No impact/alternative - libertarianism flawed – dependency exists 69
Alternative fails – libertarianism = liberalism – vague definitions 70
Alternative fails – coercion inevitable 71
Alternative fails – any residual links revert the revolution 72
Alternative fails/plan solves – the aff is a prerequisite 73
Alternative fails/plan solves – the aff is better and no clear alternative 74
Alternative fails – it’s too simplistic 75
1nc regular shell (1/5)
Taxpayers have a moral right to their income which the aff plan violates – the state can’t identify social goods that could reimburse income, any social goods identified are delivered inefficiently, taxation destroys social goods anyways, and their evidence is biased towards expanded government.
Kuznicki 9 (Jason, facilitator of multiple Cato Institute international publishing projects, Research Fellow and Managing Editor at Cato Unbound [an intellectual think tank publication], prior Production Manager at the Congressional Research Service, Ph.D. in history from Johns Hopkins University, Cato Journal, Book review of The Libertarian Illusion: Ideology, Public Policy, and the Assault on the Common Good, Spring/Summer 2009, Volume 29 Issue 2, http://web.ebscohost.com/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=0de93721-30a4-4513-87f1-57bf16a8aa5e%40sessionmgr13&vid=2&hid=12, SP)
A taxpayer has a moral claim to all of his honestly acquired income. This claim is stronger than that of any other individual or group. Adding the words "state" or "society" to the claims of others does not change this situation in any relevant sense. This is the heart of libertarian thought on taxation. If lowering taxes changes the state's revenue, a libertarian may find this a fortunate or unfortunate side effect, at his discretion. Hudson, however, disagrees not only with Norquist and Laffer, but also with the libertarian moral claim. He writes. The ability that any of us have to earn income and acquire wealth depends only partly on our own individual efforts. It relies as well on the operation of political, economic, and social institutions that make it possible for any of us to "earn a living." . . . Viewed in this light, those deductions from my paycheck can be seen as reimbursement to society for that portion of my earnings derived from social goods [p. 43]. Although social goods clearly are part of everyone's capacity to earn income, it's a precipitous move to say that the state may therefore tax us. It is by no means clear that the state, among all institutions in society, is best equipped to receive that which we offer in gratitude for social goods. It is doubtful that the state could identify the relevant goods, and that it has supplied, or could supply, any but a few of them effectively. It's even doubtful whether the state could know when taxation itself has become destructive of social goods. Indeed, the state's own incentives run toward overassessing its importance, delivering social "goods" that no one wants, and supplying them in comically inefficient ways. Communitarianism appears unfazed by these concerns, and it proposes adding many new government programs that seem equally likely to fall into these same old traps. It seems that our debt to society is never fully paid, but that society, in the form of the state, is always eager to supply us with more. At what point, if any, is my debt to society—or my debt to a certain very earnest intellectual of highminded ideals—repaid? And why do I find myself having to describe productive work in terms that verge on those of criminal justice?