Impact Defense

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ESDI 09/10

KNRW Page of

Impact Defense

Impact Defense 1

1nc soft power 2

1nc hard power 3

1nc hard power 4

1nc hard power 5

1nc Economy 6

1nc economy 8

economy ext – decoupling now 9

1nc terrorism 10

1nc terrorism 11

terrorism ext – support decreasing 12

terrorism ext – viewed as counterproductive 13

terrorism ext – threat exaggerated 14

ext – threat exaggerated 16

at: no major terrorist attacks b/c they are plotting a big one 17

1nc nuclear terrorism 18

1nc nuclear terrorism 19

nuclear terrorism – at: some state will give them weapons 21

nuclear terrorism – at: terrorists will steal a loose nuke 22

nuclear terrorism – at: terrorists will create their own 23

nuclear terrorism – at: terrorists will create their own 25

1nc bio terror 27

1nc bio terror 28

bio terror ext – hard to acquire 29

bioweapons ext – hard to acquire 30

bioweapons ext – no impact 31

1nc bio terror – small pox 32

1nc bio terror – small pox 33

1nc chemical terror 34

1nc chemical terror 36

chemical terror ext – no impact 37

1nc prolif 38

1nc prolif 40

1nc biodiversity 41

1nc biodiversity 43

1nc warming 44

1nc warming 45

1nc warming 47

warming ext – impacts exaggerated 48

1nc disease – Generic 49

1nc disease – generic 51

1nc bird flu 52

1nc bird flu 53

1nc democracy 54

ext – democracy doesn’t solve war 55

ext – democracy doesn’t solve war 57

1nc Human Rights 58

1nc racism 59

1nc women’s rights / Patriarchy 60

1nc soft power

us soft power is in crisis due to fundamental shifts in attitudes between the US and its allies – one policy won’t change that

Sloan 2/23/2006 [Stanley R., Director of The Atlantic Community Initiative. The Transatlantic Link: Building a New Foundation, Presentation by Sloan to to the Conference of Defense Associations Institute.

The recent crisis in transatlantic relations, mainly focused on the policies of the George W. Bush administration, and particularly its choice to invade Iraq, did not come completely out of the blue. It was built on a series of developments that followed the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. The United States emerged from these happy but destabilizing events as the world’s only true global power –without a clear “enemy” to focus its policies or to guide its alliance policies. The enemy deficit was filled temporarily with statements about “challenges” and “potential risks.” These were first identified in NATO’s new strategic concept of 1991, and were subsequently refined in alliance proclamations and most notably by events, particularly the conflicts in the Balkans. By the time we reached the new millennium, however, another challenge had appeared – this one from inside the transatlantic relationship. The new position of the United States in the international system had created a tendency toward unilateralism and hegemonic behaviour in US policy. This was observable during the Presidency of Bill Clinton, but emerged full blown in the first George W. Bush administration. The other part of the challenge was to be found in Europe’s response. Facing an American ally that had been “liberated” by its power position, there was a tendency in Europe to abandon the idea of the transatlantic partnership. Some Europeans advocated embracing “autonomy” and a clear distancing from the policies and inclinations of their ally that had become a not-so-friendly giant. Even if Europe could not compete with American mil-itary power, these advocates thought, Europe could build an independent approach based on its impressive soft-power resources. Even before the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and Europe were facing a new crisis in their relationship. The hegemony and autonomy challenges were fed by the perception in Washington that Europe had given up being a serious hard power player. This led some Americans, particularly influential ones in the Bush administration, to dismiss NATO and transatlantic cooperation as increasingly irrelevant to US interests. Some analysts and officials even suggested that a “new division of labor” not only was becoming a reality, but also should be embraced.

Soft power is ineffective at solving threat

Kagan 2006 [Robert. May 28, 2006. Washington Post. “If Power Shifts In 2008: A Democrat Might Not Be as Different as You Would Think” ]

The case for electing a Democrat is not only to save the party's soul, though that's a worthy task, but to pull the country together to face the difficult times ahead. The last time the Democrats were in office, the world seemed a comparatively manageable place. They have not yet had to deal with the post-Sept. 11 world. Since the only post-Sept. 11 foreign policy Americans know is Bush's, many believe -- especially many Democrats -- that if only Bush weren't president, the world would be manageable again. Allies could be easily summoned for the struggle against al-Qaeda or to bring pressure on Iran or to replace American troops in Iraq. Threats could be addressed without force, through skillful diplomacy and soft power. Maybe some of the threats would disappear. This is fantasy. The next president, whether Democrat or Republican, may work better with allies and may be more clever in negotiating with adversaries. But the realities of the world are what they are, and the imperatives of U.S. foreign policy are what they are. The diffuse threats of the post-Cold War world simply don't unite and energize our European allies as the Soviet Union did, and even a dedicated "multilateralist" won't be able to get them to spend more money on defense or stop buying oil from Iran. A smarter negotiating strategy toward Iran might or might not make a difference in stopping its weapons program. Soft power will go only so far in dealing with problems such as North Korea and Sudan.

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