themselves.

It was in actual fact this silence and sometimes the complicity of the neo-conservative state that encouraged the fundamentalists’ attacks on women. The way a given society chooses to control the violence inherent in it reflects the value it places on mutual respect and tolerance of difference, and on human rights, democracy and good governance.

The institution of the 1984 Family code is in itself symptomatic of the Algerian government’s lack of respect for women and its arbitrary neglect of women’s basic human rights. This move is also symptomatic of the government’s lack of regard for individual liberties as it paid no heed to the numerous demonstrations led by women between 1981 and 1984 to demand the abolition of the project of the family code.

The Algerian government co-opted the “conservatives, and later, Muslim fundamentalists, to safeguard their interests and stay in power. Various governments have many times made compromises and sacrificed women’s rights and safety to keep peace with the fundamentalists”4

While the institution of the Family Code seemed to have satisfied the clergy and the neo-conservative members of President Chadli’s government, the Islamists were less than satisfied; in their view the code was not Islamic enough and they called for a total implementation of the Shari‘a, and the institution of an Islamic State in Algeria.

The October 1988 Riots and their Impact on Women

The social strife that had marked the 1980s culminated in the October 1988 riots. The waves of discontent expressed initially through a series of strikes and peaceful marches quickly degenerated into wide scale riots. Alarmed by the intensity of the destruction caused by youths who attacked government buildings, the military resorted to violent repression causing the death and injury of hundreds of demonstrators and the arrest and torture of many others, which ultimately led to more anger and resentment.

The Islamists capitalised on this popular anger and exploited it politically through a populist discourse which swiftly recruited many angry youths.

On the other hand, many other groups joined the protest and took the opportunity to voice their concerns and call for radical change and the toppling of President Chadli’s government.

The women’s groups, who throughout the 1980s incessantly expressed their anger at the institution of the Family Code also joined the demonstrations and called for the recognition of democratic liberties.

In order to save his government President Chadli gave promises of economic reform and political liberalisation. It seemed that the establishment of political pluralism served as an alternative to addressing social and economic needs.

Lazreg explains, “The ‘discovery’ of citizenship is a powerful tool of protest in the hands of political opposition groups and social groups such as women, traditionally excluded from the full enjoyment of their political rights. It opens up a new era of inquiry into the many dimensions of citizenship and their culturally specific expressions as well”5.

The situation of women in this new political climate is indeed most intriguing, as while they remain minors under the dictates of the Family Code which denies them their civil rights, they can now enjoy political citizenship and form their own associations through which they can make claims for equality before the law.

The institution of the Family Code was a strong wake-up call for Algerian women and a re-launch of the Algerian feminist movement which started in the 1940s as the Algerian Women’s Union which joined the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the armed struggle (ALN) from 1954 to 1962. In the post independence period it was made into a state controlled organisation, which was stripped from its militant platform and was turned into a conformist organisation (UNFA) which was ultimately deserted by feminist women.

Women war veterans and a new generation of women who opposed the UNFA in their struggle to stop and eventually repeal the Family Code merged together and solidified their ranks in a new feminist movement whose political platform is the abolishing of the Family Code.

Immediately after the launch of the 1988 political reforms, three women’s associations were created. These are the Association for the Emancipation of Women, the Association for Equality before the Law between Women and Men, and the Association for the Defence and Promotion of Women’s Rights.

Nevertheless, the disjuncture between political and civil citizenship, has hampered Algerian women from enjoying full participation in public life and from achieving autonomy in the conduct of their private lives. What exacerbated this condition was the rise of the Islamists as political parties, the most notorious of which was the F.I.S: Islamic Salvation Front.

Women’s associations and liberal political opposition parties were alarmed and very worried by the FIS’ non-democratic agenda on the one hand and its populist discourse on the other; while its leaders never supported democracy, but repeatedly asserted that once in power they would fully implement Shari‘a law, their populist rhetoric recruited masses of frustrated youths to whom they sold packs of dreams, and through the expression of their outright hatred of the regime they have quickly managed to pose themselves as the strongest alternative to the FLN.

