Cities, Vol. 19. No. 2, pp. 95-103, 2002; see also A. Bertaud, “Land Management in Bangalore” (2003).
27 Source: Bangalore Metropolitan Transport Corporation, Annual Administrative Report 2002-2002. The feasibility study was partially funded by Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency. It was carried out by Contrans (Sweden) and Central Institute of Road Transport (Pune). An executive summary is on www.sida.se/articles.
28 See Barter et al., “Lessons from Asia on Sustainable Urban Transport” (2003).
29 It is noted that it took 23 years to build 16.5 km of metro in Kolkata. Its current traffic is 55.8 million per annum (compare to the forecast of 630.1 million made in 1971) and the cost recovery is 38% of working expenses. Source: Y.P. Singh, “Peformance of the Kolkata Metro” 2002). Similarly, it took 15 years to build the first 8.6 km of the MRTS in Chennai and that it carries 9,000 passengers per day (3.3 million annually) with very low cost recovery.
30 It may also have to do with the importance of Indian Railways and the fact that their consulting wing (RITES) has a leading role in city studies. This is also true of bus rapid transit. The Bangalore study cited above was commissioned by BMTC (a bus company) and linked to Swedish bus industry. This is said without any reference to the technical quality of these studies.
31 The private group was headed by United Breweries. Studies related to this proposal have not been made public.
32 There are exceptions, including the Bangalore LRT study cited here. See Anantharamaiah and Raman “A probabilistic revenue estimation model for providing a mass rapid transit system” (2002).
33 CMDA has at least attempted to do so, though the result is far from comprehensive. In Bangalore, the severe fragmentisation of institutions is a formidable obstacle to both developing a strategy and implementing it.
34 The term “funding” refers to the techno-political process in which investment options are generated and evaluated as an input to decision making.
35 The existing proposals are based on operation by MTCs. The strategy proposed in this report would involve a public-private partnership, with a service concession. The project would include a feeder distributor systems. The model for this approach is Transmilenio in Bogota (Colombia).
37 Source: Wilbur Smith, Study on Parking Requirements for Chennai Metropolitan Area, Interim Report, August 2003.
38 Source: Tamil Nadu Road Sector Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report 25056-IN, The World Bank, May 20, 2003
39 This refers to the area within the boundary of Chennai Municipal Corporation. Most population and area citations are from Master Plan for Madras Metropolitan Area – 2011, Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, July 1995, with newer numbers culled from diverse documents. The sources often confuse estimates from various censuses and sample surveys with forecasts made at different times from these estimates. An update of travel information is currently underway.
40 The web site (http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/urbscene/index.htm) maintained by the Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation, cites a population of 6.42 million, based on the 2001 census, but it does not say exactly which boundary this number refers to.
41 This is based on the decade growth rate of 9.76% (1991-2001) reported in SBI report on Bangalore.
42 Compare this to Bangalore at 113 people/ha, Moscow at 169, Paris at 85 and Shanghai at 303. The last three use consistent measurement criteria, which is not the case with Chennai and Bangalore data. Source: Alain Bertaud, “Metropolis: A Measure of the Spatial Organization of 7 Large Cities”, unpublished manuscript, 21 April 2001
43 Source: www.BombayFirst.org. Lall et al in “Diversity Matters“ (2003) cite a nationwide average annual wage of Rs.60,000, but Rs.74,000 for urban areas in 1998-99. The range was from Rs.41,000 in the leather industry to Rs.110,000 in electronics and computers.
45 A more detailed description is given below. This paragraph provides only the bare essentials needed to understand the demand (modal split and motorization) aspects covered in this section.
46Source: “Comprehensive Traffic and Transportation Study for Madras Metropolitan Area” RITES, Pallavan and Kirloskar Consultants for Madras Metropolitan Development Authority, September 1995. Household survey data appear to have been collected in 1992. Sea also Rajan et al, “Joint Venture of State and National Governments in Developing Rail Facilities: a Case Study of Chennai, India”, 1998
47In addition, modal splits in Chennai are distorted by both MTC and commuter rail lines having to operate under strong capacity constraints and non-existent coordination in terms of fare and access arrangements. CMDA sources cite the modal share of “private modes” as being 58% in 2002, without stating the source or providing the definition of private modes.
48 Source of data for Chennai City and the state: courtesy Transport Department, Government of Tamil Nadu. In the same year (2003), there were 6.2 million vehicles registered in the state, of which about 5.1 million 2-wheelers and 0.6 million passenger cars. A full time series 1995-2003 is available for the state.
