SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN OVER THE INTERNET BIPARTISAN STAFF REPORT FOR THE USE OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
The Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations examined several different components of the U.S. effort to combat the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet. Broadly, these entities included: (1) U.S. law enforcement; (2) the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (“NCMEC”); (3) Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”); (4) the financial services industry; and (5) social networking websites. The Subcommittee also reviewed the efforts of several foreign governments and industries with respect to the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet, including the United Kingdom’s Home Office, the Internet Watch Foundation (“IWF”), the Child Exploitation and Online Protection (“CEOP”) Centre, Interpol, the European Union, the Dutch National Police Agency and Ministry of Justice, and Europol. The Subcommittee’s investigation also encompassed examining Internet safety educational programs, as well as exploring issues related to the psychology of pedophiles and online child predators in order to educate parents and children on how children can avoid becoming a victim. Key findings from the Subcommittee’s investigation include:
Crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet are a growing problem in the U.S. and around the world, due to the ease with which pedophiles and child predators can trade, sell, view, and download images of child pornography from the Internet.
The number of sexually exploitative images of children over the Internet is increasing, the victims are becoming younger, and the substance of the images is growing more violent.
Commercial websites involving the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet are a growing and lucrative business. Current estimates indicate that on any given day there may be more than 100,000 sites with commercially available child pornography and that this is likely to be a multi-billion dollar-a-year industry.
Together with the development of digital photography and web cameras (“web cams”), the ability to communicate anonymously over the Internet through online chatrooms, Instant Messaging services, and social networking websites has made it easier for pedophiles and child predators to contact children and to “groom,” or befriend and seduce, them. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) estimates that 50,000 child predators are online at any time searching for potential victims.
The U.S. law enforcement effort to combat online child pornography involves several different federal agencies, with sometimes overlapping jurisdiction in these cases, as well as federally funded state law enforcement officers specially trained in these cases, referred to as Internet Crimes Against Children (“ICAC”) Task Forces. Each of these agencies performs vital investigative functions necessary to combat the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet. Federal law enforcement agencies either need increased funding or better prioritization and organization within their agencies, or both, specifically to combat child exploitation over the Internet, including additional agents dedicated to investigating these types of crimes, additional forensic laboratories and specialized training for investigating these cases.
The U.S. Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”), which has a long-standing role in investigating cases involving the sexual exploitation of children, does not currently have statutory authority to issue administrative subpoenas in child exploitation cases, whereas other federal agencies, such as the FBI and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), now part of the Department of Homeland Security, do have this power. In order to further enhance the ability of the USPIS to investigate child sexual exploitation crimes, an amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 3486 should be considered by Congress to include authority for the Postmaster General to issue administrative subpoenas in criminal investigations involving child exploitation.
While the federal sentencing guidelines for criminal offenses relating to the sexual exploitation of children involve strict penalties, there is a wide discrepancy in state criminal codes both in covering all the substantive offenses, as well as, in sentencing. Because approximately 70 percent of all cases involving the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet are prosecuted at the state level, state legislatures should consider enhancing the penalties for these offenses and, in some instances, passing additional criminal laws that address the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet.
Given that the vast majority of prosecutions for crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet take place at the state level, it is vitally important that state law enforcement officers are trained in investigating these crimes and have access to forensic laboratories.
Additional resources should be assigned on both the federal and state level to investigate and prosecute these cases. These resources include federal and state law enforcement agents and prosecutors, forensic laboratories and law enforcement and prosecutorial training.
The use of anonymizers and other encryption methods poses a substantial threat to law enforcement’s ability to investigate and bring charges against individuals who create, trade, or otherwise distribute images of child pornography over the Internet. Industry and law enforcement need to work together to develop methods that will allow law enforcement agents to access data related to child sexual exploitation cases while protecting customers’ needs to secure their private data unrelated to those cases.
Currently, NCMEC houses a central database of known images of child sexual exploitation, which includes images found through investigations conducted by U.S. law enforcement, such as the FBI, ICE, and USPIS. It is important that all U.S. law enforcement agencies at the federal and state level have access to this centralized database to consult when investigating crimes involving the sexual exploitation of a child online.
