Suffering is inevitable- their suffering bad arguments ignore that eternal recurrence is the way it goes down- their attempts to give suffering a purpose reinscribe us to the Christian morality of the 1ac- kain 7 – Santa Clara profressor of

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Suffering is inevitable- their suffering bad arguments ignore that eternal recurrence is the way it goes down- their attempts to give suffering a purpose reinscribe us to the Christian morality of the 1ac-

Kain 7 – Santa Clara profressor of Philosophy

(Philip, Nietzsche, Eternal Recurrence, and the Horror of Existence The Nietzsche journal.)

We have seen that in Nietzsche's opinion we cannot bear meaningless suffering and so we give it a meaning. Christianity, for example, explains it as punishment for sin. Eternal recurrence, however, would certainly seem to plunge us back into meaningless suffering (WP 55). It implies that suffering just happens, it repeats eternally, it is fated. There is no plan, no purpose, no reason for it. Eternal recurrence would seem to rub our noses in meaningless suffering. In one sense this is perfectly correct. And Nietzsche does want to accept as much meaninglessness and suffering as he can bear (BGE 39, 225; WP 585a). Nevertheless, we must see that there is meaning here—it is just that it lies precisely in the meaninglessness. Embracing eternal recurrence means imposing suffering on oneself, meaningless suffering, suffering that just happens, suffering for no reason at all. But at the very same time, this creates the innocence of existence. The meaninglessness of suffering means the innocence of suffering. That is the new meaning that suffering is given. Suffering no longer has its old meaning. Suffering no longer has the meaning Christianity gave to it. Suffering can no longer be seen as punishment. There is no longer any guilt. There is no longer any sin. One is no longer accountable (TI "Errors" 8; HH 99). If suffering just returns eternally, if even the slightest change is impossible, how can one be to blame for it? How can one be responsible? It can be none of our doing. We are innocent. This itself could explain why one would be able to embrace eternal recurrence, love every detail of one's life, not wish to change a single moment of suffering. One would be embracing one's own innocence. One would be loving one's own redemption from guilt. Eternal recurrence brings the Übermensch as close as possible to the truth, meaninglessness, the void, but it does not go all the way or it would crush even the Übermensch. Eternal recurrence gives the Übermensch meaning. It eliminates emptiness. It fills the void. With what? It fills it with something totally familiar and completely known; with something that is in no way new, different, or strange; with something that is not at all frightening. It fills the void with one's own life—repeated eternally. It is true that this life is a life of suffering, but (given the horror of existence) suffering cannot be avoided anyway, and at least suffering has been stripped of any surplus suffering brought about by concepts of sin, punishment, or guilt. It has been reduced to a life of innocence. Moreover, as Nietzsche has said, it is only meaningless suffering that is the problem. If given a meaning, even suffering becomes something we can seek (GM III:28). Eternal recurrence, the fatedness of suffering, its meaningless repetition, makes our suffering innocent. That might well be reason enough to embrace it. Or, although we may not be able to embrace it ourselves, I think we can at least see why Nietzsche might—and even why it might make sense for him to do so. [End Page 59] Eternal recurrence also gives suffering another meaning. If one is able to embrace eternal recurrence, if one is able to turn all "it was" into a "thus I willed it," then one not only reduces suffering to physical suffering, breaks its psychological stranglehold, and eliminates surplus suffering related to guilt, but one may even in a sense reduce suffering below the level of physical suffering. One does not do this as the liberal, socialist, or Christian would, by changing the world to reduce suffering. In Nietzsche's opinion that is impossible, and, indeed, eternal recurrence of the same rules it out—at least as any sort of final achievement.23 Rather, physical suffering is reduced by treating it as a test, a discipline, a training, which brings one greater power. One might think of an athlete who engages in more and more strenuous activity, accepts greater and greater pain, handles it better and better, and sees this as a sign of greater strength, as a sign of increased ability. Pain and suffering are turned into empowerment. Indeed, it is possible to love such suffering as a sign of increased power. One craves pain—"more pain! more pain!" (GM III:20). And the more suffering one can bear, the stronger one becomes. If suffering is self-imposed, if the point is to break the psychological stranglehold it has over us, if the point is to turn suffering into empowerment, use it as a discipline to gain greater strength, then it would be entirely inappropriate for us to feel sorry for the sufferer. To take pity on the sufferer either would demonstrate an ignorance of the process the sufferer is engaged in, what the sufferer is attempting to accomplish through suffering, or would show a lack of respect for the sufferer's suffering (GS 338; D 135). To pity the sufferer, to wish the sufferer did not have to go through such suffering, would demean the sufferer and the whole process of attempting to gain greater strength through such suffering.

The 1ACs astrofuturist policy is a protest of their present condition, creating a utopia in opposition to the world as it exists

Kilgore 3 - Associate Professor of English and American and Cultural Studies at Indiana University.