49The web site of India Petroleum Institute cites the following motorization levels in Chennai, drawn from a study by the Central Road Research Institute 238,000 cars, 949,000 motorized 2-wheelers, and 5,000 buses. The year is not given.
50Source: Annex 6B, Route Rationalization Study for Metropolitan Transport Corporation, Chennai Metropolitan Area, Draft Final Report, Pallavan Consultancy Services, September 2001. The survey covered 18,300 passengers, but only 2,033 answered the income-related questions.
51 Source: Impact of road transportation systems on energy and environment – an analysis of metropolitan cities of India, Tata Energy Research Group, 1993. For Bangalore, this study gives the following data: households with monthly incomes up to Rs.500, 29% owned motorized 2-wheelers, and 71% owned bicycles; for incomes between 500 and 1,500 Rs. 47% owned a bike, another 47% owned a motorized 2-wheeler and 7% owned a car; in the group earning Rs.1,500-3,000, 31% owned a bike only, 60% owned a motorized 2-wheeler, and 9% owned a car. Over Rs.3,000, 37% owned a car, 45% owned a motorized 2-wheeler, and 18% owned a bike only. Given rapid growth of the economy of Bangalore, the absolute values of these income brackets are not comparable with those cited in the text.
52 Source of vehicles per day cited in this paragraph is the CMDA document entitled “Investment Plan for Transport Infrastructure in CMA” (undated, circa March 2003).
53 Source: Chennai Traffic Police, “Steps taken …”, July 2003.
54 A comprehensive study of parking in Chennai Metropolitan Area, including the development of standards, policies and regulative framework, is being carried out by Wilbur Smith Associates. Numbers cited in this paragraph come from early reports from the study team.
55 This is comparable to 2,103 buses that CMTC had in 1982-83, and about twice the fleet at the founding. The population of Chennai increased 29% between 1981 and 2001. Source: Pallavan Transport Consultants, Route Rationalization Study, MTC Chennai, 2001.
56 This is a residual of a Rs.1,540 million (about US$40 million at that time) project for a 6.5 km rapid busway on the same street, which was developed to the stage of detailed design in the late 1990s, but was stopped before tendering because the funding agreement broke down. See V. Thamizh Arasan (2000) for additional details.
57 Source for this number is direct communication with Southern Railway. Their web site cites a 2002-2003 traffic of 223.6 million per year, which is the number used to calculate the passenger density/km.
58 The fact that two transport organizations, both public-owned and both subsidized, compete for passengers, is indicative of weak metropolitan-level transport institutions.
59 Direct operating costs include all wages, energy, parts and services, but do not include depreciation and financial costs. Cost recovery of total operating costs could be of the order of 30% or less.
60 Source: Chennai Metropolitan Development Authority, Draft Annual Report 2000-2001, p. 36-37. The source states only the aggregate nominal construction cost. Since exchange rates varied significantly over this long construction period, it is necessary to have the exact expenditure pattern (e.g. semi-annual or annual payments) to recalculate the total in constant 1980 terms.
61 Source: Rajan et al, Joint Venture of State and National Governments …” p. 326
62 These are 2002-2003 data obtained directly from the Southern Railway. Other sources cited 7,000 passengers per day in 2001, with subsequent increases of as much as 50% on monthly basis, in late 2002, due to bus strikes and fare hikes, reflecting a high price elasticity of demand.
63 Source: “On the wrong track”, The Hindu, 28 September 2003. In 2002, CMDA commissioned a study addressing the potential for densification of the MRTS Phase I corridor: L&T Ramboll Consulting Engineers, Final Report for the Densification Study, July 2003.
64 Another CMDA brochure cites a higher construction cost forecast for Phase II, Rs.6.89 billion (US$143.5 million; $12.82 million per route-km).
65 Ministry of Railways is by law responsible for all rail based systems, national and metropolitan. The budget for the MRTS in Chennai was not processed as a separate project but as a part of the Ministry of Railway’s budget. See Rajan et al (1998), p. 323.
66 Elsewhere in recommendations (CTTS, Final Report, p. 171), busways were proposed not only on Anna Salai, but also on Inner Ring Road between St. Thomas Mount and Koyambedu/Anna Nagar, and on EVR Periyar Salai. For reasons not explained in the text, only Anna Salai busway was tested as part of five alternative long-term packages.
67 MRTS Phase I had not yet been completed when these recommendations were made. The Final Report does not cite any standard economic indicators.