ISPs that provide connectivity to the Internet do not retain Internet Protocol (“IP”) address data linked to a subscriber for the same amount of time. ISPs that provide content also have a wide variety of data retention times for IP addresses and subscriber information.
It is critically important to investigations involving the online sexual exploitation of children that law enforcement agents are able to access IP address data linked to a subscriber—particularly that information kept by ISPs that provide connectivity to the Internet. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(f), once a law enforcement agent sends a data preservation request to an ISP, the ISP must retain the data described in the request for 90 days, a period which can be extended an additional 90 days if law enforcement requests. Once a preservation request or subpoena has been issued, ISPs should make every effort to respond to law enforcement as expeditiously as possible. Without this information, the investigation is likely to hit a dead end and a child in danger may not be rescued.
Child pornography investigations often take months to develop, during which time critical data, such as IP addresses linked to a subscriber’s account, may be lost if the Internet Service Provider does not have an adequate retention policy.
Law enforcement agents who testified at the Subcommittee’s April 6, 2006 hearing supported a data retention policy of at least one year for IP address information. Due to the fact that harm may be occurring to a child in real-time during an investigation involving the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet, Congress should consider requiring ISPs that provide connectivity to the Internet to retain such IP address information linked to subscriber information necessary to allow law enforcement agents to identify the IP address being used to download or transmit child pornography images and only for so long as necessary to accomplish that purpose.
When law enforcement agents are able to identify harm that is occurring to a child in real-time, it is essential that they gain immediate access to the IP address and customer information that will allow them to locate and rescue that child. In response to a lawful request, ISPs must provide this information as quickly as possible after the administrative subpoena or other lawful request is received.
The transmission of a sexual exploitative image of a child over the Internet is a borderless crime because it cuts across state, federal and, in many cases, international jurisdictions. Federal and state law enforcement in the U.S. should consider implementing the Child Exploitation Tracking System, or “CETS,” developed by Microsoft and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, to enhance communication about ongoing investigative subjects in cases involving the sexual exploitation of children between and among U.S. state and federal law enforcement agencies. This program provides a platform for law enforcement agencies to track investigations that are being conducted across the country. This system also enhances the information-sharing critical to these types of investigations as well as reduces the likelihood of unnecessary duplicative efforts. Currently, CETS is being used by Canadian law enforcement officers throughout the territories, and the U.K., Spain, and Italy are beginning to implement this program among their law enforcement agents.
The current reporting statute for ISPs, 42 U.S.C. § 13032(B)(1), requires “electronic communication service” providers or “remote computing service” providers to report any “apparent” images of child pornography to NCMEC’s CyberTipline. Under the statute, it is ambiguous whether cellular phone carriers, social networking websites, and web hosting companies are required to report into the CyberTipline.
Congress should consider amending 42 U.S.C. § 13032(B)(1) to include mandatory reporting into the CyberTipline for cellular phone carriers, social networking websites, and web hosting companies.
Currently, 42 U.S.C. § 13032(B)(4) provides that only providers that are found to have “knowingly and willfully” failed to report an “apparent” image of child pornography will be liable for civil penalties. To date, there have been no federal prosecutions under this statutory scheme.
Congress should consider ways to ensure that all ISPs are proactively searching for and promptly reporting the images of apparent child pornography on their networks.
Internet Service Providers should develop best practices and technology that will allow them to proactively search their networks and systems in order to identify the transmission of apparent child pornography images, including those transferred by peer-to-peer networks. Such proactive efforts should not expose these companies to potential liability under the current reporting requirements found in 42 U.S.C. § 13032, criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 2252 et seq., or other criminal and civil liability pursuant to Department of Justice antitrust enforcement actions. We recommend that the Department of Justice provide ISPs with guidance on these points to ensure that ISPs continue to cooperate with law enforcement agents on these investigations. These guidelines should also permit ISPs to perform proactive measures on their networks to block images of child pornography and, if the ISP is conducting such measures and blocking child pornography images on their networks, provide assurance to the ISP that they are not in violation of the crimes they are trying to prevent, such as possession and distribution of child pornography images.