Substituting the voice of the FLN with that of the FIS would indeed jeopardise the democratic process and kill the nascent democracy in its infancy. The undemocratic claims of the FIS leaders and the attitude of its supporters towards other civil society members go to confirm this point.



Islamist Violence against Women in Algeria

This new political climate positioned women’s organisations and the members of the FIS as clear opponents in a game in which the first group fought for their civil rights while the second aimed to suppress them.

The members of the FIS who used the religious space of the mosque for propagating their fundamentalist views, especially vis-à-vis women whom they put at the centre of their populist propaganda, rallied to their cause huge numbers of unemployed youths whom they convinced that women should return to their homes to fulfil their God-given roles as homemakers and leave their jobs for the unemployed male who needed them most.

Over and over again Ali Benhadj, the second leader of the FIS, portrayed women as needing male protection and reiterated that the safest place for them was the home and their prime duty was ‘to produce lions to fight for the cause of Islam’.

This discourse resulted in making the public sphere even more hostile than it already was to women who are now designated as one of the wrongs of Algerian society and for Islamic salvation to prevail they should be ‘righted’ as a matter of urgency.

Islamists repeated ad infinitum that society should be cleansed from moral corruption which is mostly personified in women, whom they branded as, “‘the avant-garde of colonialism and cultural aggression’ and, because they opposed the family code which legalised polygamy, they were dubbed, ‘the women who wanted to marry four husbands’”6

Alarmed by the Islamists’ populist discourse (as in the above quotes), and the danger they represented to the nascent democratic movement and to women’s organisations, the Association for the Equality before the Law between Men and Women, called for a massive gathering to celebrate the International Women’s Day in 1989. The members of the association emphasised their determination to continue their struggle against gender segregation as exemplified in the Family Code, which they described as an obstacle to justice, equality and democracy which they highlighted as the main components of the full development of the Algerian woman and of the society as a whole. Women’s status as minors under the law prohibits the whole society from progressing into a democratic society, and makes them extremely vulnerable in front of the Islamists’ campaign of intimidation.

As a reaction to this, the leader of the FIS Abbassi Madani told Agence France Presse, that the recent demonstrations by women were “one of the greatest dangers threatening the destiny of Algeria”. This was because the women participants were “defying the conscience of the people and repudiating national values”.

In no time at all, the Islamists dominated the public sphere, and because of the religious aspect of their party and discourse, people did not dare to challenge their intimidating moves not only against women but against the whole society.

Amongst their moves they removed satellite dishes from people’s roofs and installed loud speakers through which they preached their new way of life. Their discourse was loaded with threats and hatred directed at those who did not follow their way.

A whole new mood dominated the public sphere which was fully occupied by bearded men wearing qamīs and sirwāl (such as worn in Afghanistan), while Islamist women wore a plethora of new Islamic veils (hijāb, niqāb, jilbāb, chador…) which were all alien to Algerian society.

The level of intimidation against those who did not follow their dress code reached the point of making them feel threatened in the streets which were ‘decorated’ with graffiti shouting threats such as, ‘O you woman who wears the jilbāb may you be blessed by God, O you woman who wears the hijāb (long robe and headscarf) may God put you on the right path. O you woman who expose yourself, the gun is for you’.

As a result many women donned the veil out of fear. One such woman testifies, “None of us want to wear the veil. But fear is stronger than our convictions or our will to be free. Fear is all around us. Our parents, our brothers, are unanimous: Wear the veil and stay alive”.

In some municipalities the fundamentalists forced segregation between boys and girls in schools and deprived girls from physical education. They intimidated people on beaches and swimming pools and interfered with cultural life in general prohibiting wedding ceremonies and all forms of celebrations which used music.

They issued death threats against singers and performers, cancelled all festivals and closed all cinema houses and theatres. In 1990–1991 they issued a curfew on female students living in halls of residence after 6.00 pm. Saadi reports that anyone opposing this was ‘corrected’ with the aid of a whip or bicycle chains.