(De Witt Douglas Kilgore, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003, “Astrofuturism: Science, Race, and Visions of Utopia in Space,” Print)

However disparate their political agendas, all astrofuturists are unreconciled to the moment of their production, the world as it exists now. Their futures can be treated, according to Peggy Deamer’s characterization of utopian thought, as “not a guide to the future but a protest of the present.” Whether their disease is caused by irritation with the welfare state (Pournelle), discontent with what architectural critics and urban sociologists call “the malling of America” (O’Neill), exasperation with the limit-to-growth thesis (Bova), a rejection of the direction and methods of late capitalism (Robinson), or a desire to intervene against institutional arrangements around race and gender (McIntyre), their political and technical solution to discontent is the human expansion into space. This prospect provides astrofuturism’s fundamental rationale and shapes its character as an expression of contemporary American though. Whatever the particular political persuasion of a futurist, astrofuturist fictions inevitably present new societies that result from advances in knowledge most readily evident in technoscientific achievements. Indeed, advances in science and technology are the catalysts that prompt social and political experimentation. This characteristic alerts us to the genre’s affiliation with the technological utopianism that Howard Segal identifies as a persistent feature of American thought.

Ressentiment destroys the ability to value human life- makes their impacts inevitable.

Nietzsche 87 [“Genealogy of Morals”, second essay “Guilt…” pg. 497 in “The Basic Writings of Nietzsche”]

How can one create a memory for the human animal? How can one impress something upon this partly obtuse, partly flighty mind, attuned only to the passing moment, in such a way that it will stay there? One can well believe that the answers and methods for solving this primeval problem were not precisely gentle perhaps indeed’ there was nothing more fearful and uncanny in the whole prehistory of man than his mnemotechnics. “If something is to stay in the memory it must be burned in: only that which never ceases to hurt stays in the memory”—this is a main clause of the oldest (unhappily also the most enduring) psychology on earth. One might even say that wherever on earth solemnity, seriousness, mystery, and gloomy coloring still distinguish the life of man and a people, something of the terror that formerly attended all promises, pledges, and vows on earth is still effective: the past, the longest, deepest and sternest past, breathes upon us and rises up in us whenever we become “serious.” Man could never do without blood, torture, and sacrifices when he felt the need to create a memory for himself; the most dreadful sacrifices and pledges (sacrifices of the first-born among them), the most repulsive mutilations (castration, for example), the cruelest rites of all the religious cults (and all religions are at the deepest level systems of cruelties) —all this has its origin in the instinct that realized that pain is the most powerful aid to mnemonics. In a certain sense, the whole of asceticism belongs here; a few ideas are to be rendered inextinguishable, ever-present, unforgettable, “fixed,” with the aim of hypnotizing the entire nervous and intellectual system with these “fixed ideas”—and ascetic procedures and modes of life are means of freeing these ideas from the competition of all other ideas, so as to make them “unforgettable.” The worse man’s memory has been, the more fearful has been the appearance of his customs; the severity of the penal code provides an especially significant measure of the degree of effort needed to overcome forgetfulness and to impose a few primitive demands of social existence as present realities upon these slaves of momentary affect and desire.

The ballot’s scholarly obligation is to reject the 1AC to drop the veil of utopia in order to affect true policymaking

Kilgore 3 - Associate Professor of English and American and Cultural Studies at Indiana University.

(De Witt Douglas Kilgore, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2003, “Astrofuturism: Science, Race, and Visions of Utopia in Space,” Print)
Haraway and Jenkins represent a cultural studies methodology that eschews condescending to popular culture or to the people who produce and consume it. Their approach is controversial, for the scholar who uses it is encouraged not to hide his own taste preferences or political commitments. The resulting scholarship has to drop the veil of scientific objectivity and account for its own investments. The scholar must leave the safety of a grand tradition and expose himself to often nasty debates about the kinds of questions a discipline asks, the ideas it considers valuable, and the people it deems worth of attention. To be sure, this is not new. It is not history but nostalgia that assumes that politics and special pleadings have only recently become a part of the academic’s stock in trade.
The affirmative is engrained in a hegemonic power struggle – the obligation to solve the harms of the 1AC reinvigorates the slave morality complex – their stance of power creates a dichotomy between “we” the good and anyone else as the “evil” other.

Hunt 06 – Professor @ University of Wisconsin–Madison

(Lester, “Thus Spake Howard Roark: Nietzschean Ideas in The Fountainhead”,1946, Philosophy and Literature, Volume 30, Number 1, April 2006, pp. 79-101 (Article)HGArReTt)