Social networking websites must take proactive steps to start cross-referencing state sex offender registry lists with those individuals that have profiles on their site, and notify law enforcement immediately of their findings for further investigation. States should consider enacting legislation, such as that proposed in the Commonwealth of Virginia, to require sex offenders to provide their email address when registering as a sex offender so that social networking websites can use the registries to block those offenders from their websites.
Digital currencies are being used more frequently on commercial child pornography websites and provide another layer of anonymity to the purchaser and seller of these materials. Digital currencies on the Internet are not regulated anywhere in the world.
The U.S. Department of Treasury and the U.S. Department of Justice should propose legislation to Congress aimed at providing effective controls over the burgeoning digital currency industry over the Internet.
According to the Internet Watch Foundation (“IWF”) in the United Kingdom, approximately 50 percent of the child pornography content the IWF is discovering on the Internet appears to be hosted in the U.S. It is possible that this content may appear to be hosted in the U.S. but in fact is re-routed from another hosting company outside of the U.S. Currently, there is no registration requirement in the U.S. for web hosting companies and thus, it is difficult to know how many companies in the U.S. are hosting content over the Internet. It would benefit law enforcement investigations as well as provide uniformity in the number of web hosting companies that report to the CyberTipline if a registry for web hosting companies was created in the United States.
U.S. law enforcement investigations have uncovered instances where obvious child pornography domain names were registered with a domain registry company based in the U.S. It would benefit U.S. law enforcement’s effort to combat child pornography over the Internet if domain registry companies registered with an international body and a set of best practices were developed for domain registry companies.
The IWF provides a valuable service to ISPs in the U.K. by identifying child pornography websites to ISPs and the ISPs in turn block access to the sites identified by the IWF. In September 2006, NCMEC announced that they would be working with law enforcement and the ISPs to provide a similar function to the IWF. Under this initiative, NCMEC will work with law enforcement agents to identify websites that are not the subject of a current investigation. ISPs that report into NCMEC will be advised of these websites and should block them.
Currently, NCMEC and the IWF do not share with each other the lists of child pornography websites that each has identified. Both organizations should do so and, if NCMEC requires statutory authority both to share and receive these lists, Congress should consider enacting such legislation.
ISPs in the United States should be encouraged to employ technology that allows them to block customer access to URLs containing child pornography images. In the U.K., ISPs and mobile phone companies use this technology to block a customer’s attempt to connect to certain URLs identified by the IWF as containing child pornography, regardless of where such websites are hosted.
The Department of Justice should explore working with NCMEC and its counterparts in international law enforcement to create a central database of website addresses and URLs that have been identified as containing images of child pornography. This central database should be continuously updated by the member countries as additional websites and URLs containing child pornography are identified, and these URLs and addresses should be shared with the ISPs of the member countries so that they may block access to those websites.
The proliferation of child pornography images on the Internet demonstrates this is a global problem, with the content originating in many different countries. Under the current U.S. code, NCMEC is not explicitly authorized to transmit images of child pornography to international law enforcement agencies. In order to facilitate the sharing of images among law enforcement necessary to identify and rescue children throughout the world, Congress should consider adding a provision to 42 U.S.C. § 13032, 42 U.S.C. § 5573, and other relevant statutes to explicitly authorize NCMEC for law enforcement purposes to share images contained in their database to law enforcement agents in other countries.
Many pedophiles collect “series” of child pornography images and these images are circulated around the world thousands if not millions of times. Further, pedophiles tend to build large collections of sexually exploitative images of children. It is critical that every feasible measure be taken to stop the transmission of these images.
Some ISPs are taking proactive measures to block known images of child pornography that they become aware of on their network. This is done by taking a hash mark (digital fingerprint) of the images; however, an ISP’s database of known images is only a fraction of the size of NCMEC’s database.
Under the current U.S. code, NCMEC is not explicitly authorized to share information embedded in the digital fingerprint of an image to any ISP reporting into the CyberTipline. Congress should consider amending 42 U.S.C § 13032, 42 U.S.C. § 5773, and other relevant statutes to grant explicit authorization for NCMEC to share the digital fingerprint of an apparent image of child pornography to ISPs that report into the CyberTipline. This will enable ISPs to block access to many more identified images of child pornography.