In brief, all manifestations of social life were banned and instead a deep feeling of fear was roaming the streets of the cities where the Islamists were dominant.

What started as verbal attacks, threats and intimidations soon transformed into outbursts of extreme violence quickly after the government annulled the December 1991 Parliamentary elections, during which the Islamists made major electoral gains, and banned the FIS as a political party.

In February 1992 a state of emergency was declared and in March of the same year the two main leaders of the FIS, Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj were arrested. These moves by the government resulted in the Islamic Salvation Front as a political party turning into several armed terrorist organisations, the most notorious of which were the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé: Armed Islamic Group), the AIS (Armée Islamique du Salut: Army of Islamic salvation), and the MIA (Mouvement Islamique Armé: Armed Islamic Movement).

The fear of civilians was intensified by the random killings of policemen, journalists, intellectuals and women. The armed groups issued death threats against the intelligentsia, government security workers and feminist activists. It became very obvious to all, however, that the terrorists harboured a worrying misogyny.

One of the first women to be gunned down was the 21 year old Karima Belhadj, who worked as a clerk in a youth and sports department. She was shot in the head and abdomen on 7 April 1993.

On 23 January 1994 Mrs Mimouna Derouche, a 28 years old mother of five was decapitated in front of her children.

On 25 February 1994, two sisters aged 12 and 15 were kidnapped and gang raped.

On 3 March 1994 Samia Hadjou, aged 69 had her throat cut.

On 7 November 1994, two sisters named Saida and Zoulikha were gang raped, tortured (their fingernails and toenails were pulled out), and then their throats were cut off.

Unveiled women are now being shot down in the streets; in March 1994 three unveiled high school students were shot down7.

On 15 February 1995, Nabila Djahnine, the president of a women’s group, was gunned down in Tizi-Ouzou.

In Sfizef (south of Mascara) eleven women teachers were slaughtered in front of their pupils outside their school8.

Feminist activists were openly targeted. Their names were listed and pinned on mosque doors and shouted over the loudspeakers. Khalida Messaoudi whom the fundamentalists sentenced to death in 1993 testifies, “Over the loudspeakers, imams would hurl curses at me, describe me as ‘a woman of delinquent morals’ and a ‘danger to the morality of women,’ and warn those women who might be tempted to follow my example”9. From this date onwards she lived in hiding.

It soon became evident that women were at the top of the terrorists’ agenda and that their bodies were primarily targeted as symbols; the terrorists’ lists of women to be killed were extensive and included women from all walks of life: women who worked in government offices; women who owned shops such as hairdressers, beauty salons, Turkish baths; women teachers and University lecturers; women related to government officers or security workers; feminist activists, women artists and singers, school girls, and women who lived on their own.10

After targeting individuals the terrorists soon moved to mass murders, bombings of buses and public places and the massacre and ransacking of remote villages.

When they attacked villages11, whole populations were massacred. Daily newspapers reported the kidnapping of young girls whom they gang raped and turned into sex slaves, those who disobeyed them or attempted to escape had their bodies mutilated. It was reported that the terrorists used a technique called Tafrī‘, to split women’s bodies into two parts by attaching them to two vehicles which drove in opposite directions.

Ait Hamou describes the horror in the following terms, “ Women were attacked in their homes, brutally beaten, abducted, raped, taken as temporary wives of the ‘emirs’, or as slaves. They were shot dead, torn apart when they were pregnant and their foetuses smashed on the walls”.

In 1998, Human Rights Watch reported that more than 2000 women were raped in five years of conflict12, many of them were held by armed Islamist militia, to be violated, beaten and forced to perform domestic tasks. Those who managed to escape, were unable to secure any support and were “therefore damaged by the initial rape, but also by the shame and stigma which separates them from their families” 13

Such practices turned the terrorists’ war against women into a genuine femicide. Women were truly petrified not of death but of torture and dishonour. Bennoune reports that one woman told her, “I thought of buying poison so I can kill myself if taken by them alive, so all they get is a corpse. I am losing my hair from nerves”.