Nietzsche presents his discussion of the these two types of thinking in morals as a theory of the early development, the pre-history so to speak, of human thought about ethical matters, but he is interested in it mainly as a way of assessing the value of the ways in which people think and act today. Master morality is Nietzsche’s name for the ethi- cal valuations of various early warrior-elites, such as those represented by the principal characters in Homer. The “good” in this sort of ethic is a certain type of person, while the “bad” is simply the person who lacks the characteristics that distinguish the good. “Good” in this way of thinking is logically prior to “bad,” it is the “positive basic concept.” The good, moreover, is what the members of such an elite take themselves to be: they are the source from which their conception of the good is derived. The good are simply those who resemble themselves, “we the noble ones, we good, beautiful, happy ones” (GM I, 10). Truthfulness is an attribute of the good because they themselves are the truthful ones. For the same reason, untruthfulness, the trait of the lying common man, is identified as an attribute of the “bad” (GM I, 5). Such is the fundamental idea of master morality. In the case of slave morality, on the other hand, it is a negative valuation, a “No” which is “its creative deed”: slave morality from the outset says No to what is “outside,” what is “different,” what is “not itself.” This fact, as Nietzsche describes it, is closely related to the fact that it is based on a state of mind he calls (using a French word) resentiment. This is the state of mind of someone who has a reason to have some negative reaction toward another person, but who (as in the case of people who literally are slaves) “are denied the true reaction, that of deeds, and compensate themselves with an imaginary revenge” (GM I, 10). The “creative deed” of this sort of moral- ity occurs when “the hatred, the vengefulness of the impotent” finds that it must disfigure one’s opponent “in effigie,” by interpreting their distinctive traits as evil: here the logically basic moral concept is that of “the evil enemy,” “the evil one.” From this “basic concept” one derives “as an afterthought and pendant, the concept of a “good one.” Just as, in master morality, the bad is conceived in terms of the good, so in slave morality the good is conceived in terms of the evil. Thus the traits that make up the “good” in this code of values are simply characteristics that someone in the position of a slave must inevitably have, but interpreted in a such a way as to emphasize and valorize the absence of the power that distinguishes the masters: “impotence” is interpreted as “goodness of heart,” “anxious lowliness” as “humility,” “subjection to those one hates” as “humility,” and “the inoffensiveness of the weak man, . . . his being ineluctably compelled to wait” becomes “patience.” In a word: “Weakness is being lied into something meritorious” (GM I 14). The reason why Nietzsche prefers the noble point of view to the slav- ish one is not that one is self-serving or self-celebrating and the other is not. On his view, both these moralities can be characterized in roughly this way. For both the master and slave types, the notion of “the good” is a flattering self-portrait. Nor does the reason for Nietzsche’s rank- ing of the two moralities lie (simply) in the fact that the slave morality substitutes thought and feeling for actions. It is obvious that there are situations where such a response is superior to that of taking action. Again, the reason is not that slave-morality is deluded about the nature of its opponent, in that the notion of “evil” is a caricature of the master. Nietzsche insists that “the noble mode of valuation” similarly “blunders and sins against reality” in its view of the other: which in its case is the “bad” common people (GM I, 10). The principal reason why Nietzsche holds that the noble mode of valuation is nonetheless the superior is one that might seem counter- intuitive at first. It is however, the fundamental difference between the two positions. It is to be found in the way in which slave morality begins with a response to the other: This inversion of the value-positing eye—the need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself—is of the essence of resentiment: in order to exist, slave morality always first needs a hostile external world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all—its action is fundamentally reaction. (GM I 10) Why does Nietzsche think that the fact that slave morality is directed “outward” supports his low evaluation of it? The answer to this question is not entirely clear. We can, however, get an idea of the broad outlines of the answer if we look once more, and more closely, at Nietzsche’s idea of power. The answer has to do with the relation between what I have called the dynamic and hegemonic aspects of power—or, more precisely, with the reason why he regards the hegemonic element as indispensable to the whole. At one point he denounces what he calls “the democratic idiosyncrasy which opposes everything that dominates and wants to dominate, the modern misarchism” on the grounds that it has had a certain detrimental effect on the “physiology and theory of life,” namely that it, has robbed it of a fundamental concept, that of activity. Under the influence of the above-mentioned idiosyncracy, one places instead “adap- tation” in the foreground, that is to say, an activity of the second rank, a mere reactivity. . . . Thus the essence of life, its will to power, is ignored; one overlooks the essential priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive, form-giving forces that give new interpretations and directions, although “adaptation” follows only from this. . . . (GM II 12) There are a number of ideas tangled together in this interesting pas- sage, and a complete discussion of the possible connections between them would take me too far afield. Three things do seem to be clear enough, though. First, Nietzsche thinks that the claim that a given sort of activity consists in reacting to stimuli implies that it embodies a lower amount of power than activity that does not have this character. Second, the reason for this, he believes, is that insofar as activity is a reaction to external factors, the hegemonic element of power is lacking or relatively unimportant. Finally, he thinks that activity that does have this element will be “spontaneous.” This last idea figures prominently in his discussion of the difference between master morality and slave morality. Immediately after he says that slave morality evinces “the need to direct one’s view outward instead of back to oneself” he says that the “reverse is the case with the noble mode of valuation: it acts and grows spontaneously, it seeks its opposite only so as to affirm itself more gratefully and triumphantly” (GM I, 10). What we have just seen is that there are several distinctively Nietzschean ideas connecting these two features of the two contrasting moral codes, the outward-directedness of slave morality and the spontaneity of master morality. An intuitively appealing way to state the connection might be this.10 What slave morality does, it does because of what master morality does. On the other hand, what the masters do is done because of their own nature, and not because of what the slaves do. Their actions flow freely from the internal nature of the agent, unelicited by factors external to the self. In this freedom from such external factors lies its spontaneity. I will return to all this eventually, but we are now in a position to take another look at what happens to these ideas in The Fountainhead.

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