ISPs that report into the CyberTipline for law enforcement purposes should be granted a limited safe harbor provision for the “transmission” or “possession” of child pornography as it pertains to receiving digital fingerprint information from NCMEC and performing proactive measures on its network to block images of apparent child pornography.
Crimes involving the sexual exploitation of children, including child pornography, have long been a challenge for U.S. law enforcement. Until the advent of the Internet, the primary obstacle facing law enforcement agents investigating these cases was the sheer number of “purchasers” and “possessors” in the U.S. In addition, most of the producers of child pornography images were outside the United States, further hindering law enforcement agents’ investigations and prosecutions.
Despite these challenges, by the late 1980s, U.S. law enforcement was able to significantly reduce the creation and distribution of child pornography through the mails and other commercial avenues. These investigations were led by the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, who focused their efforts on vigilantly monitoring the U.S. mail system and engaging in aggressive border inspection of incoming materials. Law enforcement officials attributed their success, in large part, to the fact that those who desired to purchase or trade child pornography images were constricted to a limited, and largely underground, distribution network. Up until the mid-1990s, the primary means of transporting and obtaining images of child pornography was through the mail system; individuals who sought to obtain child pornography images typically did so by responding to mail solicitations and advertisements in the back of magazines or newspapers. The stigma attached to this criminal conduct also limited the commercial sources for child pornography because the “community” of pedophiles did not have an easy way to communicate and distribute images among themselves. In addition, most producers did not have the capability of developing photographs or film within the privacy of their home and were forced to go to brick and mortar businesses, further heightening the chances of law enforcement agents intercepting the images.
Law enforcement’s success in curbing child pornography during the 1980s was significantly bolstered by several Supreme Court decisions and by subsequent congressional legislation. In 1982, the U.S. Supreme Court held in New York v. Ferber1 that possession of child pornography is not entitled to First Amendment protection and may be criminalized. In Ferber, the Court recognized that the use of children as subjects of pornographic material has long term harmful effects on the physiological, emotional and mental health of the child. The Ferber decision triggered the passing of additional state and federal criminal statutes which criminalized possession, manufacturing, and distribution of child pornography. Eight years later, the Supreme Court held in Osborne v. Ohio2 that mere possession or viewing of child pornography may be criminalized.
Although considerable progress was made in preventing the distribution of child pornography images through the mails, by the 1980s and early 1990s, many pedophiles were already experimenting with the precursors to the World Wide Web,3 “newsgroups” and Internet Relay Channels (“IRC”), in order to communicate and facilitate buying, selling and trading of images. At that time, U.S. law enforcement agents were not yet focused on these methods of communication and distribution of child pornographic materials. The growing reliance on the Internet, as well as the development of digital cameras, resulted in a significant increase in the amount of child pornography images and in the number of participants in this criminal enterprise. There are three main reasons for this: (1) the Internet provides an anonymous and quick method of transporting images, particularly since broadband was introduced; (2) the Internet provides an anonymous forum for pedophiles to communicate and connect with one another; and (3) digital photographs preclude the need for going to a photography shop to have the photographs developed, hence making the transmission of the images more private.