Pondering on the Islamists’ femicide Messaoudi observes, “At the heart of their way of life, their mindset, their imprecations, and their savagery, I perceived a constant obsession, of the kind that is symptomatic of madness: an obsession with women. The truth is; no other theme looms as large as this one does in the ideology of the FIS...According to the fundamentalists, women are the root of all evil”.

Targeting women’s bodies and using them as battlefields makes it obvious that gender is at the core of the issue of Islamic terrorism and inflicting violence on their bodies is a means of controlling women and terrorising their community. Aisha Lemsine remarks, “The treatment of women raises serious questions about the level of faith and Islamic behaviour on the part of the protagonists in the civil war in Algeria”.  She adds, “As in Bosnia, Algerian women are the first victims of the civil war in their country. In the Balkans, rape and forced pregnancy were tactics of "ethnic cleansing"; in Algeria, the persecution of women is a key element of "religious cleansing”.

It has to be highlighted, however, that in their attempt to suppress women and confine them to the private sphere, Islamists’ violence was making them more visible and more central to the fight and resistance against their barbaric acts.

Women’s Resistance Strategies

Trapped between the dictates of an infamous Family Code and the barbarism of the Islamists, women were not prepared to submit to the threats of the terrorists or to give up their struggle to repeal the Family Code.

At every opportunity, women activists voiced their determination to have the code repealed and their belief that Algeria with its principles of liberation drawn from its revolutionary not-too distant past would eventually triumph over the retrograde forces of terrorism.

Women’s new struggle took a dual course of action; one was social and spontaneous and the other was political and structured, mainly led by the feminist groups.

On the social level women’s motto was ‘life as opposed to death’. Their strategy was to resist and oppose the destructive powers of Islamic terrorism by continuing to do lead ‘normal’ lives despite the atmosphere of war.

Women continued to go to work and do their daily business. They continued to send their children to school despite the fact that 16 pupils were assassinated while at school on 5 October 199714, and female teachers who were not sure of returning to their homes in the evening continued to attend to their duties, and every time a female teacher was assassinated another filled her post.

Women continued to go to hairdressers and beauty salons and continued to find ways to celebrate births, weddings and their children’s birthdays and school achievements in the way they always did.

Despite the fear and difficulty of gathering, they continued to celebrate the International Women’s Day, during which they staged mock tribunals against terrorism, they showed films and staged plays that highlighted the dangers of fundamentalism and glorified women’s courage, women’s contribution to society and more importantly raising the morale of women.

They highlighted the significance of women’s solidarity networks and the importance of their active participatory roles which they have yet to play.

In short, they celebrated life and its continuance when the terrorists spread death every single day. In the face of grief, women consoled and helped each other by hosting orphans and widows and aiding the needy at times of despair.

The feminist groups launched many charitable organisations and opened women shelters to help survivors of rape who were disowned by their families. The ‘SOS Femmes en Détresse’ organisation took care of the children of the women and girls who were forcibly impregnated and pressed on the government to permit abortion in such occurrences. They recruited doctors, midwives, psychologists and lawyers as volunteers to help in the rehabilitation process of the women survivors of violence.

In the absence of men, women stepped into new fields and positions which were traditionally designated as male domains. In some areas they led funerals, and in the work place they took positions such as in the construction and civic engineering sectors. Women took charge of small enterprise and ran new businesses.

In short, at a time when women were forcibly excluded from the public sphere they became even more visible by adopting new roles and moving into new economic domains.

On the political level, women have never given up their demands to have the family code abolished and worked tirelessly to widen the spread of awareness amongst high school and university students about the Family Code and its perils, and most importantly about women’s human rights which were denied to them by society at large, in view to mobilize support for its abolition.