68 The conversion of current rupees into US$ is done uniformly using an exchange rate of Rs.48 per dollar.
69 The most recent development, not a part of CTTS recommendations, is a proposal to construct a metro roughly in the Anna Salai corridor. This is a part of the forward wave spreading from an apparently successful financial arrangement to construct the Delhi metro. The same venture produced a proposal for a metro in Bangalore, and is now reported to be in negotiations with the state government to carry out a feasibility study for Chennai.
70 CMDA’s document Investment Plan for Transport Infrastructure in CMA is unpublished and undated.
71 Source for this growth rate: Karnataka Economic Restructuring Loan, Aide-Mémoire of the Appraisal Mission, The World Bank, April 23, 2001 (p.5).
72 Source: Mathew Joseph, “Performance of the Southern States – A Comparative Study”, Economic and Political Weekly, September 13, 2003.
73 A report from Karnataka road Development Corporation cites 4.3 million.
74 The web site (http://urbanindia.nic.in/mud-final-site/urbscene/index.htm) maintained by the Ministry of Urban Development and Poverty Alleviation, cites a population of 5.7 million, based on the 2001 census, but it does not say exactly which boundary this number refers to. Another source (unpublished SBI report Sept 2002) cites 6.5 million taken from the site censusindia.net. The implication is that this is the population within BMDA’s jurisdiction.
75 Alain Bertaud, “Bangalore Land Management”, 1993. Still, the last traffic study estimated that the central area attracted 50% of all trips in 1998 (CRRI et al, 1999).
76 Source: Benjamin, “Governance, economic settings and poverty in Bangalore”, p. 36.
77 Source: Suprya Roy Chowdhury, Old Classes and New Spaces: Urban Poverty, Unorganised Labour and New Unions”, Economic and Political Weekly, December 13, 2003. Anther source cites an older estimate by Karnataka Slum Clearance Board of about 400 slums and 0.5 million slum dwellers. See Vagale “Bangalore: A Garden City in Distress” (1998).
78 Source: www.bombayfirst.org. Compare to the 2002 average annual consumption of Rs 30,735 (about US$640 per capita) cited in: Somik Lall et al (2002) and Uwe Deichmann et al (2003). The median annual consumption was lower, 20,867 rupees ($435) per capita. The tails of the distribution were at 4,000 rupees and 140,000 rupees. Bertaud and Brueckner (April 2003) report a 1999 per capita income in Bangalore of Rs 28,300. They also cite an average household consumption level of Rs 46,400 for urban India in 1999-2000.
79 Source: Bangalore Mass Rapid Transit Ltd, presentation to the World Bank, November 2003. The total estimated number of daily trips was 5,852,000 indicating very low mobility. Some other sources cite the bus share to be 55-60% of all trips longer than 1 km. There have been no large-scale household travel surveys in Bangalore for many years, so all demand estimates are weak.
80 Sources disagree on those numbers and use different categories. This table is based mostly on numbers provided by Bangalore Mass Rapd Transit Ltd., dated November 2003. The web site of India Petroleum Institute cites the following motorization levels in Bangalore, drawn from a study by the Central Road Research Institute 234,000 cars, 1,162,000 motorized 2-wheelers, and 35,000 buses. The year is not given. Bangalore City Traffic Police cites a number of 1,750,000 motor vehicles in 2002. They forecast that this will double by year 2011. Karnataka Road Development Corporation cites 993,250 vehicles in 1996 and 1,438,057 vehicles in 2000, implying a growth rate of 9.7% per annum.
82 Source: presentation by Bangalore Rapid Transit LTD, November 2003. The number of fatalities, cited elsewhere, is a coarse estimate. The proportion of pedestrians as victims of fatal accidents is from Reddy and Ramakrishna “Individual modes: efficiency or illusion, A Case of Bangalore City” (2002). For the State of Karnataka, the number of fatalites is about 18 people per 10,000 vehicles registered, which is very high (compare US at 3.2; Malaysia at 5.5; Lao PDR at 15). Source: PAD, Karnataka State Highway Improvement Project, Project Appraisal Document, Report No. 21850-IN, The World Bank, April 23, 2001.
83 In the course of writing this report, no document was found which summarizes what has been done since 1999. In one unpublished source dated 2002, it was reported that HUDCO was planning to lend to Bangalore for another 28 flyovers. Bangalore Municipal Corporation was planning in 1999 to float a bond to finance road improvements. No mention of this bond was found in later years.
84 The amount accumulated by the end of 2002-2003 fiscal year was about Rs 4 billion (US$ 83 million).
85 See footnote re inclusion of risk in the section on metros in the main report.
86 The financial report was not available for this report, so the degree of coverage of depreciation by fare revenue is not available.