Although it is impossible to know the exact number of child pornography images on the Internet, to date, the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children’s (“NCMEC”) Child Victim Identification Program (“CVIP”) has reviewed more than six million individual images related to apparent child pornography. NCMEC, as well as various U.S. law enforcement agencies, house a database of known apparent images of child pornography. The CVIP database is comprised, in part, of images submitted by United States law enforcement agencies. The purpose of this database is two-fold. First, the database can be used to determine if a child-victim has already been identified. Second, the database is used by U.S. law enforcement agents and prosecutors as a mechanism to establish whether the image is of a “real” child, as opposed to a virtual image.4 Currently, NCMEC has been able to identify and, with the assistance of law enforcement agents, rescue 880 minor children who were being subjected to sexually exploitative conduct.5
Just as the number of child pornography images available on the Internet has increased, the number of websites offering child pornography images is multiplying. Ernie Allen, President and Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”), of NCMEC, testified at the Subcommittee’s April 4, 2006 hearing, that NCMEC estimates there are 100,000 websites offering images of child pornography. Arnold Bell, who currently heads the FBI’s Innocent Images Unit, which is charged with investigating child pornography and child exploitation crimes on the Internet, testified that a search on Google using a single search term revealed 130,000 child pornography websites. The number of reports to NCMEC’s Cybertipline,6 the entity created by Congress that is responsible for gathering reports from Internet Service Providers and the public regarding Internet child pornography, further demonstrates the growth of the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet. In its first year of operation in 1998, the Cybertipline received 4,800 reports of child pornography. Since then, reports to the Cybertipline have increased almost 400 percent to approximately 385,000 total complaints. In 2004, the Cybertipline processed 112,000 reports. Currently, the Cybertipline handles an average of 1,500 reports a week of Internet child pornography.7
While the explosion in the number of reports to the Cybertipline is a reflection of the growth in online child pornography, that number necessarily underestimates the number of child pornography images that exist on the Internet as not all Internet Service Providers in the United States report to NCMEC the apparent images of child pornography they find on their systems. In fact, only 303 of the hundreds of ISPs operating in the United States are currently registered with and reporting to the Cybertipline. In addition, current federal law does not mandate that every entity that uncovers apparent images of child pornography on its networks or systems report them to NCMEC. Under 42 U.S.C. § 13032, only those companies who provide “electronic communication service[s]” or “remote computing service[s]” must report “known” images of “apparent” child pornography to the Cybertipline. Therefore, credit card companies, social networking websites, and cellular carriers who discover images of child pornography on their networks are not included in the mandatory reporting requirements of the statute, nor are they subject to any separate statutory reporting requirements. Also, under current law, ISPs and other related Internet providers are under no duty to proactively review or search their networks for images of apparent child pornography. Instead, current law only requires that they report apparent images of child pornography to NCMEC once they are made aware of them or otherwise discover them.
Not only has the Internet contributed to an increase in child abuse images, it has also influenced the content of those images. According to law enforcement agents, the vast proliferation of child pornography images has driven a demand for “new” images of child abuse, thereby perpetuating the sexual abuse of children. Experts in Internet child pornography cases have explained that constant exposure to pornographic images of children on the Internet desensitizes the viewer. This leads the viewer to seek more violent images of children being sexually abused and also to seek images of younger victims in order to gratify his desires. Consequently, NCMEC reported that 39 percent of those persons caught with images of child sexual abuse had images of children younger than six-years-old. In addition, NCMEC found that 19 percent of those persons arrested on child pornography charges between July 2000 and June 2001 possessed images of children younger than three-years-old.
As well as providing ready access to an increased number of child pornography images, the Internet has provided a new way for child predators and pedophiles to access their victims. Every day, more teenagers and children are online. The Pew Internet & American Life Project found in 2005 that 21 million teenagers now use the Internet, with 50 percent online daily. Teenagers not only “surf” the Internet, but they communicate with people they meet online through email, Instant Messaging services, and personal webpages on social networking websites such as MySpace, Xanga, or Facebook. Child predators often use these forms of communication to “groom” their potential child victims. By communicating with children regularly over the Internet, the child predator is able to befriend the child and make him or her comfortable with sharing personal information with someone he or she has not met face-to-face. Eventually, these communications can become sexual in nature, often as a precursor to asking the child to meet the predator or to share sexual images of herself or himself. In fact, NCMEC released a study in August 2006 that found that one in seven children from the ages of 10 to 17 years-old report that they have received a sexual solicitation from someone they met on the Internet.
Experts, including noted forensic pediatrician Dr. Sharon W. Cooper, agree that the physical and psychological harm suffered by the victims of Internet child pornography continues long after the abuse ends.8 In large part, this is because the image on the Internet exists in perpetuity, essentially re-abusing the child each time it is traded or sold and viewed by another pedophile. The image, which is essentially a crime scene, can never be destroyed or removed from the Internet, even if the perpetrator eventually goes to prison. The result is that the child is continually re-victimized each time someone clicks on his or her image, forwards it, or distributes it. This is the reason why victims of Internet child pornography like Masha Allen, a child victim who testified at the Subcommittee’s May 3, 2006 hearing, have pleaded for every effort to be made to prevent the distribution of child pornography images. As Ms. Allen stated in her testimony, the thing that upset her most about the abuse she suffered is that her images would be on the Internet “forever.”