Despite their status as victims of terrorist violence and minors under the law, throughout the 1990s women engaged in consolidating their roles as agents of change and resistance to Islamist terrorism. On the 2nd January 1992 women were the first to stage a massive demonstration against the FIS. They called for the cancellation of the electoral process in which many women’s voices were taken by the FIS through the proxy vote, and warned of the danger of Algeria becoming an Islamic state.

The women demonstrators’ banners carried slogans which read, ‘ The Army, The People and Democracy’, ‘No Iran, No Kabul, Algeria is Algerian’, ‘Algeria: Free and Democratic’, ‘Lets Save the Principles of the Republic’15.

The numbers of women participating in the demonstrations amounted to thousands; their aim was to reclaim the public sphere which the Islamists were trying to dominate, but more importantly to manifest their refusal of a fundamentalist rule which they saw as a threat not only against women but against the whole society and most importantly, against the nascent democracy. Such demonstrations became a kind of routine to demonstrate that Algeria was not to submit to terrorist violence16.

On the women’s demonstrations the independent newspaper Al-Watan wrote, “Tens of thousands of women were out to give an authoritative lesson on bravery and spirit to men paralysed by fear, reduced to silence…the so-called weaker sex refused to be intimidated by the threats advanced by ‘the sect of assassins’” 17

It has to be highlighted here that since the celebrations of national independence in 1962, women had been almost absent as civil society members and did not take part in demonstrations. The institution of the Family Code and the rise of fundamentalism in Algeria were the two main wake-up calls which brought them out of their passivity to become active agents and claim their space in the political arena. Several feminist groups started organising themselves and working together to change the awareness of women’s issues in Algerian society and provide women with the knowledge that would enable them to counteract fundamentalism and produce a counter discourse both on the national and international levels.

To do so, they maintained their stand as staunch opponents of fundamentalism and terrorism, by voicing their views and making their suffering known to all. The women survivors of rape testified on national television and daily newspapers about their ordeals, telling the whole nation and those who remained in doubt about what the terrorists were doing to women and how their savage acts contradicted the essence of Islam.

This act was a very powerful move in Algerian history and in the history of Algerian women in particular; what used to be an unspoken taboo during the war of independence and in the years which followed, was now spoken of openly and is widely mediatised!

Women transformed the issue of Islamist violence in terms of rape, from taboo into a campaigning issue, which has taken on transnational dimensions. The front pages of the Algerian daily newspapers carried pictures and stories of the lived horrors while the feminist organisation, Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes Démocratiques (RAFD), carried out the documenting of human rights violations and the collecting of women’s testimonies. It is, indeed interesting to observe how these survivors of rape relate their stories in minute detail to magnify the human tragedy they went through.



Algerian Women and Transnational Networking

Having strengthened their ranks on the national level as a resistance group against terrorism and fundamentalism, Algerian feminists reached out to the international arena by forging solidarity networks with other women globally but particularly with those living under Muslim laws.

In 1995 they joined the Maghreb Egalité Network together with Moroccan and Tunisian women’s groups to represent Maghrebi women at the Beijing Conference, where they made violence against women a priority and cooperated in this with organisations such as Women against Fundamentalisms and Women living under Muslim laws.

By joining such networks Algerian women also sought to secure resources for the women survivors of violence and widely publicise their cause. In establishing resources for women survivors of violence, the women activists began to liaise with international funding agencies, building their capacity for effective action.

Along with raising funds these women were keen to secure the support of many Western countries whose media often portrayed the Islamists as the victims of the undemocratic Algerian state who crushed their victory by cancelling the electoral process in 1992. Their main aim was to create a counter discourse to that of the FIS and demonstrate to world opinion that the FIS used democratic means to eradicate the nascent democracy in Algeria. Feminists publicised FIS leaders’ statements against democracy18 and presented themselves as an alternative voice to that of the state which lost its credibility on the international scale. The women of the RAFD filed a civil action suit in Washington DC, against the FIS and its US representative, Anwar Haddam.

Feminist leaders became tireless ambassadors in various countries across the world telling Western audiences about the realities at stake in Algeria. At the height of the Islamist terror in November 1994, Sa‘ida Ben Habylas, the official Algerian representative to the UN-sponsored regional meeting that took place in Amman gave an impassioned speech denouncing the violence against women.

