The purpose of this file is so that we can control the impacts read in any given round. While it’s true in many cases that the 1AC will probably outweigh the disad simply because the 1AC has more impacts, it’s always a safer bet if the DA doesn’t have an impact at all, or vice versa when you’re neg, you will probably want to mitigate the impacts of the aff’s advantages. This is updated from the file that was put together at the beginning of the year and has an index based off of the index for Emory’s impact file, courtesy of William Rains. It is alphabetized, to make things easy to find, and you might just want to read through the index so that you know what impact answers you have. Note: this file is large and cumbersome, and it might be to each team’s individual advantage to make their own condensed version of this file for their own use of impact that they want, and then print that, keeping the rest on computer to both save paper, and increase organization, in fact, if I were you, I would choose my 31 favorite impacts and put them into a file, and then expando it. For that matter, this is what I would take:
6. Deficits 17. Middle East War 27. Terrorism (put nuclear terror in the same pocket)
7. Democracy 18. Oil Peak 28. U.S. China War
8. Disease Spread 19. Overpopulation 29. U.S. North Korea War
9. Economy 20. Patriarchy 30. U.S. Russian War
10. Free Trade 21. Poverty 31. WTO
11. Global Warming Anyway, enjoy and take out some impacts!
AT: Accidental Launch/Nuclear War
1. No risk of accidental/unauthorized war.
Dr. Leonid Ryabikhin, General (Ret.) Viktor Koltunov and Dr. Eugene Miasnikov, June 2009. Senior Fellow at the EastWest Institute; Deputy Director, Institute for Strategic Stability of Rosatom; and Senior Research Scientist, Centre for Arms Control, Energy, and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology. “De-alerting: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Strategic Nuclear Forces,” Discussion paper presented at the seminar on “Re-framing De Alert: Decreasing the Operational Readiness of Nuclear Weapons Systems in the U.S.-Russia Context,” www.ewi.info/system/files/RyabikhinKoltunovMiasnikov.pdf.
Analysis of the above arguments shows, that they do not have solid grounds. Today Russian and U.S. ICBMs are not targeted at any state. High alert status of the Russian and U.S. strategic nuclear forces has not been an obstacle for building a strategic partnership. The issue of the possibility of an “accidental” nuclear war itself is hypothetical. Both states have developed and implemented constructive organizational and technical measures that practically exclude launches resulting from unauthorized action of personnel or terrorists. Nuclear weapons are maintained under very strict system of control that excludes any accidental or unauthorized use and guarantees that these weapons can only be used provided that there is an appropriate authorizationby the national leadership. Besides that it should be mentioned that even the Soviet Union and the United States had taken important bilateral steps toward decreasing the risk of accidental nuclear conflict. Direct emergency telephone “red line” has been established between the White House and the Kremlin in 1963. In 1971 the USSR and USA signed the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Nuclear War Threat. ThisAgreement established the actions of each side in case of even a hypothetical accidental missile launch and it contains the requirements for the owner of the launched missile to deactivate and eliminate the missile. Both the Soviet Union and the United States have developed proper measures to observe the agreed requirements.
2. Unpredictable timeframe – accidental launch might not happen for years – it might never happen – prefer our impacts
3. No need to de-alert --- systems stable.
William J. Perry and James R. Schlesinger et al, 2009. Former Secretary of Defense, Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor at Stanford University, senior fellow at FSI and serves as co-director of the Preventive Defense Project, and former Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Counselor to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, lecturer @ SAIS, Johns Hopkins University, PhD International Relations @ UPenn. “America’s Strategic Posture,” Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, media.usip.org/reports/strat_posture_report.pdf.
The second is de-alerting. Some in the arms control community have pressed enthusiastically fornew types of agreements that take U.S. and Rus- sian forces off of so-called “hair trigger” alert. This is simply an erroneous characterization of the issue. The alert postures of both countries are in fact highly stable. They are subject to multiple layers of control, ensuring clear civilian and indeed presidential decision-making. The proper focus really should be on increasing the decision time and information available to the U.S. president—and also to the Russian president—before he might autho- rize a retaliatory strike. There were a number of incidents during the Cold War when we or the Russians received misleading indications that could have triggered an accidental nuclear war. With the greatly reduced tensions of today, such risks now seem relatively low. The obvious way to further reduce such risks is to increase decision time for the two presidents. The President should ask the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command to give him an analysis of factors affecting the decision time available to him as well as recommendations on how to avoid being put in a position where he has to make hasty decisions. It is important that any changes in the decision process preserve and indeed enhance crisis stability.