The prevalence of online child pornography also has a distinct psychological impact on those who collect and possess it. According to psychologists who study the issue, individuals collect child pornography not only for sexual gratification but as a “plan for action.”9 A study conducted by Dr. Andres C. Hernandez and published in a poster presentation entitled “Self Reported Contact Sexual Offenses by Participants in the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Sex Offender Treatment Program: Implications for Sex Offenders” supports the notion that viewing child pornography is likely to lead to contact offenses involving a child. The study showed that, of the inmates who elected to participate in the Federal Bureau of Prisons Sex Offender Treatment Program, 76 percent of those who were convicted on charges related to Internet sex crimes, such as possession of child pornography or luring a child, had also committed sexual contact offenses against children. This conclusion was based on polygraph examinations of offenders who chose to enroll in Dr. Hernandez’s program. This link between viewing or possessing child pornography and molesting a child has been demonstrated in other studies as well, including one conducted by the United States Postal Inspection Service beginning in 1997. This study found that 33 percent of the 2,433 individuals arrested by USPIS agents since 1997 for using the U.S. mail and the Internet for the sexual exploitation of children had molested children. These findings are alarming and lend credence to the notice that exposure to images of child pornography can, in fact, create child molesters, and hence, result in more child-victims.10
Of additional concern is that commercial Internet child pornography has become a lucrative and growing business. Although it is impossible to pinpoint the revenue generated by an illegal business, such as commercial child pornography, some estimates indicate that commercial child pornography may generate billions of dollars a year in revenue.11 To evade detection by law enforcement agents, the payment schemes employed by commercial child pornography websites are increasingly complex and involve the use of digital and electronic currencies and other forms of barter. Those individuals who sell child pornography images often set up fictitious businesses in order to obtain a merchant account for credit card processing. The technology supporting these websites is equally sophisticated. It is not unusual for websites to be registered using fictitious names and to use servers in several different countries to host images, thereby making it extremely difficult for law enforcement agents to identify the responsible individuals. Even so, according to several reports published quarterly by the Internet Watch Foundation (“IWF”)12 in the United Kingdom, the United States appears to be hosting a majority of the child pornography content on the Internet. Law enforcement agents believe that this may be due to the fact that the United States has some of the fastest and most advanced Internet connectivity in the world, making U.S. servers especially appealing to commercial child pornography operators looking for servers to host their content. It is unclear, though, whether all of the websites that the IWF claims are hosted in the U.S. are, in fact, hosted here or whether a proxy server is being used. Currently, web hosting companies in the U.S. do not typically review any of the content on their servers nor do they report into NCMEC’s Cybertipline on a regular basis.13
Law enforcement agents at both the state and federal levels are working to combat the proliferation of sexually exploitative images of children over the Internet. In the U.S., there are four primary law enforcement agencies which investigate the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet. These agencies are: (1) the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”); (2) Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”); (3) the U.S. Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”) and (4) the Internet Crimes Against Children (“ICAC”) Task Forces. Currently, agents from each of these law enforcement agencies as well as the U.S. Marshals Service are assigned to NCMEC and assist in investigating the tips reported to the Cybertipline. All of these law enforcement entities have jurisdiction over cases involving the sexual exploitation of children; however, each has a primary mission and jurisdiction that dictates what types of cases the agents will work.
Within the FBI, the Innocent Images National Initiative is responsible for investigating Internet child pornography cases. Fifteen agents and 22 analysts are assigned to this unit, based in Calverton, Maryland. The FBI also has agents in field offices around the country that may be assigned a child sexual exploitation case, however, no field agents exclusively work on child sexual exploitation cases over the Internet. For cases with an international nexus, the Cyber Crimes Center of ICE has jurisdiction. Currently, 10 to 12 agents within the CyberCrimes Center are dedicated to investigating exclusively child exploitation crimes, and in the field, there are the equivalent of 221 ICE agents dedicated to Operation Predator cases, an initiative developed by the Department of Homeland Security and ICE to identify, investigate, and arrest child predators. Finally, 35 postal inspection agents are dedicated to investigating Internet child pornography cases that involve the use of the mails on a full-time basis.