The reality which the Algerian feminists aimed to explain to the world was that Islamic terrorism was not a home grown phenomenon and a result of socialist mismanagement, but the result of the US and other Western governments’ actions in promoting Islamism and training Arab fundamentalist armed men in Pakistan and Afghanistan during the 1980s.

In brief, while world opinion in the 1990s supported the view that Algerian authorities should have given the FIS the opportunity to rule after winning the 1991 elections, Algerian public opinion thought the opposite; members of the FIS were terrorising the society well before they won the elections. Letting them rule the country would have resulted in the Talibanisation of Algeria. The rise of the FIS in the 1990s coincided with the return of some 3000 Algerians who fought and trained in Afghanistan. General Belkheir declared in an interview that what the army did in Algeria was to prevent it from becoming another Afghanistan. The task was made very difficult by the moral embargo imposed by the West on Algeria which prevented it from supplying its units and men with adequate weapons such as reconnaissance and night-vision equipment.

By the end of the 1990s the Algerian army succeeded in neutralising the threat that Islamism represented for the state. Yet, the international community still had not recognised the legitimacy of the war against Islamic terrorism and continued to hold Algerian authorities responsible for human rights abuses, while the terrorist violence which resulted in a death toll of 200 000 victims, the dislocation of thousands of people and the destruction of both state and private infrastructure remained underestimated.

The 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre resulted in a radical change in world opinion towards Islamic terrorism and a reassessment of violence in Algeria. At this stage charges of human rights violations by the Algerian security forces were dropped and the legitimacy of the war against terrorism in Algeria was recognised.



Conclusion:

With the end of the most terrible violence in Algeria and as the Islamist threat subsides, Algerian women are emerging from a difficult yet formative period. The legalisation of their associations in 1989 has allowed them to organise themselves as pressure groups and become active actors in the public sphere. Their continuous demands for their legal rights, while combating and resisting Islamic terrorism, has made them real political actors and maintained them at the centre of political manoeuvres. On the subject of gender and violence, the Algerian government came under continued pressure both from regional and national women organisations as well as from international bodies to take serious action to address the problem of violence against women. Violence is now debated as a social phenomenon and is treated as a health problem which the society has to fight. Various media have been used to encourage women to bring violence to the open and report it to the authorities, whose attitude toward domestic violence has also changed.

In October 2000 the organisation ‘SOS Femmes en Détresse’, convened a conference in Algiers on violence against women and children and set up a network which has published its own report on violence. Lloyd contends, “These actions were significant in that they acknowledged the problem and recognised a role for specific legislation to protect women from violence.”19.

The experience of terrorist violence against women which often amounted to femicide ‘banalised’ the subject of gender violence and made victims come forward and testify about it in the hope of denouncing the perpetrators. Moreover, the work of NGOs resulted in lifting the veil of shame from all forms of violence.

Women groups asserted that the government campaign against gender-based violence could not be successful for as long as the Family Code remains unchanged. They insisted that women ought to be protected by laws which would punish perpetrators of violence.

On the subject of the Family Code, women NGOs pressed for government action to repeal it. Although this has not been achieved, in 2005 some changes to the Code were introduced after heated debates and long protests by conservative political parties who opposed its modification.

Although the draft is believed to stop far short of eliminating all discriminatory provisions of the Family Code, most women activists and organizations in Algeria recognize these amendments to the Code as a significant improvement to the present law, and what is most important is the shifting of the sacred aspect of the Code which was viewed as a God-made document.


1 On April 20, 1980, Tizi-Ouzou has seen three days of rioting. The insurgents demanded the recognition of Berber/Amazigh language and culture. After 1980 the Berbers celebrated the Berber Spring to commemorate the black spring and insist on their demands.

On October 28, 1981, a ‘Hundred Angry Women’ demonstrated in the streets of Algiers expressing their anger at the government’s decision to debate the family code in secret. On November 16, 1981 five hundred women gathered in front of the National Assembly as it met for a plenary session. Women have not stopped demonstrating against the institution of the family code, which was instituted in June 1984. From then on they incessantly demonstrated for repelling it.




2 World Health Organisation, World Report on Violence and Health (Geneva: 2002), p. 38.

3 “Algeria: Women left unprotected from violence and discrimination”, Amnesty International Press release, (10-01-2005).

http://news.amnesty.org/mavp/news.nsf/print. Accessed 21-12-2005.


4 Ait Hammou, ‘Women’s Struggle against Muslim Fundamentalism in Algeria: Strategies or a Lesson for Survival?’. p. 118.


5 Marnia Lazreg, “Citizenship and Gender in Algeria” in Suad Joseph ed., Gender and Citizenship in the Middle East, (Syracuse University Press, 2000) p.58.


6 Karima Bennoune, “S.O.S. Algeria: Women’s Human Rights under Siege”, p.197.

7 Salim Ghazi, “Deux Lycéenes assassinées”, El Watan (31 March 1994), p.1.


8 Amnesty International, “Algeria: Civilian population caught in a spiral of violence” (London: 1997), p. 18

9 Khalida Messaoudi & Elisabeth Schemla, Unbowed: An Algerian Woman confronts Islamic Fundamentalism. Trans: Anne C.Vila (University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998), p. 87.

10 In the southern Algerian town of Ouargla, a group of fundamentalists set fire to the house of Saliha Dekkiche, a divorced woman living alone with her children, resulting in her three year old child burning to death.


11 In a single night in August 1997 the terrorists massacred 100-300 women, children and men in Hay Rais, and in September of the same year they slaughtered 64 women in Beni Messous and 100-200 in Bentalha. For more details see: Anissa Barrak, “Les Faits à travers la presse algérienne”, Confluences Méditerranée, 25 (1998), pp. 11-20.

12 Human Rights Watch, “Algeria: Country reports”, (Washington DC: 1998), p.4.

13 Amnesty International and Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l'Homme and Human Rights Watch, Algérie: Le livre noir (Paris: La Découverte, 1997), pp. 20–21.

14 In September 1994 the GIA called for a boycott of schools and threatened reprisals in the form of school burnings and murders of pupils and teachers, on anyone defying the order. Quoted in Meredeth Turshen, , “Militarism and Islamism in Algeria”, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Vol.39, No. 1-2 (2004), p. 125.


15 Such slogans were repeatedly shouted at subsequent demonstrations such as that on 25 October 1993 and other. Such slogans demonstrate women’s awareness of the replications of Islamic fundamentalism at the international level. It also demonstrates a will to link the women’s movement in Algeria to other women’s movements internationally but most specifically with Women Living Under Muslim Laws. See http://www.newint.org/issue270/270edge.html. Accessed: 21-12-2005.


16 For more details see Shadow Report on Algeria to CEDAW, submitted by International Women’s Human Rights, Law Clinic and Women Living under Muslim Laws. http://www.nodo50.org/mujeresred/argelia-shadwreport.html ,

Accessed 30 June 2004.


17 Valentine M.Moghadam, “Organizing Women: The New Women’s Movement in Algeria”, Cultural Dynamics, Vol.13 (2001), p. 140. http://cdy.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/13/2/131 . Accessed 17 June 2009.

18 As an example, this is what the two main Algerian fundamentalist leaders/co-founders of the FIS party have to say, even long before the December 1991 elections were cancelled in Algeria, about their programme and democracy: “I do not respect either the laws or the political parties which do not have the Qur’an. I throw them under my feet and I trample them. These parties must leave the country. They must be suppressed”, Ali Benhadj, Alger Républicain ( 5 April 1991), “Beware of those who pretend that the concept of democracy exists in Islam. Democracy is Kofr”, Ali Benhadj, Le Matin (29 October 1989).

19 Lloyd, “From Taboo to Transnational Political Issue: Violence against women in Algeria”.







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