On the state level, the ICACs are federally funded and trained state and local police officers dedicated to investigate crimes related to the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet. The ICACs are funded primarily through the Department of Justice’s Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention (“OJJDP”) and work cooperatively with their counterparts in federal law enforcement. During fiscal year 2006, Congress appropriated $14,315,00 to OJJDP for ICAC Task Force operations. In addition to ICAC trained officers, there are also many state and local law enforcement officers that work on online child sexual exploitation cases, both in proactive and reactive investigations.
Recently, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced a series of initiatives aimed at investigating and prosecuting the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet. In February 2006, Attorney General Gonzales announced “Project Safe Childhood.” The goal of the project is to coordinate efforts between state, local, and federal law enforcement authorities when investigating Internet crimes against children. On May 17, 2006, Attorney General Gonzales announced that Project Safe Childhood would be implemented on a national level. The initiative requires each United States Attorney to designate a Project Safe Childhood coordinator within two weeks and to begin meeting with local partners to develop a plan for their district within 90 days. In addition, U.S. Attorneys must partner with their local ICACs and federal law enforcement agents in order to increase federal involvement in child pornography cases and to train state and local enforcement and educate local communities.
On April 21, 2006, DOJ submitted proposed legislation to Congress to amend 42 U.S.C. § 13032. DOJ’s proposed amendment would triple the fines imposed on electronic communications services providers who knowingly and willfully fail to report to NCMEC’s Cybertipline, as required by 42 U.S.C. § 13032. Under the proposed legislation, delinquent providers would be assessed $150,000 for an initial violation and $300,000 for each subsequent violation. In addition to increasing fines for those who knowingly and willfully fail to report, on May 15, 2006, DOJ proposed a second piece of legislation that would impose fines on providers who negligentlyfail to report. The current statute requires that the provider “knowingly and willfully” failed to report. Under the proposed legislation, the provider would be fined $50,000 for the initial, negligent failure to report and $100,000 for each subsequent violation. Under the current statutory scheme, DOJ has never prosecuted a provider. Neither proposal was enacted by the House or Senate.
In January 2006, the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations initiated its investigation of the sexual exploitation of children over the Internet to examine the scope of the problem; the approach of law enforcement; the entities involved; and ways to prevent the proliferation of child pornography on the Internet. The investigation was prompted by an article in The New York Times by Kurt Eichenwald entitled “Through his Webcam, a Boy Joins a Sordid Online World.” The article featured the story of Justin Berry, now a 19-year-old young man. Beginning at the age of 13-years-old, Justin was repeatedly victimized by child predators who contacted him over the Internet when they saw his image on a webcam, which he had received as a free promotional gift to subscribers of Earthlink. In addition to describing the abuse he suffered at the hands of the individuals whom he met online, Justin also described how some of these individuals encouraged him and even assisted him in developing and operating commercial pornography websites featuring sexual images and videos of Justin. In that article, Justin also stated that he provided prosecutors in the Department of Justice’s Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section (“CEOS”), and the FBI with specific information about those individuals involved in the commercial child pornography business, including the names of the individuals who helped him host the websites and process payments. As a result of the information Justin voluntarily provided to DOJ, he was granted immunity. According to the article, Justin was concerned about how DOJ and the FBI handled the information that he provided to them about a commercial child pornography enterprise.
Based on the Committee’s jurisdiction over matters related to the Internet, telecommunications and consumer safety, Committee leadership instructed staff to review U.S. law enforcement efforts to combat online child pornography, the role of NCMEC as a conduit between law enforcement and private industry, and how private industry is responding to this threat against children over the Internet. As the extent of this criminal activity became clear, the investigation was expanded to include all methods by which the Internet was used in the sexual exploitation of children.